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Abstract
 
In this overheated world, where children from the highest-scoring countries 
on the Human Development Index are on regular school strikes to cry for 
help - it is high time to ask what philosophy and education can learn from 
children and childhood. The scope of this work is - arriving at, asking and 
then attempting to answer the question: What is the scope for the philoso-
phical blossoming of adults when they enter children’s playfully constructed 
worlds as guests?
Through a hybridic, nomadic phenomenological investigation - by 
muddling through with Sungjae, Enaya, (Baby) Ole, Emma, Captain Duke, 
Finn, Thor, Amelie, Gullveig and Aida, I found that there is a vast scope 
for adults to blossom philosophically with children as their primary philo-
sophical guides. For this however, the adult view of what constitutes the 
form of philosophising must be surrendered. Childism proposes that we 
view philosophy as play and play as philosophy. By play, I mean something 
akin to the Norwegian verb å leke or the Portuguese verb brincar. In doing 
so - ignorance, incompleteness and immaturity of the embodied adult is 
unveiled, whereby the epistemological authority of the everyday adult phi-
losopher simply dissolves. Subsequently, philosophising itself becomes a 
process of muddling through the mysterious. 
When children play/philosophise - they perform embodied thought 
experiments in motion in a way that brings counter-factual spatio-tempo-
ralities into the horizons of the particular lived experience of the moment. 
Philosophising/Playing with (Norwegian: hos/ German: bei) children requires 
us to slow down, scale down and cool down more often than one currently 
manages. In doing so, one can start nearing the possibility of - preparing 
for unpredictable futures and shouldering responsibilities in the face of the 
greatest challenges of the overheated world. For adults in highest-scoring 
nations on the Human Development Index, this is a more realistic possibility 
than those in the majority world. And it need not cost much.
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General Introduction
This dissertation constitutes a philosophical journey into the richness that 
children can offer adults, in order to overcome their own conceptual limit-
ations and blossom philosophically. The core investigational process unfol-
ded in the cosmopolitan Norwegian city of Trondheim with the generous 
companionship of some of its child-citizens. Without an intimate relating 
in those familial contexts, a work like this would not have been possible. 
But the pre-conditions, conditions and meandering trajectories of the 
specific routes that led to the realisation of this project have the vulnerable 
interdependent characteristic of my changing geographical and theoretical 
positionalities in relation to the worlds within which words make sense. The 
birth of the central research question arises out of the embodied mind that 
arrived at articulating it in oral and written language. 
 What is the scope for the philosophical blossoming of adults when they 
enter children’s playfully constructed worlds as guests?
I did not simply wake up one day in Germany, go to my desk at the Depart-
ment of Education at the University of Bayreuth and write down that question. 
I arrived at it as an embodied mind, pre-captivated by the pedagogy of 
philosophy in what anthropologist and public thinker Thomas Hylland 
Eriksen termed - an asymmetrically overheated world (Eriksen 2016). The 
pre-captivation occurred in India where I studied and taught philosophy. 
How come an embodied mind, pre-positioned in Asia, ends up at a desk in 
Europe writing a central question that unfolded in a cosmopolitan fjord city 
in Scandinavia? Why is a question concerning pedagogy directed towards 
the adult and not the child? 
The theoretical turning towards childism (Wall 2012; 2019) through the 
meandering trajectories that influenced the directedness of questioning, 
was an organic part of this project. The childist perspective is both a result, 
as well as the condition for arriving at, asking and then attempting to answer 
this central question. 
Childism is the effort to reimagine and practice child-inclusive social 
processes and structures (Wall 2012:136: 2019). Among else, it aims at 
treating children as scholarly and democratic subjects, insofar as this is 
possible (ibid.), and emerges from the interdisciplinary movement in social 
sciences called childhood studies (James, Jenks & Prout 1998; Spyrou et al 
2018). Childhood has mostly been seen as a feature of parental (or solely 
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maternal) discourse, or the currency of educators or the sole property of 
developmental psychology (James, Jenks & Prout 1998; Tatlow-Golden & 
Montgomery 2020). Since its onset in the late 20th century, the discipline of 
childhood studies has been committed to seeking new possibilities in the 
face of dogmatic reassertions about the temporal other of adulthood (James, 
Jenks & Prout 1998; Spyrou 2018; in italics Beauvais 2018). Just as childhood 
has been seen as a feature of parental discourse or the currency of educators, 
the question ‘what is a child?’ as a foundational question for the philosophy of 
childhood, has been subsumed by the philosophy of education (Siegel 2009). 
Particularly with reference to the pedagogy of philosophy, children are 
invariably positioned and c onceived of as pupils of logo-centric philosophy 
education. The importance of philosophy education for global peace and 
preparing children to shoulder responsibilities in the face of the greatest 
ethical challenges of the contemporary world, has been repeatedly ack-
nowledged since the 1946 Memorandum on the Philosophy Programme by 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (here 
on UNESCO; Goucha 2007). The conviction voiced by UNESCO upholds 
the right to philosophy for all (ibid.). However, while the global community might 
have expressed the desirability of a right to philosophy for all, children 
remain philosophically constrained as default addressees of pedagogy, as 
they are categorically meant to be taught something by adults. In spite of the 
recognition of philosophical agency in even babies (Gopnik 2009) and the 
recognition of children’s consciousness as a positive phenomenon (Merleau- 
Ponty 2010: 131; Bahler on Merleau-Ponty 2015, 2016; Welsh on Merleau- 
Ponty 2013), somehow the philosophical agency of small children remains 
underestimated in terms of its philosophical worth for big adults. The value 
of philosophy education as a response to global crises, seems to be expressed 
in terms of adults teaching children how to philosophise and not themselves 
learning to philosophise with (Norwegian: hos/ German: bei) children. 
What are the contemporary global crises that philosophy education 
is responding to? I grasp this through the anthropological description of 
‘overheating’ i.e. Anthropocene neoliberalism as a compounded term 
(Eriksen 2016). The description is not limited to the environmental crisis, 
but incorporates neoliberal economic activity and identity politics as well. 
Eriksen’s description further integrates awareness of the asymmetrical 
nature of overheating in so far as formerly colonised parts of the world pay 
higher existential costs in order to maintain standards of living elsewhere. 
The central double bind of this era is obtaining the balance between eco-
nomic growth and ecological sustainability. The overheating metaphor 
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refers to an era that has no inbuilt ‘thermostat’ or to decide upper limits 
for growth-oriented runway processes e.g. energy use, urban expansion 
and population growth, tourism, migratory waves, waste production and 
waste colonialism, and the direct effects of such processes on local envi-
ronments. Upscaling e.g. expanding of mining operations at the expense of 
local community and environmental interests is an integral part of overhea-
ting. Within the education sector phenomenon such as large-scale global 
testing of school children is an example. The testing is supposed to enable 
more internationally competitive human capital development; at the same 
time the pressure to perform and labour in schools increases for pupils and 
teachers across the globe, without their understanding and/or participation 
in the decision.
Eriksen (2016) explains that the three inextricably intertwined crises of 
overheating i.e. environment, economy and identity are individually expe-
rienced through cognitive oscillations between small and large clashing 
scales. The micro and the macro are seen as two sides of the same coin; yin 
and yang (ibid.). Eriksen further explains, that a clashing of scales occurs 
between the local and the global, in distinguishable ways i.e. in the social 
(reach of ones networks), physical (the compass of an infrastructural sys-
tem), cognitive (the size of ones perceived world) and temporal sphere (the 
time horizon one imagines, forwards, backwards, when taking decisions 
and making plans) (ibid: 29). 
To draw a loose analogy of clashing scales in the intergenerational light, 
the difference between social, physical, cognitive and temporal scales 
also applies to the child-adult continuum. Bigger scales however, do not 
guarantee more or better philosophical capacities. As Alberto Caeiro, one 
of Fernando Pessoa‘s heteronyms illustrates (Pessoa 2006: 16: tr. Zenith) -
“From my village I see as much of the universe as can be seen from earth,
And so my village is as large as any town,
For I am the size of what I see
And not the size of my height …
In the cities life is smaller
Than here in my house on top of this hill.
The big buildings of cities lock up the view,
They hide the horizon, pulling our gaze far away from the open sky.
They make us small, for they take away all the vastness our eyes can see,
And they make us poor, for our only wealth is seeing.”
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Although the social, physical, cognitive and temporal scales of children are 
smaller, my investigation demonstrated their capacity to think counterfac-
tually and expand the horizons of conscious experience to be even broader 
than that of my own graspable adult consciousness. Such capacities are 
indispensable to philosophical processes and yet the value of philosophical 
education as a response to global crisis, has been solely located in giving 
children philosophical education. 
My hybridic, nomadic phenomenological investigation explores what 
doing philosophy with children could be like. The exploration pursues the 
value of asking what philosophy and education can learn from children 
and childhood (Kennedy & Kohan 2016; Storme, & Vlieghe 2011). The 
longitudinal inquiry is located in an overheated world (Eriksen 2016), where 
children from the highest-scoring countries on the Human Development 
Index are now on regular school strikes, crying for help (Thunberg 2019) 
and challenging their default positions as ‘pupils’ (Su & Su 2019; Straume 
2019). In such a time, childism urges that we conceive of children beyond 
the developmental perspective (Wall 2012; 2019).
The text at hand is divided into five parts. Part 1 introduces an existential 
perspective on the overheated world of high-speed modernity i.e. Anthropo-
cene Neoliberalism, within which the neoliberal global education sector houses 
nation-specific, institutionalised philosophy with/for children (PC) practices. 
Part 2 gives a historical overview of how philosophy with children has 
become part of standardised global educational practices. Then, I discuss 
major critiques starting with the instrumentalisation of philosophy with the 
involvement of children and the questionability of the epistemology underly-
ing the method itself, namely the ‘white reason-ability’ that characterizes it. 
Various critiques seem to be pointing at the necessity to take adult positio-
nality more seriously. The critique raised in the Norwegian context is unique 
insofar as it recognises children as existentially equal truth seekers as their 
adult counterparts. None of the critics, however, seem keen on renouncing 
the spatio-temporality of schooling itself, where the pedagogical authority 
of adults is structurally protected and reinforced. Moreover, none of them 
seem to envisage the child as a philosophical guide. 
Part 3 discusses how the child has invariably been seen as a pedago-
gical addressee i.e. someone to be taught and civilized by adults, what is 
said about modern childhood cultures and children‘s cultures in literature. 
The text narrows into a discussion of children‘s evolving role as researchers 
and democratic participants in high Human Development Index contexts 
(especially, following the introduction of the United Nations Convention 
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on the Rights of the Child). The changing scholarly and social positions of 
children in high Human Development Index contexts, as a corollary, implies 
that the scholarly and social positions of adults in relation to children are also 
changing. Finally, new research designs and new roles of adult researchers 
of childhood are discussed based on the childhood studies paradigm. 
The lengthiest body of this work - part 4 begins with a description of 
the attributes of this particular study at hand, followed by the three phases 
of exploration or, as Gallacher and Gallagher (2018) propose to label it, 
the muddling through. The organic experimentation design engaged with 
children as interlocutors and co-explorers, drawing upon Continental and 
Indian phenomenological and logical traditions in order to enter into immer-
sive play with co-explorers. Playing emerged as a form of philosophising 
enabling adults to unstiffen their conceptual muscles in a way that facili-
tates crossing the borders of one’s taken-for-granted world. I term these 
opportunities ‘philosophical clearings with (hos/bei) children’, whereby we 
can experience other fleeting, temporal, co-existing worlds regardless of 
their contradictory appearances. 
Section 4.2 i.e. the embryological Phase 0 of the study features peculiar 
content, due to its seemingly autobiographical narrative style. The purpose 
of integrating this contextual section in the body of an academic disserta-
tion is to make visible the invisible. Even welcoming the idea of a child as a 
philosophical guide for an adult in the first place requires some rigid borders 
to be transcended. These could literally be large scale national, bureaucra-
tic, financial and disciplinary borders, as well as our small scale embodied 
conceptual child/adult borders. Chance has an equally significant role to 
play in how such borders get crossed - whether internal or external ones; 
this in turn has us delving deeper into the mysteries we tend to enframe as 
problems. Finally, interpersonal reciprocity and trust or the lack of it enables 
or disables any enquiry insofar as processes of fielding and access to any 
particular geographical or thematic field unfold. 
Phase 0 can be especially confusing for readers who are acquainted 
with autoethnography. Resemblance is not identity. Well, not always. If one 
adheres to comparison as a primary way of knowing, then one risks mista-
king the previously unknown for the known. 
The resemblance between autoethnographic works and this particular 
section is valid, insofar as autoethnography can be taken as a phenome-
nological tool (Pitard 2019). As the word autoethnography itself suggests, 
autoethnography is the methodological coming together of the self and 
other (Jones, Adams & Ellis 2016). Autoethnography is methodologically 
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unafraid of intimacy (Smith 2005). One embraces vulnerability; pays atten-
tion to physical feelings, thoughts and emotions using systematic socio-
logical introspection and emotional recall in order to grasp an experience 
one has lived through (Ellis 1999). Another resemblance which is also valid 
is that both methodologies are ‘queer’ in the etymological sense of the 
term i.e. being odd or non-conforming; and also because they bring forth 
commonly marginalised subjectivities. Queer metholodologies are scavan-
ger methodologies in so far as they use different methods to collect and 
produce knowledge about deliberately or accidentally excluded subjects 
from traditional studies of human behaviour (Halberstam 1998, in Jones & 
Harris 2018; Adams & Jones 2011). Moreover, such methodologies refuse 
academic compulsion towards disciplinary coherence (ibid.). This is espe-
cially noticeable in the diverse and experimental writing styles testing the 
limits of academic certainty (Johnson-Mardones 2015; Adams & Jones 
2011; MacKinley 2019). Given its fundamentally critical and unorthodox 
character, autoethnography is appealing for decolonising the academy and 
making it a kinder place (Mackinlay 2019; Chawla & Ahmet 2018). For 
childist projects such as this one, re-imagining the academy in interde-
pendent relationality to childhood and children’s experiences, necessarily 
implies a movement towards kindness as a virtue. Hence, resemblance is 
valid; Inferring an identity between the two based on that however, is not. 
Despite its commitment to intersubjective reflexivity owing to the 
phenomenological and existential traditions, this project was not con-
ceptualised as an autoethnographic endeavour rooted in the discipline of 
anthropology. The presence of ethnographic detail, including personal first 
person accounts and inclusion of written correspondences, in the embryo-
logical phase is to make explicit how and what influenced my philosophical 
process with regard to pedagogy of philosophy. The possibility of the ari-
sing of a question is itself contained within the standpoint of questioning. 
The limits of what and how something can be known is already demarcated 
by the directedness of a question. A central question doesn’t only open up 
epistemological horizons, it simultaneously closes others off. 
My interest in the pedagogy of philosophy began from the adultist posi-
tion of a philosophy tutor for a child, whom I solely regarded as a pupil. From 
an adultist position becoming concerned with the scope for the philosophi-
cal blossoming of the adult side was a non-existent sliver. The possibility of 
the primary overarching question could not have started opening up, had 
I not undergone the embryological processes in the first place. While the 
relevant knowledge and capital I was acquiring on the way and the children 
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I met facilitated my arrival at the leading question, internal and external 
borders have also often become hindrances on the way; often clashing, 
at previously unimaginable subtle and gross scales, and generating plenty 
scope for philosophical engagement. 
Taking referential cues from participatory research methods in interdi-
sciplinary childhood studies, during the systematic stages I embraced the 
methodological attitude of immaturity and muddled through (Gallacher & 
Gallagher 2018) with children as co-explorers whose influence I gradually 
and deliberately surrendered to. In doing so I stopped focusing on a logo-
centric understanding of philosophising and instead grasped it as play. 
Overcoming the logo-centric understanding of philosophy implied a new 
directedness of questioning, motivation and thereof method of investi-
gation, and a newfound critical approach towards the Continental pheno-
menological tradition as I had known and grown intellectually attached to. 
Through the methodological attitude proposed by Gallacher & Gallagher 
(ibid.) - the hybridic phenomenological method of entering immersive play 
with co-explorers came about. Every phase elaborately explained in part 
4, shows how maintaining a methodological attitude made way for adap-
ting methodical choices in order to investigate the philosophical richness 
of playing with children for adults. Thus, this is not an autoethnographic 
enterprise; it is a hybridic, nomadic phenomenological investigation into a 
pedagogy of philosophy and in turn a philosophy of pedagogy. 
The progression of part 4 simultaneously traces the contextual emer-
gence of the central question. The emergence owes itself to the ability to 
change the standpoint from where that question can be asked from. It cannot 
be asked, as long as the child remains a default addressee of pedagogy. The 
so-called ‘development’ of question in orthodox dissertations, in light of a 
work like this, is in the ‘development’ of the embodied mind that writes it. 
Can one even talk of ‘development’ in such a case? Not really. The question 
emerges through the influences traced in it. It emerges more or less towards 
the end of this work. Why didn‘t I start this work from the point the central 
question was ‘finalised’? Because arrival at a question is as relevant, if not 
more, as asking and answering one. At least for a philosophical project con-
cerning the pedagogy of philosophy, arrival at a central question depends 
on the pedagogical attitude that carries it. An elaboration of the mundane 
whys and hows of arriving at the central question may also be seen as a 
response to abstract philosophical works which clearly refer to childhood 
experiences and were most probably inspired by engagement with and 
observation of children. Such works seldom make explicit the contributions 
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and influences of children on the authors. I have tried as far as possible 
to offer readers transparency in terms of what influenced the questioning 
and its turn towards the childist standpoint. Here too, the diverse forms 
of ethnographic details, improvised and adapted to what various stages 
called for, are present in order to make influences transparent. ‘Muddling 
through’, in its literal sense , appeals to the ignorance of the one who mudd-
les through. The principle researcher, who is invariably an adult. Acknow-
ledging and embracing one‘s ignorance as an epistemological asset whilst 
investigating with children as an adult, is part of the methodological attitude 
underlying the methodical steps. Childism offers the valuable probability of 
finding strength in interdependence and vulnerability when a powerful adult 
position re-cognises its ignorance vis-a-vis a child. 
Part 5 revisits the overall research question concluding this work, which at 
its core is about arriving at, asking and attempting to answer - 
 What is the scope for the philosophical blossoming of adults when 
they enter children’s playfully constructed worlds as guests?
 
- in an overheated world. 
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Illustration 1: Childist ideas for a pedagogy of philosophy in an overheated world
9
1.  The Existential Crisis of  
an Overheated Epoch
Anthropocene neoliberalism is the universal context within which this longi-
tudinal exploration of what philosophising with children could be for adults 
has taken place. The essence of Anthropocene neoliberalism is overheating 
(Eriksen 2016) and the unresolvable dilemma of the epoch is obtaining bet-
ween ecological sustainability and environmental growth (ibid.). 
The compound term - Anthropocene neoliberalism - refers to the over-
heated zeitgeist of the early 21st century, uniquely characterised by the 
acceleration of acceleration (Eriksen 2016). In the last three decades alone, 
the growth rate of human population has accelerated exponentially, as the 
world inhabitants went from 4.8 to 7.7 billion. Consequently, this was par-
alleled by an acceleration in modern human activities. The first component 
of the compound term, i.e. Anthropocene, refers to the geological epoch 
where traces of human activity are found everywhere on the planet (Ehlers 
2008; Steffen, Crutzen et al 2007). The second component of the term, 
i.e. neoliberalism, refers to the post-colonial modern era of the free market, 
whereby trade barriers between nations were reduced and capital flow 
increased. The era progressed through post-colonial practices such as out-
sourcing industries, exponential exploitation of nature and waste colonia-
lism, especially in the majority world. And all the while, there seems to be no 
upper limit to neoliberal growth or the speed at which growth takes place.
Speed and heat being inextricably connected, the zeitgeist we find our-
selves in can be said to be overheating (Eriksen 2016).
1.1.  Modern Education and Anthropocene Neoliberalism
Modernity designates a period in human history whose ideological under-
pinning heavily relies on/is impregnated with Cartesian dualism, as well as 
the Cartesian idea of human beings as masters and possessors of nature, 
coupled with the technological prowess made possible by Newtonian natu-
ral science (conf. Faarlund, in Reed and Rothenburg 1993; Heidegger 
1977). According to continental phenomenology - a response to modern 
scientism - what this particular modernity did is mathematise nature, cer-
tainly leading to perceived scientific progress, but also inaugurating a criti-
cal phase for humanity (Husserl 1970). Heidegger’s view on modern tech-
nological prowess was that it revealed nature, including human beings, as 
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a storehouse of resources ready for supply on demand which he termed 
Bestand (Heidegger 1977). In Heidegger’s words, 
“Only to the extent that man for his part is already challenged (German: 
Herausforderung/ Norwegian: Utfordring) to exploit the energies of 
nature can this ordering revealing happen. If man is challenged, orde-
red, to do this, then does not man himself belong even more originally 
than nature within the standing-reserve? The current talk about human 
resources, about the supply of patients for a clinic, gives evidence of 
this. The forester who, in the wood, measures the felled timber and to 
all appearances walks the same forest path in the same way as did his 
grandfather, is today commanded by profit-making in the lumber indus-
try, whether he knows it or not. He is made subordinate to the ordera-
bility of cellulose, which for its part is challenged forth by the need for 
paper, which is then delivered to newspapers and illustrated magazines. 
The latter, in their turn, set public opinion to swallowing what is prin-
ted, so that a set configuration of opinion becomes available on demand 
(ibid: 19; bracket insertion by author).”
In this passage, Heidegger was not particularly describing the exploitative 
colonial situation in the majority world. The description rather concerns 
the demanding modern human-nature relationship that was accepted as 
progress in the minority world, specifically continental Europe itself1. Within 
the minority context, for example, Norway was still a developing country 
when it was invaded under Hitler’s stewardship. Following the  technological 
might of the allies, Norway eventually set out to train its personnel and 
expand its national economy, increasingly turning into a modern industrial 
nation (Faarlund, in Reed and Rothenburg 1993:159). 
Following Danish existentialist Kierkegaard, the Northern Norwegian 
existentialist Zapffe used the word biosophy to describe the depth of the 
philosophical predicament that emerges when the modern human learns 
enough about the world and our place in it to realize that the planet would 
be better off without us (Reed and Rothenburg 1993:3; Zapffe 1933, in Reed 
and Rothenburg 1993). Of course, by ‘us’ Zapffe was neither referring to the 
Sami minorities of Norway, nor peoples of the colonised continents who 
1 The term continental Europe is employed in the vernacular sense expressed in the 
Norwegian term Kontinentet to refer to the geographical area of the European continent 
excluding the Scandinavian peninsula, Britain and Iceland.
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were ‘not yet civilized’ through modern education to become comfortable 
enough with nature, including human beings as - Bestand. 
By the 70s, literal philosophical movements, largely informed by Naess’ 
explication of Gandhian non-violence (conf. Naess 1974) came forth to 
argue against the reigning modern philosophical commitment which reve-
als nature as a storehouse of resources ready for supply on demand (Reed 
and Rothenberg 1993). 
A telling example of the deep philosophical efforts to performatively 
deconstruct modern commitments that the rapidly developing indust-
rial Norwegian society had embraced (conf. Stugu 2012: 164–286) is the 
non-violent demonstration against the hydropower project in Mardøla Falls. 
Opponents of the premise, like Kvaløy and Naess, chained themselves to 
earth in order to prevent the machines from chewing their way up into the 
mountains (Kvaløy 1993, in Reed and Rothenberg 1993). 
Seen as an escalated end of the spectrum that phenomenological philo-
sophers such as Husserl and Heidegger pointed towards, and as confirmed 
in the latest international scientific report titled, Global Warming of 1.5°C, 
an IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above 
pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, 
in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate 
change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty (Here 
on IPCC 2018), I believe that Anthropocene neoliberalism is an existential 
crisis in the individualistic and anthropocentric assumptions underlying 
global economic and social structures i.e. in the way we think (as in Strat-
ford 2019). Consequently, radically new approaches in education science 
and philosophy through more interdisciplinary engagement are urgently 
called forth (ibid.). 
In practice, neoliberalism is blatant in education too (Burbules and Tor-
res 2000). Insofar as upscaled modern education is reduced to skills quali-
fication and employability (conf. OECD 2015), the global education sector 
contributes to the problem and not the solution (Fitzsimons 2002; Biesta 
2015; Clemens & Biswas 2019). Within the sector, philosophising in 
schools and kindergartens i.e. sitting and talking about philosophical topics 
through practices like P4C or PwC (here on PC) are globally implemented 
(Goucha 2007). 
But as early 21st century global children, i.e. minor citizens, sense in their 
own capacities that something does not add up, they challenge the power of 
adult citizens who intentionally or unintentionally not only contribute to the 
acceleration of Anthropocene neoliberalism, but continue to pass on the 
12
bad modern philosophical ideas that got us into this deplorable situation in 
the first place. 
1.1.1. Overheating and Childism
The Thunberg Effect that fuels the #Fridaysforfuture movement is a compel-
ling large-scale instance of a socio-political expression of childism. In August 
2018, 15-year-old minor Swedish citizen Greta Thunberg exited The defi-
ning spatio-temporality for modern childhood, i.e. school, and took on a strike 
to argue for the premises of the Paris Agreement in Sweden be held onto 
(conf. Thunberg 2018; 2018a). Within a year, kindergarten, and school stu-
dents -accompanied by adult guardians across continents- began striking 
school regularly to voice the accelerated existential crisis of our overheated 
epoch. After the global deep strike on March 15 2019, UN General Secretary 
Antonio Guterres admitted that his generation had failed to respond properly 
to the challenge of climate change (Guterres 2019). By March 2020, in face 
of the global COVID-19 pandemic and global lockdowns, protestors did not 
stop. They simply moved online embracing new forms of digital protesting.
The Thunberg Effect can be understood as a powerful relational impulse 
coming from the context of childhood that performatively deconstructs 
modern adult power at an upscaled level (Holmberg & Alvinius 2019). 
Already in 1992, Severn Cullis-Suzuki addressed adults regarding their (ir)
responsibility in terms of considering children and future generations at the 
UN Earth Summit, Rio de Janeiro (United Nations 2017). At the age of 9, 
Cullis-Suzuki founded the Environmental Children's Organization (ECO). 
Similarly, following the 2017 forest fires in Portugal, directly affected plain-
tiffs between ages 5 and 14, represented by British environmental lawyers, 
launched a crowdfunding campaign to sue European countries for global 
emissions (Bandeira 2017; Laville 2017). 
The philosophical (here, ethical) challenge posed to adults by children 
reveals an intergenerational failure owing to the modern human-earth rela-
tionship and view of civilizational progress that conceives of nature were 
indeed a standing reserve 2.
2 A comparatively different paradigm for defining progress for example can be found in the 
Seventh Generation Principle of the indigenous philosophies of North America. Following 
the seventh-generation principle, any deliberation should take into consideration sustai-
nable human-earth as well as community relationships over the next seven generations 
(Clarkson et al. 1992). 
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In Norway, modern adult stewardship of the planet and intergenerational (ir)
responsibility are also challenged by minor citizens through school strikes. 
For example, during the early phases of global school strikes in Septem-
ber 2018, school students in Norwegian cities demanded more responsible 
handling of fossil fuels (Randøy 2018). As seen in the image below, ban-
ners used during the demonstration included illustrating current Norwegian 
Prime Minister Erna Solberg setting planet Earth on fire3. 
 
 
 
 
Alas, as unexamined philosophical commitments rooted in so-called Euro-
pean Enlightenment occasion at accelerated pace on Earth - the coloni-
zation of Mars is on its way (Fairen & Parro et al 2017, Schulze-Makuch 
2013; Zubrin 1995). Zubrin (1995) has predictably predicted that future 
motives as well as commerce systems will parallel the colonial patterns of 
Europeans followed by a specific developmental attitude. Mars will be to 
the pioneering nations of the coming centuries what the Mediterranean was 
to the Greeks or the New World to the Western Europeans (ibid.). The pre-
dicted interplanetary triangle trade, for example, will be analogous to the 
Illustration 2:  Erna Solberg depicted setting earth on fire, Image from: 
https://nu.no/saker/klima/2018/09/streiket-skolen-for-klimademonstrasjon/ 
[23/12/2018]
3 The thought bubble placed above the head reads: Responsibility? Whatever!
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triangle trade of Britain, her North American colonies and the West Indies 
during the colonial period. The illustration below is a reproduction based on 
Zubrin’s diagram (1995: 410):
The philosophical unreasonableness of modern human civilization con-
sists in the possibility to engage in epistemological pursuits -science- as if 
there were no normative implications for the universal planetary lifeworld. 
For example, the problem of the Greenhouse Effect (Arrhenius 1896) has 
been known since colonial periods and its finder has been celebrated by an 
esteemed scientific community (conf. Arrhenius and Caldwell et al 2008). 
Lamentably and systematically, modern civilisation has pursued an ideal of 
limitless growth which by the early 21st century has brought humanity4 to 
a point where its home, the Earth, is on fire (Thunberg 2019; IPCC 2018; 
Eriksen 2016). Mortiferous consequences of Anthropocene neoliberalism 
as estimated by IPCC 2018 do not account for postcolonial global inequity. 
As more and more children in the majority world (e.g. child monks in 
Ladakh, conf. Biswas 2013; 2016; Biswas & Sharma 2020 in press) are 
driven indoors to being competitively schooled to qualify for the neolibe-
ral job market with the deceitful promise of a better future - their natural 
Illustration 3:  Hypothetical interstellar colonial triangular trade based on Zubrin 1995, 
graphic by Emma Neumeyer
4 About 7,713,468,205 human beings as reported on 07.04.2020 to be approximately precise 
(conf. https://www.populationpyramid.net/). Approximately a third of the number are children.
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resources and with it their relationships with nature are depleting and the 
fact remains: the future for all life on earth is on thin ice, and this does not 
even account for global inequity (IPCC 2018). 
In practise, neoliberalism is self-evident in education too (Burbules and 
Torres 2000). Insofar as upscaled modern education is reduced to qualifi-
cation and employability (conf. OECD 2015), the global education sector 
contributes to the problem and not the solution (Fitzsimons 2002; Biesta 
2009; 2015; Clemens & Biswas 2019). Within the sector, philosophising in 
schools and kindergartens i.e. sitting and talking about philosophical topics 
through practices like P4C or PwC (here on PC) are globally implemented 
(Goucha 2007). 
With 21st century global children -minor citizens-, sensing and voicing 
that something doesn’t add up, the power of adults -full citizens-, is placed 
under doubt (Straume 2019). Regardless of whether adult citizens contri-
bute to accelerated acceleration in Anthropocene neoliberalism intentio-
nally or unintentionally, the bad modern philosophical ideas that got human-
ity into this mess in the first place are called forth into radical rethinking. I 
am not referring here to particular philosophical ideas - but the cohort of 
taken-for-granted ideas that are gathered in together in a modernity that 
enabled the current fossil fuel generated civilization. 
Oddly, Being (ontology), Doing (ethics) and Knowing (epistemology) i.e. 
the inseparable triangular scope of philosophical addressing has been segre-
gated in this modernity. In fact, the history of modern Western philosophising, 
as Heidegger argued, is a history where the question of existence i.e. Being, 
itself has been systematically avoided (Heidegger 1972; 2010). To put it mini-
malistically: Cogito ergo sum was the philosophical conclusion of Descartes’ 
philosophising i.e. I think, therefore I am. Western philosophy progressed by 
working out the ‘Cogito’ and the ‘Ergo’ i.e. the rational, but the Sum i.e. existen-
tial basis was conveniently left out (Heidegger 2010: 23; Jaaware on Heideg-
ger 2016). What was overlooked is that a human being doesn’t exist because 
she thinks; rather, thinking can happen because firstly one relationally exists.
It is beyond the scope of not only this dissertation, but my positioned 
lifespan in the early 21st century world, to attempt to explain how colo-
nial modernity has enframed relational existence and what that implies in an 
era of Anthropocene neoliberalism, which is, needless to say, post-colonial. 
But, as a step towards the matter of philosophising with children in this era, 
I have shed some light on the enframing of childhood and education. This 
textual step is taken in order to narrow down the context within which the 
matter is embedded. 
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1.1.2.  The Enframing of Childhood and Education
As I have explained elsewhere (Biswas 2014: 184-186), the term Enfra-
ming is a translation of the Heideggerian German term Das Gestell, used 
to describe the kind of modern technological challenging which reveals the 
phenomenon ‘nature’ as a standing reserve i.e. Bestand. The philosophi-
cal concept is derived from the root verb stellen meaning to place/ to set 
something or somebody/ to put/ to regulate/to supply, also found in verbs 
such as herstellen i.e. to make or vorstellen i.e. to represent. It is then com-
bined with the prefix Ge- connoting a gathering-together as in the German 
nouns Gebirge i.e. mountain range or Gedächtnis i.e. memory or literally 
the gathering together of thoughts. Accordingly, Ge-stell is the essence of 
modern technology which gathers human perception in a challenging man-
ner to order the self-revealing of beings as standing reserve i.e. Bestand. 
The prowess of modern technology thus affects our intelligibility and also 
results in forgetfulness and unawareness of non-calculable being. In other 
words, only that which can be measured can be.
Enframing is not something modern humans actively do. Nevertheless, 
they are affected by it in a way allowing them to discover nature itself in its 
measurable usefulness for themselves. For example,
“The forest is timber. The mountain a quarry of rock, the river is water 
power, the wind is wind ‘in the sails’. As the ‘surrounding world’ is disco-
vered, ‘nature’ thus discovered is encountered along with it... But in 
this kind of discovery of nature, nature as what ‘stirs and strives,’ what 
overcomes us, entrances as landscape, remains hidden. The botanists 
plants are not flowers of the hedgerow, the river’s source ascertained by 
the geographer, is not the ‘source in the ground’.” (Heidegger 2010:70)
Along similar lines, children come to represent for modern society - a stock 
of future human capital serving the economic growth of nations. For modern 
science, they become subjective objects of research (e.g. the overlapping 
common German and Norwegian term Proband which is etymologically 
rooted in the Latin term probare signifying ‘to test’). This subsequently 
affects the empirical foundations of reigning educational science theory, as 
well as practical implementations as found in the current overheated era. 
The reigning global evidence-based evaluation paradigm has been 
identified as the age of measurement (Biesta 2009; 2015). Standardiza-
tion (e.g. in curricula, testing etc.), segregation (e.g. of persons into classes 
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according to chronological age) and speed (e.g. amount of time to teach 
and learn specific content) appear to be features of this specific cultural 
form of education i.e. schooling (Biswas 2013). Large-scale global assess-
ments such as PISA5 as well as ideas such as those of employability and 
human capital are grave symptoms of this era (Clemens & Biswas 2019). 
Emphasis on technical aspects such as qualification or work-life rele-
vance in schooling makes it possible to talk about a market which consists 
of service providers (school staff) delivering the product called ‘excellent 
education’ to its clients i.e. students and guardians (Biesta 2009; 2015). 
The assessment movement works to capture and evaluate the production 
of an industry that sets into standard order by enframing human beings and 
knowledges into standing reserves to be called upon to resort on demand. 
Consequently, education becomes a technology for national economic 
development, and is as such assessed and valued according to its poten-
tial to proficiency in sustaining a predetermined goal of limitless growth. In 
such cases, the purpose of education is not called into question, but sim-
ply given. The stress on human resource development for the production 
of research and (calculable) scientific knowledge as found in the OECD and 
World Bank agenda is an evident example. Late 20th century OECD reports 
on education (1997a; 1997b) clearly specified that the aim of the techno-
logisation of education was to prepare students for 21st century capitalism. 
Accordingly, the human being is challenged to participate in economic acti-
vity that contributes to the acceleration of 21st century overheating. 
The human being thus becomes part of a structure which produces an 
industrially predetermined goal. Rendered into an industry, the student 
supplies the consumption, the state supplies capital and the teacher sup-
plies the product. Since each part of the structure depends on the regula-
tion of the other parts, it is the system and not the person that reveals (Fitz-
simons 2002: 184).
The enframing of education conceals the state of beings from them-
selves. What is revealed is an educational framework for constituting and 
instituting One order. Such education demands, sets upon order, engages 
5 PISA, The Programme for International Student Assessment (conf. http://www.oecd.
org/pisa/) is a triennial global survey that evaluates national education systems by testing 
the skills and knowledge of 15-year-old students. PISA is an initiative of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development which was founded and operates primarily 
to stimulate global economic progress. Non-participation of specific countries in PISA 
testing does not imply absence of a competitive human capital market for which children 
across the world are being disparately prepared for.
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‘efficiently’, but does not entertain any other mode of revealing. In such an 
educational process, whatever threatens to elude established rules or wha-
tever threatens the conventional order is in turn subsumed into the frame-
work. Thus, education provides a framework that demands a constant sup-
ply of resources – whether that be knowledge, people, or financial capital 
assets (ibid.). The mathematisation of nature itself leads the movement 
from human beings to human capital in national contexts that can compete 
in the global market. Consequently, children and childhood get invariably 
reduced to investments for the future - whether they want to be part of that 
predetermined future or not.
Even the Norwegian society with its affluent, powerful and relatively sta-
ble status in the global context is not exempt from partaking in the human 
capital competition. An illustrative example of this national direction is the 
case of royal children: Princess Ingrid Alexandra and Prince Sverre Magnus, 
who in 2014 were moved from public to private school (Skrede et al 2014). 
Considering that this implied an annual investment of approximately 100,000 
Norwegian Kroner (approximately 10,000 Euros) per child as opposed to 
free public schooling, the move was no doubt economically strategic. The 
decision of the royal family was controversial and critiqued by common Nor-
wegians because it was a break from the long tradition of the national royalty 
participating in common collective life as equals. Furthermore, it indicated 
that free public educational institutions - in a nation with the highest Human 
Development Index - were no more sufficient in forming the kind of global 
human capital or teaching life-skills that the era demands (!). 
With the competitive logic of the global era, it follows that being in this 
world as Princess Ingrid Alexandra and Prince Sverre Magnus demands an 
annual educational investment of 200,000 Norwegian Kroner. Their exis-
tence as royalty in an overheated world is challenged by an evidence-based, 
highly competitive global evaluation paradigm and is enframed by it. 
Industrially-inclined, mass-schooling is primarily carried out by geogra-
phically separating the human from its environment. This includes inter-
generational segregation based on strict division of humans according to 
chronological age. There is One order to be followed and anyone who does 
not fit into that specific order is either excluded or risks being medically dia-
gnosed as problematic. Beder et al. (2009) demonstrate how contemporary 
psychiatry is now systematically employed to discipline naughtiness, inatten-
tion, excess spontaneity, and creativity, to blunt anger and aggression or to 
control mood variations in children (ibid: 206). Increasingly diagnostic criteria 
for childhood disorders are identified and medicated with reference to the 
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boundaries of social acceptance of adult thought, mood and behaviour (ibid: 
207). Most dis-orders e.g. learning, communication or attention deficits are 
categorized in relation to the performance of their roles within the education 
system. Adult faith in the ordering itself remains relatively unstirred. 
A blueprint of modern childhood lifespan according to this ordering can 
be minimally visualised as follows:
The oddity of this kind of ordering is that at first glance, things seem to be in 
perfect order. It is however brought into and kept in place by causing disorder 
elsewhere. Or, as stated earlier, by reinstating into the framework whatever 
threatens to get out of that specific singular order (Fitzsimons 2002: 184). 
Integration of philosophical practices with children (PC) within school 
curricula occurs within this enframed education system. Philosophy is also 
enframed in a manner that it becomes deployed as an instrument to work 
on children so that they can develop cognitive, thinking, moral, social and 
democratic skills and capacities (Biesta 2011:310). Here, neither is the 
adult pedagogue invited to be reflexive in terms of the horizons of her own 
aforementioned capacities, nor are the epistemological foundations of a 
singular understanding of philosophy itself reflected upon. 
Illustration 4:  Blueprint of a modern childhood lifespan. Graphic by, Emma Neumeyer
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1.1.3.  Philosophising with Children in  
an Overheated Epoch
PC practices are considered in line with the Memorandum of the  Philosophy 
Programme of UNESCO written in 1946 (Conf. Droit 1995). As  stated 
in the report by the director-general on an intersectoral strategy on 
philosophy (UNESCO 2005), the task of the programme was to “imbue the 
public mind with a certain number of philosophical and moral notions to be 
regarded as a minimum equipment, and which are calculated to reinforce 
respect for human personality, love of peace, hatred of narrow nationalism 
and the rule of brute force, solidarity, and devotion to the ideal of culture.” 
The Paris Declaration for Philosophy accordingly acknowledges the role 
of philosophy education as indispensable to democratic participation (Paris 
Declaration for Philosophy, in Droit 1995: 15). The declaration reiterates 
that “philosophy education, by training independently-minded, thoughtful 
people, capable of resisting various forms of propaganda, prepares every- 
one to shoulder their responsibilities in regard to the great questions of the 
contemporary world, particularly in the field of ethics.” Nonetheless, PC prac-
tised within the walls of enframed education, nested in the universal overhea-
ting context of the Anthropocene neoliberalism, tends to reproduce the ins-
trumental nature of the global education sector. Furthermore, the concern 
is finally being explicitly voiced that its epistemological basis of reference is 
rooted in white ignorance or racialised common sense (Chetty 2018). 
At a time when minor citizens i.e. children are mobilising themselves 
on an unprecedented scale for school strikes to show resistance, great 
questions of the contemporary world are being explicitly posed to major 
citizens i.e. adults themselves are increasingly challenged by great ques-
tions shaking the foundations of the contemporary world. In turn, adults 
are called forth to question themselves on philosophical grounds. The 
overlap between philosophy and democracy here is that both continu-
ously question themselves and believe in the fecundity of doubt (Mayor, in 
Droit 1995:12). 
The initial vision of PC was a pedagogical practice stimulating democra-
tic citizenship that emphasised reasonability, more than reason itself (Lipman 
1991:64). Lipman justified the practice for its democratic i.e. social and 
political impact (Kennedy & Kohan 2016: 47). The epistemology of the PC 
approach itself however operates within what is termed ‘white ignorance’, 
in turn becoming an intimate part of a racialised common sense (Chetty 
2018). PC practices, namely those based on the community of inquiry met-
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hod, fail to fathom the fleshiness of reasonability6 that is embodied by the 
adult pedagogue. Chetty (ibid.) asserts that reasonability stemming from 
white ignorance in fact leads to a gated community of inquiry. Philosophical 
commitments of privileged adult pedagogues do in fact play out, because 
they remain protected in their embodied ignorance. Consequently, space 
for adult pedagogues to reflect on their positionalities i.e. one’s social loca-
tion in relation to one’s existing economic, political, cultural and social net-
work (Martín Alcoff 2008: 148, in Reed-Sandoval & Sykes 2017) has been 
questioned in the context of PC practices. 
Theoretical literature further raises the question of what education and 
philosophy can learn from children and childhood, as opposed to what chil-
dren and childhood can learn from education and philosophy (Kennedy & 
Kohan 2016; Kohan 2014; Kohan 2011). 
Positionalities, essentially relational in nature, is where our reasonability 
dwells. Therein, the borders of our perception, acting and thinking are loca-
ted i.e. the horizons of one’s consciousness. Within the spatio-temporal 
walls of instrumental schooling there are structural limitations as to how far 
embodied reason-abilities and positionalities can be negotiated. 
By understanding philosophising as a set of processes that broaden the 
horizons of one’s consciousness, I doubt that one can philosophise within 
the literal walls of a class. One can teach philosophical acts such as dialo-
gue, argumentation, critical thinking and rhetoric, essential for exercising 
democratic participation. But especially for those whose voices don’t count 
in democratic decisions regarding their lifespans anyway, the understan-
ding of philosophising cannot be limited to such acts. Therefore, it could be 
worth exiting class-based philosophy where the adult pedagogue is the phi-
losophical guide for the child and accept the child as a philosophical guide 
for a change. Consequently, the search of this exploration in the universal 
context of Anthropocene neoliberalism is lead by the question:
What is the scope of philosophical blossoming of adults when they enter 
children’s playfully constructed worlds? 
The question is not about particular instances of philosophy as a noun or 
philosophy as an institutionalised discipline. In so far as Being, Doing and 
Knowing are fundamental recurring concerns throughout human lifespan, 
the question concerns the verb philosophising as a self-reflexive, inter-
6 Chetty had used the term reasonableness, I use reasonability to express the same.
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subjective process that human beings regardless of social status, inclu-
ding age, go through. Here, the human being, as the one who goes through 
a philosophical process, is affiliated to what Gullestad (1996) has called 
hverdagsfilosof or everyday-philosopher. Chetty’s elucidation of the problem 
of white ignorance in PC in this light refers specifically to everyday-philoso-
phers who are major citizens of the highest Human Development Index nati-
ons of the early 21st century (conf. Human Development Report Office 2018). 
Following the nation-specific legal status as globally defined by Article 
1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child, here a child 
is “every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the 
law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier” (conf. Cohen 1989; 
United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner). However, 
given that the chronological category is socially constructed, a static defini-
tion for the term child (and, as a corollary, adult) especially based on chro-
nological age is no longer reasonable (Aries 1962; James and Prout 1997; 
James, Jenks and Prout 1998; Qvortrup 1995, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2004, 
2006, 2008, 2009; Alanen 2005, Corsaro 1993, 1997; Sorin 2006; Wyness 
2000; Bluebond-Langner 1978:5; Speier 1976; Gullestad 1997). Corpo-
real, mental and social aspects related to chronological age can be relevant 
depending on the questioner’s interests, but for a philosophical project as 
presented in this text - the child is further understood as a temporal other 
of the adult being (Beauvais 2018). This notion comes from the continen-
tal existentialist tradition and is a recent addition to the childhood studies 
paradigm. Children can not access a past like adults can and adults can not 
access a future that children will be able to. Symbolically children have more 
time left than adults. At the same time they inherit the past baggage of their 
adult counterparts. The primary temporal tension refers to who is heard in 
the nowness of lived-experience. There is a considerable degree of fatalism 
in so far as children become agents of a project to which they are committed 
by others, before they arrive in the world. Furthermore, they might commit 
others to similar projects in the future. Children’s resistance to becoming 
agents of a fatalist project moving towards an unknowable future is also part 
of this temporal tensions (ibid.). One of the ways in which temporal other-
ness plays out is through chronological age insofar as it determines not only 
socio-political and economic positioning, but also the scope of philosophical7 
negotiations. The lower one is on the chronological age rank, the higher the 
sense of futurity that is attached to what a child represents for an adult. 
7 Being (ontology), Doing (ethics) and Knowing (epistemology).
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In an overheated epoch of economic growth and human capital, micro and 
macro level decisions made by adults in the best interests of the child are 
not only to provide the best possible children’s welfare. In fact, they are also 
to be understood in light of futurity as an investment towards future socio-
political and economic capital (Qvortrup 2008). Structurally speaking, in 
spite of instruments like the child rights convention, their voices in negotia-
ting what this futurity entails remain marginalised (ibid.) 
As in the minimal diagram below - nationhood forms the default frame 
for mass schooling, which in turn enframes standardized modern childhood 
by default. By childhood, I refer to a category in the social structure which 
determines the place children are expected to occupy in a society (Qvor-
trup 2011).
So, although the internationally sanctioned declarations on philosophy edu-
cation and consequent pedagogical practices, PC in schools across the 
globe, intend to teach skills based on specific notions of critical thinking 
and moral values, as indispensable to democratic participation, the scope 
for philosophising itself is enframed. As Chetty has finally pointed out espe-
cially with respect to PC - the epistemology of such practices is rooted in 
white ignorance or racialised common sense (Chetty 2018). 
Chetty’s observation doesn’t come as a surprise given that the upsca-
led imagined community of nation (Anderson 2006), which houses schools 
and within them modern childhoods, is itself inextricably coloured with 
white reason-ability, especially in the highest Human Development Index 
contexts. In spite of the noblest intentions regarding teaching children how 
to philosophise, as declared by the Paris Declaration for Philosophy, what 
is unintentionally passed on then is a reason-ability that contributes to the 
Nation
School
Child
Illustration 5:  Nation as the default enframing of standardized modern childhood
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reproduction of the 19th-century European idea of nation that is neither 
tenable nor philosophically justifiable in the light of the existential planetary 
crisis humanity is faced with.
Through the case of Norway, it may become evident how separating 
sentiments accompanying shared imaginations of white nationhood and 
childhood can become a complex task. 
1.1.4. The Irrational National 
Historically, 19th-century European conceptualisations of nation tended to 
anthropomorphize the imaginary nation into a stable and strong adult (usu-
ally white female) figure. The painting by Honoré Daumier (1848), titled 
The Republic, vividly pictorialises the complex and intimate relationship 
between a developmental nation-state model and childhood as a state of 
dependency on adulthood (Lee 2001: 34). Similarly, the pictorialisation in 
the work titled The Motherland and Her Dependent Colonial Offspring by 
William-Adolphe Bouguereau (1883) extends the scope of the develop-
mental nation-state model and childhood dependency to include colonies. 
Modern European societies also constructed a range of imaginaries, atti-
tudes, discourses and institutions as a result of what Aries (1962) termed 
le sentiment de l’enfance. Since childhood and adulthood are a conjunctive 
phenomenon - corresponding constructions of adulthood form part of the 
childhood sentiment. What has almost become part of our natural attitude 
(Husserl 1962) of understanding ourselves as individual adults today cor-
responds to a shared modern imaginary bound with the idea of the develo-
ped nation. 
Generally, the Norwegian nation is referred to as fatherland. With femi-
nist critiques of gender roles in society, especially in 1970s (Stugu 2012: 
274-276), this imagination was challenged. In the influential political satire 
Egalias Døtre (Daughters of Egalia, Brantenberg 1977; conf. also Moberg 
1985) one sees the powerful emergence of the idea of the nation as mother-
land. In either case, adulthood and nationhood remain knotted. Norway in 
particular is a unique context wherein children and childhood are highly 
visible in nationalism. In fact, children and childhood are at the very heart of 
contemporary theories about national identification (Gullestad 1997). 
An example coming from the 19th century, discussed by Gullestad 
(ibid.,) is the patriotic hymn called Småguttenes Nasjonalsang (The National 
Song of Small Boys - Wergeland 2008). The opening lines already express, 
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“We - the little two feet tall ones are a nation too”. Intersections of childhood 
and adult-nationhood becomes visible as the song goes on. The song is 
not written only for humans within the chronological age determined cate-
gory called children (see for example the adult choir: UnikHum – Trondheim 
Humanistkor 2015), but as though one were always located in an imaginary 
context of childhood. 
Another widely discussed example is the annual Barnetoget or the chil-
dren‘s parade on National Day 17th May. There is a general pride in Norway 
regarding the representation of children in national parades, and not adult 
soldiers. The tradition goes back to the 19th century and was initiated by 
school manager Peter Qvam and poet Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson (Det Norske 
Kongehuset/ The Royal House of Norway 2016). To this day, celebrations 
are marked by the heavy presence of children participating through kinder-
gartens and schools. 
Ironically, tensions around changing imaginations of nationhood occur 
from within this tradition too. In the so-called Flag Debate - the central 
question has been whether or not ‘foreign’ or ‘non-Norwegian’ children 
should be allowed to bear other flags and costumes (Strøm & Henrik Klau-
sen 2017; Lundesgaard 2013; Svarstad 2013)8. It is customary to cele-
brate childhood, but only as long as children represent a specific imagi-
nation of Norwegian nationhood. When that is stirred, from kindergarten 
playgrounds to homes and right upto the public sphere - heated debates on 
where to place the symbolic borders occur. 
The inclusion of childhood in the knotted understanding of a developed 
adult-nation made way for transposing qualities of youthfulness and inno-
cence into a developed sense of Norwegian nationhood. The adult-nation in 
this case is not only developed, stable, responsible, caring and so on, but 
also ever peaceful, pure, innocent and nature-loving - like a child. In turn, 
strong boundaries to protect itself from ‘foreign’ contamination become 
necessary, as observed in Norway’s resistance to the EU (Gullestad 1997). 
Gullestad (ibid.) identifies this as the Norwegian passion for boundaries.
Similarly, micro level child care is marked by the notion of ‘grensesetting 
(boundary-setting)’, which has replaced traditional authoritative notions 
of disciplining children. Children spend less time outside on their own and 
more time in pedagogic settings with adults (ibid: 34), being taught to pro-
8 Debates expanded with the inclusion of ‘non-Norwegian’ children, but have already been 
present through the indigenous Sami population - which has for long struggled for visibility 
and recognition in Norway (Stugu 2012: 278 -282). 
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tect their own boundaries. At home, the phenomenon of ‘quality time’ with 
children emerges (ibid.; Eriksen 2001:133) because parents have limited 
time with children. Grensesetting consequently becomes an important psy-
chological and pedagogical notion which - it is argued by educationalists - 
is done for the sake of the child, not the adults9. Firm and autonomous per-
sonal boundaries are deemed necessitous towards culturally correct social 
involvement (Gullestad 1997: 34). 
However, since the 1990s, traditional notions of childhood as well as 
adulthood and nationhood have been steadily diminished and reshaped. 
Moving effortlessly across macro and micro scales, Gullestad (1997: 
39, footnote 18) summarises the change in the knotted adult-nation view 
as follows, 
“Not only is childhood at risk, but adulthood also. It seems no longer possi-
ble to keep the notion that responsible, rational adults can create and main-
tain the necessary conditions for ‘traditional’ childhood. In a similar way 
it seems increasingly problematic to believe in and plan for the traditional 
paternalistic Norwegian welfare state - rationally and consciously caring for 
all the needs of its citizens. Rather, the new conditions for both individual 
and national life seem to be, increasingly, global market forces - outside 
anyone’s conscious, rational control. The best nation-states can try to do 
is to steer, direct, influence these forces along ‘national’ and ‘international’ 
lines, just as parents no longer see themselves so much as setting the con-
ditions for life within the home, but as providing the necessary mediations 
(money, transportation, etc.) that allow their children to move between dif-
ferent social arenas - from the music lesson to the sports club to friends’ 
houses, to school, etc. Adulthood is in many ways diminished - or at least 
reshaped - as much as childhood.” 
Gullestad here hints at two aspects: 
a.  the complex intersections of internal and external boundaries of 
adulthood, childhood and nationhood, and
b. the diminishing character of those boundaries in the current era. 
9 The psychological notion in education according to childhood researcher Anne Trine 
Kjørholt (in Gullestad 1997: 39, footnote 19) was introduced to the general public in 
Norway by psychologist Åse Gruda Skard (1976).
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However, the power of nationhood and adulthood does not simply disappear. 
In fact, in light of recent phenomenological investigations, whiteness as insti-
tutionalised orientation (Ahmed 2007) and the fleshiness of racialised com-
mon sense in PC (Chetty 2018) deeply rooted in the imaginations of nation-
hood in high Human Development Index countries also become visible. The 
upsurging of some sort of white nostalgia in the feeling of loss in Norwegian 
society after the July 2011 massacre (Svendsen 2014) also illuminates the 
deep-rootedness of complex internalised borders of reason-ability. 
Traditionally internalised intersecting borders of (white) nationhood and 
adulthood are no longer tenable. However, these imaginations continue to 
determine how children and childhood are perceived, or not, in an overhea-
ted era. Moreover, these internalised borders also determine how children 
are invested in and educated by adults to become future full democratic 
citizens of their respective high Human Development Index nations in a glo-
bal context. 
As it eventualises, through a phenomenon like the Thunberg Effect cau-
sing school strikes, children are simultaneously emerging as - to use Gul-
lestad’s words - boundary breakers and bridge builders (Gullestad 1997) 
at a greater scale than they have traditionally understood to be. They might 
not be as large as the scales of powerful adult worlds and adulthood, but 
they are making their presence felt. In turn, the greatest questions of this 
era are already being posed to adults. 
The articulated intention of philosophy education might in fact be to cul-
tivate thoughtfulness and capability to resist propaganda and prepare for 
shouldering responsibilities in regard to the great questions of the contem-
porary world (The Paris Declaration for Philosophy, in Droit 1995: 15). But 
where enframed education across the globe fuels the great problems of the 
contemporary world, it doesn’t particularly help to invest in adults training 
children to sit and talk philosophically in an epoch which has driven children 
across the globe to strike school in the interest of a planetary future. 
What could be the case is that adults give humble way to letting chil-
dren play their simultaneous parts as boundary breakers and bridge buil-
ders in our era of Anthropocene neoliberalism. This would imply slowing 
down while surrendering to the daunting task of letting the stiff internal and 
external boundaries of our adult natural attitudes to dissolve. In turn, taking 
impulses for our philosophical blossoming from children, rather than tea-
ching them what should/could/would/may, be done and be known. 
However, such a process is easier to let happen outside the walls of ins-
trumental mass-schooling.
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1.2.  Seeking outside the spatio- 
temporality of schooling 
In order to arrive at a position where I as an adult researcher could comment 
on the scope for the philosophical blossoming of adults when they enter 
children’s playfully constructed worlds as guests, I let the scope of inquiry 
move farther and farther away from the walls of instrumental schooling. 
The spatial ground of reflection is any place that is not school. Simi-
larly, the temporal ground is not school time i.e. chronological time, either. 
Spatio-temporal suspension of schooling allowed this exploration to reflect 
upon the philosophical blossoming of the adult when they enter children’s 
playfully constructed worlds as a guest. In other words, the default addres-
see of pedagogy is not the chronological child, but the chronological adult. 
Shifting from my own need for epistemological giving to epistemologi-
cal receiving and arriving at the leading question itself has been part of the 
exploration. As a product of a modern institutionalised lifespan in an over-
heated world, I struggled with confronting my own internalized borders with 
respect to a chronological child as a pedagogical addressee through the 
empirical phases of this hybridic, nomadic and pluralistic exploration. It is 
not as though complex internalised borders have vanished, but the awaren-
ess that comes about as a result of trying enables me to suggest what phi-
losophy and philosophising with children could also be. ‘With’ here is not to 
be directly translated in the sense of mit (German) or med (Norwegian), but 
rather grasped in the sense of bei or hos (Biswas 2017: 97). 
This exploration culminated in a childist perspective, which can be seen 
as the conclusion of this work. 
1.3. Summary
Our overheated zeitgeist of the early 21st-century world, uniquely cha-
racterised by the acceleration of acceleration (Eriksen 2016) or Anthro-
pocene neoliberalism, is the universal context within which this longitudi-
nal exploration has taken place. The era progressed through post-colonial 
practices such as outsourcing industries, exponential exploitation of 
nature and waste colonialism especially in the majority world. Obtaining a 
balance between economic growth vis-à-vis environmental sustainability 
is the central double bind of this paradoxical era (ibid.). Exploitative colo-
nial patterns along with a specific developmental attitude preceding the 
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current era are predicted to become the model for hypothetical interpla-
netary relations in the future. 
I grasp the historicity of the present era mainly through modernity, 
understood as based on Cartesian dualism, the Cartesian idea of human as 
master and possessor of nature, and technological prowess made possible 
by Newtonian natural science of continental Europe. 
Following the Heideggerian German understanding of the essence of 
modern technology as Das Gestell and Bestand i.e. enframing of nature and 
corresponding self-revealing of beings as standing reserve where only that 
which can be measured can be - the enframed educational sector is recog-
nised as a vital part of accelerating same old trends in newer forms and at 
larger scales. 
Philosophical efforts to performatively deconstruct premises of modern 
commitments in high Human Development Index contexts can be seen in 
instances such as the non-violent demonstrations by opponents like Kvaløy 
and Næss against the hydropower project in Mardøla Falls in Norway. 
As pupils across the planet today are themselves challenged by the 
demands of the global neoliberal market, the early 21st-century global 
school strikes as a consequence of the Thunberg Effect are understood 
as upscaled efforts on the part of children to resist the existential crisis of 
Anthropocene neoliberalism powered by the individualistic and anthropo-
centric assumptions underlying global economic and social structures. 
Neoliberalism is blatant in the education sector in so far as upscaled 
modern education is reduced to skills, qualification and employability. Wit-
hin the sector, philosophising in schools and kindergartens i.e. sitting and 
talking about philosophical topics through practices like PC are globally 
implemented in order to respond to the great questions of our time and 
form children into full democratic citizens of the future. Not surprisingly, 
philosophy is also enframed in a manner that it becomes deployed as an 
instrument to work on children so that they can develop cognitive, thinking, 
moral, social and democratic skills and capacities. Illustrated in the minima-
list diagram below, one can see how PC is nested within the global educa-
tion sector, which is nested in the early 21st century era of the Anthropo-
cene neoliberalism:
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Critiques of PC that go beyond its instrumental character, particularly of 
the community of inquiry method, point towards taking subjective positio-
nalities of pedagogues into account. Within the high Human Development 
Index context attention is now being directed towards racialised common-
sense inherent in its epistemological foundations itself. 
In theory, as opposed to asking what children and childhood can learn 
from education and philosophy, it is now being asked what education and 
philosophy can learn from children and childhood. Taking philosophising 
as processes of broadening the horizons of one’s consciousness, I firmly 
doubt that one can philosophise within the literal walls of school. Conse-
quently, I sought to understand what the adult everyday philosopher can 
learn from children and childhood by exiting the enframed spatio-temporal 
context of school altogether. Hence, this work is directed towards attemp-
ting to answer the question: 
What is the scope for the philosophical blossoming of adults when they 
enter children’s playfully constructed worlds as guests?
Illustration 6: Summary Part 1. Graphic by Emma Neumeyer
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2. Philosophy with/for Children (PC) 
The history of philosophical practices with children - specifically the ques-
tion of its ‘origins’ - follows discourses oscillating between either North 
America or Europe (mainly Germany) as the pioneer land. This partly has to 
do with the cultural paradigm through which something as existentially fun-
damental as ‘philosophising’ is understood. 
The UNESCO 2007 report - Philosophy, A School of Freedom: Teaching 
and Learning to Philosophize, Status and Prospects - states that the spi-
rit of the report is universal and does not favour a particular cultural criteria 
(Goucha 2007: xix) . It claims that the study enables readers to embrace 
a broad vision insofar as it does not restrict philosophy and its transmis-
sion through teaching to the Greek and Western context. Further, that the 
study is contextualised “completely within the context of the promotion of 
the universal, indefeasible values: those of human rights and the rights of 
children, and in particular the right to education (Goucha 2007: xix).” 
The recommendations claim to be designed to be adapted to different 
cultural contexts and to diverse educational policies (Goucha 2007 :16). At 
the same time it seems evident that PC as interpreted and re-presented in 
academic journals, international networks and above all the UNESCO 2007 
report refers to and favours a very specific cultural criteria. Hence, the 
report ironically confesses the problem that it reinforces, “While the history 
of philosophical practices in relation to young people in the past remains to 
be written, there are examples of such practises being used in many parts 
of the world. In the West, Plato noted Socrates' dialogues with adolescents, 
including Lysias, and rhetorical and theological disputes were organized 
in schools during the Middle Ages. We might also mention the tradition 
of debates in Buddhist monasteries or the traditional African institution of 
'palaver', a process of debate and consensus (ibid. :16).”
Traditional Buddhist debate practices (conf. Perdue 1992)  endure, 
however, in Tibetan Buddhist monastic communities, for example in 
Ladakh. The image below, for instance, documents child monks practising 
debate in 2017. Hence, the Tibetan Buddhist Debate tradition belongs not 
just to historical representations of philosophical practices with children, 
but also to the descriptions of contemporary practices. This is especially 
pertinent within the purview of the way the genre of philosophical practices 
with children is represented in the early 21st century - somehow tracing its 
genesis to a specific form of philosophical activity in 1970s USA or at the 
most Europe. Within the minority world too, there have certainly been other 
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forms and cultural practices10 that as a result of high standardisation proces-
ses have been in some way - left out of the picture. 
It is not only that a transnational history of philosophical practices in relation 
to children is missing, but also a history of philosophy which is not nation- 
or continent-centred. 
In the broader realm of the history of education itself, Fuchs et al. (2014) 
demonstrate the need for transnational histories which, instead of putting 
nations in the centre, put cross-cultural transfers characterised by adap-
tation, re-contextualisation and hybridisation into perspective. The need 
further points to the way 'borders' are conceived of. The problem may not 
be tracing abstract roots of 'philosophy' to the European continent, but to 
broaden the horizons of our imaginations so that cultural transfers that are 
part of the evolution of thought may be rightfully accommodated. It is not 
surprising therefore, that the UNESCO 2007 report on PC worldwide is 
comprehensive and yet limited.
The trajectory of PC has also been described by Vansieleghem and 
Kennedy (2011:177) as a “method which has become a movement (ibid.)”. 
Based on Stephan Engelhart’s work (1997), the initial character of this 
genre is understood through the following three threads (ibid :172):
10 In the case of Scandinavia - the Sami and Inuit practices for example.
Illustration 8:  Child monks practising Tibetan Buddhist debate a monastic school in 
Ladakh in 2017. Image by author
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a. as focusing on developing critical thinking skills in an educational 
environment (e.g. Matthew Lipman) whereby analytical thinking skills 
are emphasised.
b. as a means of closing the gap between adult and the child (e.g. 
Gareth Matthews) in being critical of the validity of Piaget's develop-
mentalism in terms of interpreting philosophical intelligence, since it is 
held that children are likely to ask more interesting questions than adults. 
c. as a strategy to reconstruct power mechanisms and to communi-
cate as well as reflect upon personal meanings (e.g. Ekkehard Martens) 
 whereby the focus is on “letting children learn that there are different 
orientations and the practise of philosophical inquiry is necessary in order 
to learn to think beyond totality, dualism and exclusionary categories 
(Vansieleghem and Kennedy 176-177: 2011)”. 
With the second generation representatives of PC like Ann Margaret 
Sharp, David Kennedy, Philip Cam, Karin Murris, Marina Santi and Michel 
Tozzi et al., the instrumentalist structure of traditional mass schooling 
began to be understood as being at odds with the purposes of philosophy 
with children. Philosophy through this lens is not a certain skill, but a space 
wherein students can ascertain important questions for our time, and seek 
their own answers through the practice of thinking for themselves and with 
others (Vansieleghem and Kennedy 2011: 178).In other words, the focus 
of this trajectory is seen as moving from philosophy for towards philosophy 
with children (ibid.). This implies among other things that the experience of 
interacting philosophically with children gave way to a profound critique of 
the normative adult view of the child. 
2.1. Continental Roots of Philosophical Praxis
In the early 1900s in Germany, mathematician and neo-kantian philo-
sopher Leonard Nelson proposed a didactically re-oriented approach to 
Socratic discussions (Gespräche) as opposed to Socratic dialogues in 
order to guide youth and adults towards a process of critical revision of 
one’s convictions and knowledge. His student Gustav Heckmann develo-
ped Nelson’s ideas further and facilitated their travel beyond Germany to 
the Netherlands and Great Britain (Siliberti 2004:8). 
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Siliberti (2004:6) takes philosophical practice as the broader histo-
rical point of departure and credits its origins to Gerd Achenbach‘s 
 Philosophische Praxis - the first philosophical counselling practice - in 
1980s Germany. Inspired by Achenbach’s work, Parisien philosopher 
Marc Sautet began the Café Philo movement in cafés, libraries, bars and 
pubs – open to all (adults) who wished to participate. Like Sautet’s Cafe 
Philo in Paris, potter-philosopher Evan Rutherford was invited to start the 
Café Philosophique meetings by family-friends and owners of the Scart-
hin Books of Cromford in Derbyshire, hosting over 100 meetings in over 
a decade. 
While practices initiated by Achenbach, Sautet and Rutherford were 
addressing adult talk-based philosophical communication, the parallel 
evolution of philosophical practices specifically with children with an expli-
cit pedagogical intention was also gaining ground in the minority world. 
With Matthew Lipman’s publication Harry Stottlemeier‘s Discovery in 
1974, a so-called official P4C curricula was implemented in North Ame-
rica. Subsequently, an instructional manual (Lipman, Sharp et al 1980) 
would also be published. 
By 1986, in France, postmodern philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard 
had pedagogically addressed children and childhood through his work 
Le Postmoderne expliqué aux enfants (1986). By the 90s, the work had 
been made accessible to readers of English (The Postmodern explained 
to children, 1992) and German (Postmoderne für Kinder, 1996). Deleuze 
and Guattari‘s work Duheme dessine Deleuze: L‘Oiseau Philosophie 
(Duheme draws Deleuze: The Bird Philosophy) was published for a fran-
cophonic child audience in 1991. Though neither of these well-known 
European publications had the same kind of curricular intention as their 
American counterpart Harry Stottlemeier‘s Discovery and the conse-
quent instructional manual, they were indeed addressing children with a 
pedagogical intention. 
In the same year, that is 1991, Sofiesverden (Sophie’s World) by 
 Jostein Gaarder was published in Norway, a book that went on to receive, 
in 1994, the highly esteemed Deutscher Jugendliteraturpreis (German 
Children’s Literature Award) in Germany , and just within a year was to be 
found on best-seller lists in Spain, Italy and Korea (Lyall 1995). Through 
Sophie’s World, Gaarder presented a history of Western philosophy and 
philosophical thinking in a story that addressed both children and adults. 
The story was retold by virtue of computer games and television shows 
across continents and by 2017 had been declared the biggest Norwegian 
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global literary success for children and youth by the Norsk faglitterær for-
fatter- og oversetterforening (Norwegian Non-Fiction Writers and Trans-
lators Association). 
Gaarder went on to carve a niche in the literary realm of philosophical 
practices related to childhood with books like Hallo? - Er det noen her? 
(Hello? Is there anybody here? 1996) and a host of others which did not 
gain the same reception as Sophie‘s World, but contributed to a new genre 
of philosophical literature addressing children and childhood. Sophie’s 
World for example became an inspiration for a German publication based 
on a letter correspondence between and philosopher and a child called 
Nora (Hösle 1996). 
Through both curricular as well as extra-curricular media such as com-
puter games and literature, children remain on the receiving end of the phi-
losophical address. Even in nation-specific contexts such as Norway, where 
critiques of PC acknowledge children as existential equals of adults, the 
step towards re-postioning the adult pedagogue is not made.
 
2.2. PC in the Norwegian Context
Within the institutionalised pedagogical context, the Lipmanian community 
of inquiry model started to be widely accepted in global school curricula 
with nation-specific modifications. The founders of the pioneering orga-
nisation for PC in Norway - Schjelderup and Olsholt - held that important 
facets of Lipman‘s ‚caring thinking‘, i.e. to treat children with humility and 
respect, were already present in the Norwegian context. The reason, accor-
ding to Schjelderup and Olsholt, was that since Scandinavian societies 
adhere strongly to democratic thinking led by ideals of justice and equality, 
it was natural for Norwegian teachers to meet children with a humble and 
respectful attitude. 
At the same time, many educators in Norway viewed philosophy as an 
exclusive, esoteric art, placing limitations on practising the community of 
inquiry in Scandinavia. Having tried out various ways of initiating and faci-
litating philosophical dialogues with different age groups and children with 
different backgrounds, their main focus remained the spoken dialogue. As 
a consequence, they maintained some skepticism in terms of introducing 
too many pedagogical games and tools or to “let the orchestration of dia-
logue replace the dialogue itself (Goucha 2007: 37, Box 9)”. 
Lipman‘s curriculum has been a significant source of inspiration for 
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Schjelderup and Olsholt to create their own material, but they do not use 
Lipman‘s materials because they found it “culturally foreign, bearing too 
much upon American culture and pragmatist worldview11. Furthermore, 
they held that the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children 
(IAPC) adopted an instrumental approach towards philosophical thinking 
as a tool to arrive at certain external ends such as improved reading, writing 
and output in other subjects along with qualities such as openness, friendli-
ness and democratic attitudes. That would in turn compromise the intrinsic 
value of philosophy (ibid; Osholt & Schjelderup 2002: 126). 
Osholt & Schjelderup (2002: 124) held that believing in a method 
blindly leads to overlooking the ‘whole child’. Moreover, they held that there 
is no existential difference between children and adults insofar as they are 
both in search of the truth of life. It is the adults’ forgetfulness of their own 
ignorance that causes them to stop their search, but being with children as 
fellow co-explorers of truth, adults have much to learn. The ideal that adults 
mustn’t function merely as professional educators, but rather be catalysts in 
a pedagogical context and learn to become philosophers in their own lives, 
was part of Osholt and Schjelderup’s re-evaluation of the Lipmanian agenda 
(ibid: 126-127). 
At the time of the UNESCO report in 2007, when philosophy with chil-
dren was still in its initial stages in Norway, the activities of the Children and 
Youth Philosophers (CYP) received no general support or subsidies from 
the state, limiting their scope. Therefore, the focus of institutional philoso-
phical practices with children turned towards spaces like art institutions, 
philosophy clubs and camps etc. Schjelderup and Olsholt had also expres-
sed the need for academic research in the fields of pedagogy and philoso-
phy, as well as for offering seminars at university levels. 
As Schjelderup and Olsholt identified a need for bridgework between 
academia and child and youth institutions like schools and kindergartens, 
they made efforts at the University of Oslo. However, they were not very 
successful due to lack of finance and to institutional resistance. Schjelde-
rup and Olsholt perceived a worry that the practise represented a threat to 
the theoretical work that was being done at philosophical institutes. Con-
sequently, Schjelderup and Olsholt sought to collaborate on a governmen-
tal level as well as network with people and institutions that were receptive 
towards philosophy with children (Goucha 2007: 37). 
11 The scepticism towards the Lipmanian model is also present in Jesperson’s approach 
conf: http://www.buf.no/nyheter/2011/?page=0315
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Especially paralleling the growing emphasis on the third section of the 
National Kindergarten Framework (Norwegian Directorate for Education 
and Training 2017; already present in the 2006 version) devoted to the 
child‘s right to be involved (Norwegian: medvirkning), philosophy, especi-
ally with kindergarten children, had found its spot in institutional pedagogy. 
By 2016, kindergarten teacher training courses in institutions like Dronningen 
Mauds Minne in Trondheim had included the Norwegian application of PC 
in the institutional curricula. The Norwegian Directorate for Education and 
Training had also begun to concretely consider philosophy with children in 
schools (conf: Breivik & Håvard 2007). 
Alternative, ‘child-friendly’ methods outside the formal institutional 
contexts in Trondheim included events during festivals such as Olavs-
festdagene. In 2016, for example, actress Kari-Ann Grønsund realised a 
puppet-theatre12 based on philosopher Arne Næss’ toy-companion  Timotei 
(Mejlænder 2007). Children - in all cases, despite being recognised for 
being existentially on a par with adults and in spite of the ideal of engaging 
with them as philosophical co-explorers - remained addressed in a deve-
lopmental context as default addressees of pedagogy. 
2.3. Major critiques of PC
The desirability of PC as a pedagogical practice was justified on the grounds 
of its social and political impact (Kennedy & Kohan 2016: 47). Lipman’s 
community of inquiry model in particular intended to stimulate democratic 
citizenship with an emphasis on reasonability (Lipman 1991:64). In prac-
tice though, and not surprisingly, PC fell into the logic of measurement of 
the contemporary overheated era, the global education sector being no 
exception (e.g. Biesta 2011). 
Chetty (2018) has thrown critical light on the epistemological grounds 
of the method itself, pointing to a racialised common sense or fleshiness 
of reason-ability embodied by those assuming the position of the pedago-
gue in the community of inquiry. The Lipmanian premises are challenged 
by Chetty, who highlights the white ignorance that contributes to a gated 
community of inquiry, rather than a community of inquiry. The problema-
tic seems to be shared by critics who are invoking a poverty of self-reflexi-
12 Link to former Olavsfestdagene 2016 event: http://www.olavsfestdagene.no/event/
den-lille-filosofen/ [12/11/2018]
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vity insofar as philosophical commitments of privileged adult pedagogues 
remain protected in their embodied ignorance. Reed-Sandoval & Sykes 
(2017) appeal to adult pedagogues to reflect on their social location within 
existing economic, political, cultural and social network i.e. their positiona-
lities as part of pedagogical practices. Further novel questions emerging 
from critical philosophical considerations on the pedagogy of philosophy 
now start to be raised: what can education and philosophy learn from chil-
dren and childhood? (Kennedy & Kohan 2016; Kohan 2014; Kohan 2011). 
Although major critiques of PC models based on the community of 
inquiry (Biesta 2011; Kohan 2011; Jasinski & Lewis 2016; Reed-Sand-
oval & Sykes 2017; Chetty 2018) differ in focus, they all seem to be poin-
ting towards taking adult positionalities more seriously into account. At 
the same time, critiques of the dominant institutionalised practices also 
still seem to firmly believe that philosophy is possible in classrooms, but 
it is a matter of different approaches to make more spatio-temporal room 
for those positioned as default addressees of pedagogy e.g. a community 
of infancy (Jasinski & Lewis 2016). However, the institutional setting and 
commitment to spoken dialogue as The form of philosophising remains 
the same. 
So, despite the theoretical critiques and nation-specific differences wit-
hin the high Human Development Index context, PC forms part, in one way 
or another, of “a method which became a movement Vansieleghem and 
Kennedy (2001:177)”. The movement has to be further seen as part of 
the larger flow of the inclusion of children and childhood into democratic 
models as citizens. For societies like Norway, where a high “belief in social 
engineering based on social science research (Gullestad 2010:9)” is found 
- it is not surprising that children’s right to participation is extended to scien-
tific activity too. At the same time, the inclusion of any group within a par-
ticular field (e.g. political, pedagogical or scientific) implies a shift in initial 
positioning and changes in horizons of the defining borders. In other words, 
the inclusion of children in definitions of democracy implies re-positioning 
the adult-self as a citizen or the concept of democracy itself. Consequently, 
the recognition of children as citizens and children’s cultures implies shifts 
in adult-centric cultural criteria of democracy (Wall 2011; Moosa-Mitha 
2005)13. Similarly, the inclusion of children and childhood into specific cri-
13 In the case of including children in research, the re-positioning extends beyond adop-
ting child-friendly tools of research, but implies re-thinking the researcher-self and the 
methodological attitude itself (Gallacher & Gallagher 2008).
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teria of philosophising has given way for adults to engage pedagogically 
with children on philosophical topics. 
In the Norwegian context, Schjelderup & Olsholt (2002) recognise the 
existential sameness of children and adults and propose the idea of con-
sidering children as philosophical co-explorers (ibid.). However, a strong 
attachment to word-based dialogue (Gespräch) as The form of philosophi-
sing remains evident. The attachment to spoken word reinforces the epis-
temologically authoritative position of the adult whereby children are inva-
riably addressed in the developmental context. 
Despite critiques in terms of the instrumentalisation of philosophy in PC, 
the white reason-ability of the epistemology of the community of inquiry 
or the recognition of taking adult positionality more seriously, the proposal 
of including children as philosophical co-explorers due to their existential 
sameness, children, not adults, remain the default addressees of pedagogy. 
Additionally, the default entitlement of adults to be philosophical guides for 
children remains insufficiently opened for questioning. 
2.4. Summary
Within the curricular context, Matthew Lipman’s publication Harry Stottle-
meier‘s Discovery in 1974 in North America may be seen as the first offi-
cial P4C curriculum. Mathematician and neo-Kantian philosopher Leo-
nard Nelson’s proposal for a didactically re-oriented approach to Socratic 
discussions (Gespräche) in early 1900 Germany may also be considered a 
forerunner for contemporary PC practices. Outside the curricular context, 
continental philosophers such as Lyotard and Deleuze and Guttari made 
their philosophical ideas accessible for children via literature by the early 
1990s. In Scandinavia, the publication of Jostein Gaarder’s Sofiesverden 
in 1991 especially was a pathbreaker in terms of the global reception of the 
idea of addressing children pedagogically on philosophical themes. 
Second generation representatives of PC like Ann Margaret Sharp, David 
Kennedy, Philip Cam, Karin Murris, Marina Santi and Michel Tozzi et al. began 
to recognize the instrumentalist structure of traditional mass schooling as 
being at odds with the purposes of PC. Philosophy, they held, was a space 
where students can ascertain the most important questions of our time. Phi-
losophy, according to the second generation, was not a mere skill. Especially 
Biesta’s critique of the instrumentalisation of philosophy in PC is telling of how 
PC became appropriated by a larger culture of measurement in the global 
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neoliberal education sector. Consequently, the trajectory of PC began moving 
from philosophy for towards philosophy with children. Experiences of adult 
pedagogues and philosophers interacting philosophically with children also 
began giving way for a critical review of the normative adult view of the child. 
The Lipmanian community of inquiry as well as other variations, however, did 
not pay attention to the corresponding position of the adult pedagogue. 
Towards the end of the 20th century and early 21st century, PC had 
found channels through both curricular as well as extra-curricular media 
such as computer games and literature across the globe. In any case, chil-
dren remained and remain on the receiving end of the philosophical address 
i.e. the default addressees of pedagogy. 
In a wider high Human Development Index context too, major early 
21st-century critiques of PC models based on the community of inquiry 
seem differ in focus e.g. instrumentalisation, white reason-ability or lack of 
self-reflexivity, but they all seem to orient theory and praxis towards taking 
adult positionalities into account more seriously. The desirability of asking 
the question - what can education and philosophy learn from children and 
childhood, not vice versa - has also found space in theoretical considerati-
ons. At the same time, critiques of the dominant institutionalised practices 
seem to maintain that philosophy is possible in the spatio-temporality of 
classrooms. Moreover, the institutional setting and commitment to spoken 
dialogue (Gespräch) as The form of philosophising remains the same. Even 
in nation-specific contexts such as Norway, where critiques of PC acknow-
ledge children as existential equals of adults and as equal philosophical co-
explorers, there is hesitation in taking the step towards re-positioning the 
adult pedagogue such that they can learn to become philosophers in their 
own lives through exploring with children. 
The very display of the desirability of asking what education and phi-
losophy can learn from children and childhood already seems to consti-
tute a significant motion towards re-positioning of the adult pedagogue. In 
fact, the desirability of the question itself reflects that, somewhere in the 
intimate theory-praxis fibres of pedagogy of philosophy and philosophy of 
pedagogy, the will for re-positioning is breathing. Thus, the possibility to 
ask anew from different positions is there. The probability of asking anew 
from different positions, however, is stunted. The stunted probability of 
placing the pedagogical entitlement of the adult for being the philosophi-
cal guide into question owes largely to the way children and childhood are 
in fact positioned in pedagogical contexts i.e. as pupils or learners. In other 
words - as the default addressees of pedagogy. 
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It seems as though this default positioning in both theory and praxis is one 
of the strongest borders across disciplines and nations. The border, due 
to its embodied materiality, is not something that can simply be decons-
tructed away. 
At the same time, with the ever growing school-strikes, voices of chil-
dren from both private and public spheres are calling for attention in posing 
the ‘great questions of our time’ to adults. Therefore, the border cannot be 
ignored either and beckons engagement. 
With this, I proceed to take a closer look at the temporal others of adult 
beings who are posing the greatest questions of our era back at us; right-
fully calling for our attention, disrupting big plans, pulling us up and slowing 
us down in an overheated world with a bleak future. In doing so, I will pro-
ceed to present some challenges and responses around children’s right to 
participation in research, as well as a larger democratic society within which 
research happens. 
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3.  On Theoretical and Methodological  
Approaches
For the purpose of this project, I have assumed that the inseparable triangular 
scope of philosophical addressing i.e. Being (ontology), Doing (ethics) and 
Knowing (epistemology) is recurring rudimentarily throughout human life-
span, regardless of social status in terms of chronological age. Accordingly, 
all human beings are everyday-philosophers (Gullestad 1996a; 1996b) in 
their lifeworlds. What post-Husserl philosophers call the lifeworld (German: 
Lebenswelt) or anthropologists generally call culture spans the unquestio-
ned repertoire of beliefs, values, ideas, habits, dispositions, assumptions and 
practices of everyday-philosophers in a society (Gullestad 1996: 23). 
Following a Goffmanian understanding of team-based role performances 
as defining ‘real’ situations (Goffman 1990), it becomes possible to observe 
how those positioned as children are kept at bay in order to maintain the ‘rea-
lity’ of situations. Goffman uses the term performance team to refer to “any 
set of individuals who cooperate in staging a single routine” (ibid.: 85). Even 
though both children as well as adults may be recognised as everyday phi-
losophers at par, the scope for children to performatively negotiate taken-
for-granted meanings is limited in mundane life. As Goffman explains, “It 
is apparent that if performers are concerned with maintaining a line they 
will select as team-mates those who can be trusted to perform properly. 
Thus children of the house are often excluded from performances given for 
guests of a domestic establishment because often children cannot be trus-
ted to ‘behave’ themselves, i.e. to refrain from acting in a way inconsistent 
with the impression that is being fostered” (ibid.). In the respective foot-
note, Goffman further explains: “ In so far as children are defined as ‘non-
persons’ they have some licence to commit gauche acts without requiring 
the audience to take the expressive implications of these acts too seriously. 
However, whether treated as non-persons or not, children are in a position 
to disclose crucial secrets” (ibid: 96, footnote 20).
Certain ways of seeing become habitual to performance teams of ever-
yday philosophers as we co-universalize our own little lifeworlds in order 
to keep up with the normalized temporality of life. One takes for granted or 
simply surrenders to that which is already taken for granted. For adult per-
formance teams, it becomes necessary to ensure that children maintain the 
desired epistemological balance of knowing and concealing.
Think for example of the disruptive child in Anderson’s (1837) Kejserens 
nye Klæder (Emperor’s New Clothes), who literally spills the naked truth. Or 
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Professor Robert Kelly’s BBC live-telecasted Skype interview (BBC News 
2017) was interrupted by the unsupervised entry of his children, followed 
by his wife who desperately tried to pull them out of the visible scene. Simi-
larly, as a result of COVID-19 lockdowns which imposed new temporary 
norms of home-office and video conferencing, ‘disruptions’ of professio-
nal adult performative acts became a wide-spread phenomenon (Schmidt 
2020). Business as usual requires keeping game-changing actors at bay. 
What makes sense in one’s worldview instantly vanishes as tiny de(con)
structive performances reveal the mythical pictures that adults are philoso-
phically committed to. The capacity of child beings of the human species 
to deconstruct our taken-for-granted worlds with the tiniest acts doesn’t 
require sophisticated argumentation. By simply being in the ‘wrong’ place 
at the ‘wrong’ time, the co-constructed realities of adult teams can be put 
into profound question. Such states of being-put-into-question concern 
the mundane e.g. how mundane routines and subjective states should be 
experienced, but also concern deeper levels of philosophical commitments 
e.g. what and how life from prenatal to postmortem states is/should be. 
In contemporary modern European and Scandinavian worldviews, it 
seems as though the existential telos of upbringing is individual autonomy 
and self-determination. Highly institutionalised and standardized human 
life-spans starting with prenatal stages is one of the general social opera-
tions through which this value (among others) is realised. Childhood is cha-
racterised by early years of total dependence, security, innocence, exten-
ded play and compulsory schooling (Honeyman 2013: 167). 
Furthermore, being schooled is a default way of childhood and there are 
no structurally supported lifestyle choices possible for children as in the 
case of child monks in Ladakh (Biswas 2013; 2016). An individual or a 
‘person’ in a modern, Western view is understood as egocentric as oppo-
sed to sociocentric, and starts with birth and ends with death (Smith 2012; 
Eriksen 2004: 20). Further, there is no agreement on what happens after-
wards (Eriksen 2004) or realms beyond objective, secular, material rea-
lity where human consciousness could come from and so on. Other cau-
sal understandings regarding where life comes from, however, do exist (eg. 
Gottlieb 2015). Not in every worldview does the egocentric individual life 
begin at birth and end with death; the Buddhist causal view of life and death 
for example is cyclical (conf. Chatterjee and Datta 2016). Modern egocen-
tric individual lives, however, are interconnected through processes of pro-
duction and reproduction - in every sense of the term. 
Reproduction of humans i.e. a precondition for social reproduction of 
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any sort - is an indispensable factor in keeping human societies going on 
earth. A lot depends on children and childhood, but even more so on how 
and from where adults view children and childhood. In fact, the dimensions 
through which children and childhood are viewed influence theorizations on 
the matter. Frønes (1994: 148-149) charts four dimensions of studying 
children and childhood14: 
a. analysis of socio-cultural relations among generations, 
b. relationships among children, 
c. institutional arrangements of childhood and 
d. childhood as an age-group akin to social class.
As a structural component of modern societies, I consider childhood wit-
hin the triangular constellation of the state, family and the child. It is wit-
hin this constellation that children can be identified as separate objects of 
social administration and control, whereby identifying children as ‘individu-
als’ means formally separating them from their social background in order 
to bureaucratically individuate them (Näsman 1994). 
While individuation is the systematic tendency to treat individual humans 
as the basic units of bureaucratic handling, individualization refers to indi-
viduals as a psychological personality (Frønes 1994: 147). Individuation is 
possible through a refined system of classification and differentiation for 
the bureaucratic insurance that justice is done by treating each member 
of the category equally. It is not intended to accentuate the uniqueness of 
each member of a particular category (ibid.). Chronological age is a central 
reference point in demarcating modern childhood globally; as done by the 
United Nations Child Rights Convention by defining individuals under the 
specific chronological age of 18 as children15. 
Age-group consequently becomes the primary factor through which 
life-phases are institutionally organised. Based primarily on such social 
14 Mouritsen (2002) uses the term ‘child culture’ to lay out a similar analysis to Frønes’ 
dimensions of studying children and childhood analysis (1994).
15 Chronological age as per UNESCO convention is a pragmatic point of reference for 
determining who is identified and positioned as a child. The phenomenological understan-
ding I follow is that of ‘a temporal other’(also conf. section 1.1.3). 
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facts, one can talk about childhood (and thereof the identity of a ‘child’) 
as socially constructed. It is not just a matter of social meaning, as Schrag 
(2006:427) critically remarks, but also of the highly individuated, indivi-
dualised and institutionalised framework which demarcates the existential 
horizons of how a modern lifespan (as becoming in time) may be expe-
rienced. This includes: 
1.  the spatial positioning within a particular economic way of produc-
tion, insofar as children’s obligatory tasks are system-immanent, 
i.e. they always correspond to the prevailing forms of production 
(Qvortrup 2001:97). 
2.  the temporal positioning, i.e. a. the way the experience of time is 
shaped as well as claimed by society, and b. the extent to which one 
has claim to society’s resources (Qvortrup 2008). 
It is not by chance that modern children’s school work is dominant in quan-
titative terms; the new economy could not survive and prosper otherwise 
(Qvortrup 2001:97). This type of highly socially engineered, existential, spa-
tio-temporal positioning of human life is peculiar to modernity and especially 
correlates to contemporary high Human Development Index contexts. 
In other words. high Human Development Index contexts re-produce 
human capital and culture primarily through highly individuated, individua-
lised and institutionalised age-based segregation systems. Of course, as 
these contexts do exert considerable influence on how lifecourse experien-
ces should be globally standardized e.g. through human and child rights 
conventions, it becomes possible to talk about ‘designed childhoods’ glo-
bally (Gutman and Coninck- Smith 2008). The mass-scale operation of age-
based segregation gives rise to forms of cultural islanding (Gillis 2008) which 
are specific to age-groups. 
On the one hand then, adults can individuate ‘our’ children and ‘their’ chil-
dren based on nation-specific demarcations such as ‘Norwegian’ or ‘non-
Norwegian’ children. On the other hand, the adult members of the human 
species live on mythical islands whereby new members called children are 
systematically assimilated into their own mythical, but onto-epistemologi-
cally superior worlds. As Gillis (2008: 317) explains, 
“Modern life is full of child-centred moments - Christmases, birthdays, 
summer holidays - elaborate rituals created by adults both to connect 
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with children and gain reassuring access to memories of their own child-
hoods. [...] The islanding of children must be considered a creation of 
adults, a response to their own needs rather than those of children. [...] 
Adults have not only islanded children physically, but have also cons-
tructed mythical landscapes that sustain childhood in its idealized 
forms, even when it is no longer sustainable in a real world. [...] Myt-
hical geography consists of the mental maps that orient us in the world 
where physical landmarks and signposts are often obscure or absent. 
The mythical landscapes of childhood constitute a kind of parallel uni-
verse, one that bears a similarity to physical geography but has the vir-
tue of being invulnerable to both temporal and spatial changes that are 
constantly transforming the real world.” 
Consequently, new geographical imaginations and philosophical borders 
come forth. Borders that have to be passed on, in order to sustain the highly 
‘developed’ ways of life which the ‘naive native’ does not yet know. 
The assumption seems to be: developed ones develop the developing 
ones. Further, that the developing ones are dependent, needy receivers of 
aid, care, knowledge and most importantly: principles of reason. Further-
more: the developed ones are independent, non-needy, rational givers. 
For some indescribable reason these borders also position the develo-
ped one as philosophically higher - whereby the adult, primarily by virtue of 
being adult, already qualifies to teach the child something philosophical. A 
Gregorian calendar-determined identity ends up creating an islanded life-
phase, invariably rendering the child into a default addressee of pedagogy. 
As a child, constantly being positioned as the pupil leaves little room to 
negotiate existential matters of becoming and time. One has to learn how 
not to put the ‘larger’ adult-determined realities into profound question. 
Processes of interpretive reproduction i.e. socialisation (Corsaro 1993; 
1997) are limited in so far as they cannot negotiate the philosophical pre-
mises of what is given by the adult-determined reality. Consequently, one 
can move from the little developing islands of childhoods to the large deve-
loped countries of adulthoods. Primarily due to my increasing awareness 
of this little room to negotiate existential matters of being and becoming as 
a child with and within larger adult-determined realities - I began doubting 
the PC practices in classrooms. It seems as though this particular cultural 
practice belongs to a long tradition of civilizing human beings who are not 
there yet due to their temporal otherness - what amounts to invariably pla-
cing the child on the learning end of the pedagogical relationship. 
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 3.1  The Child as a Default Addressee of Pedagogy
According to Duane (2013:3), the concept child has a long history of being 
metaphorically deployed in Western scholarship as the model for human 
progress, for example from savagery to civilization, from murky past to a 
fully realized present and so on. In opposition to Hume’s claims of white 
racial superiority, and in order to make the point that one has to allow time 
for a process of civilisation to take place, Beattie (1805: 309) writes, “The 
inhabitants of Great Britain and France were as savage two thousand years 
ago, as those of Africa and America are at this day. Civilisation is the work of 
time. And one may as well say of an infant, that he can never become a man 
as of a nation now barbarous, that it never can be civilised.” 
A similar analogy occurs in Jefferson’s letter to Bancroft whereby Jef-
ferson (1789, in ed. Boyd 1958: 492) asserts: “ [...] as far as I can judge 
from the experiments which have been made, to give liberty to, or rather, 
to abandon persons whose habits have been formed in slavery is like aban-
doning children.” The conceptualisation here is of something i.e. a person, 
place or time that is primitive, uncivilized and foreign, yet having the poten-
tial for a rationally autonomous future. This is to affirm, at the least, that 
child members of the human species are in the most basic and broadest 
sense addressed within the context of development. However, in all cases 
a crude not-yet-ness has to undergo some sort of training. The one that is 
entitled to train belongs to the developed context and is epistemologically 
higher in the hierarchy. 
For instance, the popular etiquette writer Mrs. Manners in 1853 North 
America echoed a widely shared view describing young boys as wild, care-
less, primitive savages commonly compared to Indians and African tribes-
men (Rotundo 1998: 337). Kant, who is held to have been highly influenced 
by Rousseau’s Emile (Kant 1904. ed Buchner: 25), advised that “children 
should be educated, not with reference to their present condition, but rat-
her with regard to a possibly improved future state of the human race, that 
is, according to the idea of humanity and its entire destiny” (ibid.: 116).
For Kant, reason and duty were to triumph over both instinct and incli-
nation (Buchner on Kant 1904: 27; Schapiro 2003:577). In the introduc-
tion to his Lecture-Notes on Pedagogy, Kant (1904:101) opens with a 
clear reference to the child as a default pedagogical addressee, “Man is the 
only creature that must be educated. By education we mean care (main-
tenance), discipline (training), and instruction, including culture16. Man 
is thus babe, pupil, and scholar.” Kant held that “man can become man 
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through education only” and that “man could be educated only by those 
who are educated themselves” (ibid:107). One of his chief classifications 
of the telos of education was the development of humanity in so far as 
man had to be  disciplined, cultured, civilized, moralized through educa-
tion (Kant 1904: 121-123). 
In section 30, Kant lays down the guidelines for what should be obser-
ved in educating a child towards freedom through constraint. Section 30c 
is particularly noteworthy as a developmental context which is also primi-
tive and foreign is explicitly evoked: “It must also be shown to the child that 
he is under such constraint as will lead him to the use of his own freedom; 
that he is cultivated, so that one day he may be free, - that is, not depen-
dent upon the foresight of others. This is the child’s latest acquisition. For 
the consideration that each must rely upon himself for his own sustenance 
comes to the child very late. They fancy it will always be as it is in the paren-
tal home; that food and drink will come without any thought on their part. 
Without such treatment, children, and especially those of rich parents and 
princes, become like the inhabitants of Tahiti, who remain children their 
whole life long.” (ibid: 132; emphasis by author) 
One sees here a conceptual synthesis of childhood and the non-white 
peoples’ context conceived of as in need of development. On these lines, 
Bøyum (2002: 100) raises the question - what was it about Tahitians that got 
Kant to evoke this comparison with children? The answer he provides is the 
following: “First and foremost the natural. The childlike is not yet cultivated, 
and so locates itself closer to the original natural state. Next, the emotional. 
The childlike17 follows its emotional hunches instead of reason. To be child-
like is therefore also to be instantaneous. One follows one’s instincts “wit-
hout thinking over it”, not taking a step back in order to reflect. Therefore, 
we think of children as irresponsible. However, we can also perceive that as 
freedom because it is not determined by social conventions and self-con-
sciousness. These features also apply to the childlike mentality. To think in a 
childlike manner is to be subjective. One considers things for the meaning 
they bear/have for oneself instead of taking a general perspective. This also 
16 According to Buchner, Kant’s conception of culture here is Bildung and is to be unders-
tood in the sense of moral culture. In some cases e.g. in section 6 of Lecture-Notes on 
Pedagogy Buchner has translated the term as ‘education’. The term ‘culture’ has been 
broadly used by Kant and alongside ‘morality’ central to his conception of education. 
17 Since the term childish carries derogatory connotations, Barnlige is translated as 
childlike instead.
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inbears a self-orientation towards the concrete and particular instead of the 
abstract and general. One can also say that the childlike mindset is orga-
nic: it does not draw distinctions and treat different things for themselves 
such as an analytic approach requires. Lastly, the childlike is characterised 
by letting the fantasy govern, not logic. Consequently the childlike is asso-
ciated with play, as opposed to the serious work of reason. One therefore 
gladly perceives art as childlike and science as the opposite. The question 
then is: Where does philosophy place itself?” (ibid.: 100-101; translation 
from Norwegian by author, emphasis original). 
On similar lines, Speier (1976: 168 - 186) describes the view that posi-
tions the child as a default addressee of pedagogy as the adult  ideological 
viewpoint. The traditional interest in studying childhood orients itself 
towards regarding children as a raw material for cultural18 learning. Moreo-
ver, apart from their physical growth, they have also been looked upon 
as entrants in a society who have to learn to adapt to that social context 
(Speier 1976: 168). A magnitude of the focus of so-called Western scho-
larship has been on the process through which a child becomes an adult in 
her society i.e. development.19
The normative framework of conceiving development has been based 
on an adult view of social life in terms of the rules for navigating properly in 
their lifeworld. The adult ideological viewpoint perceives development as 
a historical and biographical process. It is also through this viewpoint that 
the adult members of the society with whom a child interacts are referred 
to as ‘agents’ of socialisation and it is argued that they become models 
for her own behaviour (ibid: 169). What in turn occurs is a compromise in 
terms of cognizing the interactional characteristics of processes of socia-
lisation and the possibility of grasping the child members of a society as 
inter-actants (ibid: 171). 
Analogously, child members of a society also remain invariably 
 addressed in this developmental light when considered in their role of 
philosophical beings. 
18 And as a corollary: philosophical.
19 A noteworthy parallel with the integration and migration debates is that key questions 
about multiculturalism or assimilation are about the immigrant becoming a ‘citizen’ of the 
host society (e.g. Kivisto and Wahlbeck 2013). 
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3.1.1  The Child as a Default Addressee of  
Philosophical Development
In the realm of philosophical education for children, pedagogue Jespersen 
has been a central figure in Scandinavia (Breivik & Løkke 2007: 4). In his 
work on childhood and philosophy, for instance, one remarks a tendency 
towards understanding childhood as a primitive, developmental context 
which is also foreign/extraneous. As part of the conviction as to why phi-
losophy should be included in schools, Jespersen (1993:10; translation 
from Danish by author) argues: “From nativity to adult life they go through 
in their spiritual and intellectual development, reflecting all of philosophy’s 
development from ancient Greece to the present. Therefore, it can be 
argued that children think pre-philosophically. Therefore, philosophy can 
reach them in the world they live in. Therefore, we need to have philoso-
phy in the school.” Here, there is an analogous developmental discourse in 
describing a generalized history of philosophy beginning in Greece and a 
child’s life course. Childhood as a stage is likened with a pre-philosophical 
stage in ancient Greece. 
In other words, the analogy conceptually presents childhood as somet-
hing in the past with a potential for philosophical development. It implies a 
corollary that adulthood is the present space-time towards which the child 
has to be led. Jespersen further concludes that, due to the similarity bet-
ween children’s development and the history of philosophy, it is possible 
for philosophy to be brought into the world where children live in. Hence, 
philosophy should be introduced in schools. The child here is recognized as 
having her own world, but also as in need of being helped to move from a 
universal pre-philosophical stage (as in ancient Greece) to a more contem-
porary stage through adult intervention. 
Therein, while the philosophical attributes of children receive positive 
validity, one concludes that the next step is to infiltrate their world in order 
to teach them something. In this particular strain of understanding, where 
childhood appears to be a (foreign) country in the past and adulthood is a 
country in the present; the present is also epistemologically more advanced 
and thus entitled - and perhaps also obligated . to support the movement 
from the pre-stage to a post-stage. The intervention is usually supposed 
to take place in a particular social space allocated to childhood: the school. 
Especially in high Human Development Index countries, it is next to 
impossible to think about the child independently of a pedagogical insti-
tution to which she ‘belongs’. This is not surprising, given that obligatory 
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institutionalization is the dominant way of life for children, especially in high 
Human Development Index contexts. 
Structurally speaking, then, children can be legally obliged to spend a 
sizeable amount of their time in schools i.e. “a spatial positioning which pro-
vides a singular possibility for the focused and highly considered manage-
ment and control of an extensive group within the population” (James, 
Jenks & Prout 1998:41). Accordingly, these spatial positionings “provide 
an ordered temporal passage from child to adult status; at the same time, 
on a daily basis, they restrict the ways in which children can spend their 
time” (ibid.). Important rites of passage from one life stage to another also 
become intimately knotted with institutionalised spatial positionings, for 
example the high-school graduation ritual Russ, which almost every Nor-
wegian child citizen participates in (Corsaro and Johannessen 2013). 
The individualising effect that modern schooling has on children not 
only progresses through the school system e.g. primary to secondary or 
rites like Russ, but daily time-slotting such as lessons, break-time etc. 
too (Oswell 2013: 121). Furthermore, curricula are more than content-
description, because of the non-accidental theories of cognitive and 
bodily development containing world-views embedded in their construc-
tions. Among other things, this involves philosophies of human nature 
and potential, apart from selections related to questions of power and 
identity specifically addressing children and childhood. Curricula, espe-
cially the time-table as its central organizing principle, “instances human-
kind’s selection from and control of its world; its replication and repetition 
in paradigmatic style instances the control of others through the constitu-
tion of the child’s body and consciousness into the form of an educational 
identity”(James, Jenks & Prout 1998:42). It is not surprising that the rai-
son d’etre of PC in curricula is often expected to be justified on grounds of 
its efficacy in promoting argumentation and reasoning skills (e.g. Reznits-
kaya and Anderson 2006).
The matter of education is invariably interlaced with processes of socia-
lization and one’s knowledge of the social order. One’s tendency towards 
grasping concepts like ‘child’ and ‘childhood’ consists in viewing them as 
universal recipients of rearing, care, education and guidance through adult 
members of the human species in the particular societies where its child 
members are situated. Such an approach, however, re-emphasises, re-
plays and re-produces the epistemologically powerful, independent and 
developed ‘adult’ who is invariably positioned at the giving end of any child-
adult dynamic. Moreover, it systematically neglects vital areas of childhood 
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e.g. peer-relations, care-giving, social negotiations, children’s epistemolo-
gical manipulation of adults and so on. 
I describe this as the pedagogical gaze i.e. an instrumentalising gaze 
whereby even scientific attention is directed to the areas of behaviour that 
parents focus on (Bluebond-Langner 1978:5). Hence, such gaze follows 
from an adult-ideological (Speier 1976) or what Flascher has termed the 
adultist position (Flascher 1978). In other words, one focuses on bringing 
children up by negating that children are also involved in literally and figu-
ratively bringing adults down i.e. grounding them back to earth in the pro-
cess. 
As actors in their own right, children are not one-sided recipients of pro-
cesses of socialisation; on the contrary, they interpretively reproduce the 
social orders and codes that they grasp through their being in the world 
(Corsaro 1993; 1997). The pedagogical gaze is oriented towards all that 
is necessary for performing as competent adults according to a rather ido-
lized and complete picture of adulthood. In turn, this implies viewing chil-
dren in terms of what they will become and viewing childhood through its 
bearing on future activities and status (Bluebond-Langner 1978:5). Child-
rearing is however only one aspect of interaction with children and sociali-
zation processes (ibid.). 
Similarly, teaching (German: beibringen) children something is one 
aspect of child-adult interaction which is possible by first and foremost 
viewing the child as a pedagogical addressee. If the rearing and teaching 
must in fact take place, the addressee of rearing and teaching is howe-
ver still supposed to simultaneously interpret the address and act along. 
“Possessing a self20 children can interpret the behaviour of others and act 
on the basis of their own interpretations (cf. Mead 1970 and Blumer 1969) 
[...] in the course of inter-action” (Bluebond-Langner 1978:7-8). In other 
words, the process of meaning-making in coordination with the objects and 
others around the self is in motion. It may not happen through spoken or 
written words and sentences, and may not be articulated or could be inter-
preted as inarticulated. Nevertheless, the lifelong continuum of interpreta-
tion and meaning making IS in motion. 
20 Self here in an existential sense i.e. the sense of existing in the world. Not in a psy-
chological sense of experiencing oneself as a separate entity. The latter can be ‘tested’ 
through tools like the famous mirror tests performed on animals and children. The former 
can only be inferred. 
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3.1.2. Bluebond-Langner’s Axioms 
In cases where children can communicate in languages that their adult 
counterparts recognize and understand as ‘language’, a play of showing 
and concealing knowledge becomes evident as in Bluebond-Langner’s 
study with dying children shows (Bluebond-Langner 1978). The study is 
especially relevant here, as it deals with the lived-experiences of a highly 
philosophical subject namely: death. At the same time, it is not in abstrac-
tion that such a subject lives - it is a subject that comes into the existential 
play of life the moment a human is born. 
The emphasis here is that the terminally-ill participants of Bluebond-
Langner’s study-participants had mechanisms to find out that they were 
dying when no one told them. Furthermore, they concealed their own 
knowledge from their parents and medical staff. Both the knowing and 
concealing of the knowledge that they would die are examples of how the 
children actively acquired the knowledge that was existentially import-
ant to them and at the same time decided not to reveal it - reflecting the 
social order to which they were socialised and the place that death had 
in their society. 
The mutual pretence in the interplay of knowledge and concealment 
was part of preserving a certain social order of those particular, interre-
lated, institutional settings e.g. family and medical facilities (Bluebond-
Langner 1978: 198). In other words: why they play along. Mutual pretense 
is like a ‘delicately balanced drama’, with a superfluity of (adult-determi-
ned) rules to be followed, and it inevitably breaks down (Glaser and Strauss 
1965b:74ff, in ibid: 200). An open awareness then becomes the new con-
text for interaction (ibid.). 
While the parents had their questions e.g. What am I going to do? 
What does it all mean? Will he die? What am I going to tell him? (Blue-
bond-Langner 1978:3) - obviously there were questions on the other side 
too e.g. What can I do? What is happening to me? What is going on? Why 
are my parents behaving like this? Regardless of how one categorizes the 
nature of these questions from the outside, what is important to mark here 
is the relationality of the questions. That is to say that questions and co(r)
responding motions arise in a highly interrelated context. Not all questi-
ons may be as directly corresponding to each other - but there is a form of 
implicit dialogue flowing here and children are actively participating. The 
following axioms about children are presented as a result of Bluebond-
Langner’s work (ibid : 12): 
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1. They are willful, purposeful creatures who possess selves.
2.  They interpret their behaviour and act on the basis of  
their interpretations.
3. They interpret their own self-images.
4.  They interpret the behaviour of others to obtain a view of  
themselves, others, and objects.
5. They are capable of initiating behaviour so as to affect the view 
others have of them and that they have of themselves.
6.  They are capable of initiating behaviour to affect the behaviour  
of others toward them.
7.  Any meaning that children attach to themselves, other, and  
objects varies with respect to the physical, social, and temporal  
settings in which they find themselves.
8.  Children can move from one social world to another and act  
appropriately in each world.
Re-positioning the way one sees children as the other based on the afore-
mentioned axioms has significant implications for scientific understanding 
of the nature of consciousness which is highly significant for the discussion 
on philosophising in general and in children in particular. 
For the pedagogical gaze in philosophy some immediate, unanswered 
questions emerge, namely: What role does consciousness play in philoso-
phising? Is there a difference in child and adult consciousness? (If so, then) 
Should and can it be hierarchically categorized in terms of higher and lower 
or better or worse consciousness? In the case that one is higher or better, 
which one is it and can pedagogical authority towards the other be justified 
on those grounds?
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3.1.3.  Childhood Beyond the Developmental  
State Model
The axioms that Bluebond-Lagner’s work outlines belong to the purview 
of childhood studies whereby children are seen as active social partici-
pants (James, Jenks and Prout 1998, Qvortrup 1994; Alanen 2005; Cor-
saro 1993; 1997) and at the same time relate to the sociological critique 
of the adult/child distinction as a product of history and changing social 
relations (Lee 2001:37). This has also led some to doubt the assumption 
that adulthood itself can no longer be understood as axiomatically sta-
ble, complete, independent and developed; in turn calling for a fairer con-
ceptualisation which can see all humans as fundamentally dependent and 
incomplete (ibid.). The equation of childhood as a state of dependency 
itself, it has been argued, lies in the history of nation-states and in the 
widespread adoption of the developmental state model (ibid: 34). Howe-
ver, the imaginary concept of nation, (Anderson 2006) too, is in a flux. 
Nationhood - which has been understood as part of the ‘inner self’ 
and hence linked with individual identities - is also being understood as 
flexible. In the light of increased migration, national boundaries are gra-
dually being conceptually divorced from ‘physical boundaries’ (Kjørholt 
2008:33), while powerful discourses on children as citizens entertain the 
question whether children are being constructed as a new global nation 
(ibid.). The idea of a travelling nation has also been suggested (e.g. Hult-
quist & Dahlberg 2001). In the Norwegian context one can affirm the pre-
sence of a hegemonic element in the interdiscursive relationship between 
discourses on democracy and nationality on the one hand, and children 
and childhood on the other (Kjørholt 2008:37; also see Gullestad 1997). 
To break it down further - the underlying matters here refer to:
1.  participation 
2.  that in which one participates. 
Increasingly, seeing children as active social participants leads to forms of 
social construction whereby “to an increasing degree, childhood is cons-
tructed as a symbolic value related to democracy, national identity, auto-
nomy and authenticity” (Kjørholt 2008: 31). In the early 1990s, in the 
Norwegian project Prøv Selv (Try Yourself) children were constructed as 
an imagined community that is supposed to inhabit its own authentic cul-
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ture. The imagined community, however, is not anchored in any particular 
geographical area, as a notion of childhood is constructed within particu-
lar historical and cultural circumstances. 
Some of the participants constituted an imagined community of 
friends, united in a shared interest in singing, making music and travel-
ling around, raising money for a charitable organisation. Their imagined 
travelling community was spatially dispersed in the public space, depic-
ting the blurred boundaries between the local and the national (ibid.). Alt-
hough Kjørholt acknowledges the view of childhood as a symbolic space 
where notions of democracy, nationality identity, autonomy and authenti-
city are both represented and reproduced, she herself is equally hesitant 
to regard the notion of children’s culture as separate from the surrounding 
adult cultural context, because it can contribute to concealing the dyna-
mic interrelatedness and embeddedness of children’s cultures in larger, 
adult-constituted cultural and political structures (ibid.). 
However, given that structural individuation and individualization along 
with institutional segregation based on age are basic operations of social 
engineering through which high Human Development Index contexts sub-
sist, it seems unlikely that –the recognition of the islanding of childhood is 
avoidable. Such recognition, however, need not entail an exclusion of the 
structure-immanent or interdependent nature of childhood with respect 
to adulthood21. In other words, the childhood-adulthood continuum in 
itself is not negated, but the affirmation of cultural worlds on the smaller 
side of the continuum is magnified for the pedagogical gaze. 
In order to magnify the smaller side of the childhood-adulthood con-
tinuum, in what follows, I will now present a consideration of islanded 
modern childrens’ cultures as part of system-immanent childhood cultu-
res from micro- and macro-level dimensions. The consideration is taken 
on in order to come closer to identifying where and how children’s inter-
pretive philosophical agency subsists in constrainment. 
21 Especially if plurality is integrated into the logical foundations of studying children 
and childhoods. In other words, one needs something that goes beyond traditional 
two-valued logic.
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3.2.  Children’s Cultures in System  
Immanent Childhood Cultures
The biological fact of differences between adult and child bodies - including 
the brain - cannot alone justify the entitlement of the philosophical autho-
rity of the adult in relation to the child22. It may also amount to an analytical 
fallacy to (con)fuse the senses of ‘developmental context’ to refer to both 
childhood as well as specific geographical localisations.  
Nevertheless, as I have written in the earlier sections, there has been a 
historical tendency in Western traditions, including philosophy, to draw an 
analogy between children and peoples who were perceived as ‘foreign’. The 
former and latter have also been considered as ‘lacking’ culture which the 
‘educated’, ‘developed’ or ‘civilised’ one has. Hence, I remark:
 
1.  The having seems to give way to a sense of entitlement and even duty 
to ‘aid’ and ‘raise’ the ones who do not-yet have. This in turn comes to 
negate what the one addressed in the developing context has and the 
so-called ‘educated’‘, ‘developed’ or ‘civilized’ one does not. 
2.  The individuating, individualising and institutionalising nature of 
modern and especially high Human Development Index contexts 
gives way to islanding of childhoods, that remains structurally 
addressed in the developmental context. 
The former remark refers to the non-recognition and negation of the epis-
temological surplus of the other with reference to a self that is centrally-
positioned as having culture. The latter refers instead to how modernity 
itself structurally constructs islanded cultures based on age-segregation. 
Consequently, recognizing and studying children’s life-worlds has multiple 
overlapping dimensions. 
Corresponding to the micro and macro level dimensions of studying chil-
22 As I have argued elsewhere (Biswas 2017: 91), if philosophising is primarily defined 
through articulated language-bound acts such as argumentation, a bigger adult brain as 
opposed to a smaller child brain can claim philosophical authority. However, the mind 
plays a role in philosophising and there is no scientific certainty about what is meant 
by the term ‘mind’. The tendency in Western (Cartesian) traditions is to treat the mind 
as body and attribute a psychical localisation to it in the brain. Here, it is assumed that 
the mind is in the brain and that is where ‘thinking’ happens. Consequently, it is derived 
that a more developed brain automatically implies a more developed mind. It is however 
ridiculous to suggest that the mind is located solely in the brain! 
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dren and childhood (Frønes 1994: 148-149) i.e. child-adult, child-child, 
institutional and structural as in social class - conceiving childhoods as 
cultures and children’s cultures also has multiple, intertwined dimensi-
ons. As I mentioned before, especially in modern societies in general, and 
in high Human Development Index contexts in particular - childhood must 
be considered within the triangular constellation of the state, family and 
the child. 
Within this constellation, general child-adult relations or rather the 
childhood-adulthood relationship is not solely of cultural and natural 
reproduction, but also of production (Oldman 1994: 56). To put it simply: 
it costs money to raise children. To put it crudely: it costs money to pro-
duce highly developed human capital. Childhood activities are for exam-
ple structured in order to serve the economic interests of adulthood i.e. 
family as well as state and market. Supervised curricular and extracurri-
cular activities outside the family create childwork, whereby the child is 
the psychological or pedagogical object of adult labour - one that is in the 
process of becoming, not being (ibid: 46).23 
Only a small amount of childwork is done by parents and without 
financial reward24 (ibid: 45) and takes place outside the nuclear family due 
to the increasing incorporation of mothers into the labour force (ibid: 51). 
On the other hand, unsupervised new media technology-assisted activi-
ties make children at once independent and dependent (Lee 2002: 87) 
and free parents from child care (Oldman 1994:55). Parent-child time in 
the broadest sense becomes a one-parent-at-a-time thing with the other 
parent ‘freed’ for work (ibid:52). 
Children’s domestic labour in high Human Development Index con-
texts too is primarily linked with self-maintenance; not that of other family 
members. Therein lies the contemporary value of children’s domestic 
labour for adults (ibid.), in turn reproducing specific constructed cultural 
understandings of the ‘autonomous’ child. The value of scholastic labour 
is also linked with the childwork it represents e.g. teaching, ancillary, 
administrative staff in schools etc. Consequently, one sees the connection 
23 Institutionalised philosophical training too, as I have discussed, belongs to the same 
adultist tendency. 
24 In high Human Development Index contexts in welfare states like Norway, provisions for 
parental leave from work, as well as financial support in this period exists. Financial support 
to cover children’s living and educational costs are also generously covered by the state. 
Parental leave is however only in a limited amount of time in early years and one is not paid 
for childwork as such.
59
between educational expenditures expressed for example in salaries and 
educational output expressed through ‘achievements’ of children (ibid: 53). 
Similarly, with extra-curricular activities like swimming, dancing, ska-
ting, skiing, listening to music and so on comes at a price which goes into 
child-work wages and profits of leisure industries. Although many adults do 
‘voluntary’ work, often this is a stepping stone into part-time paid work or 
entry into the professionalized labour-market as a child worker (ibid: 54). 
Here, the vulnerable child’s desire for play and leisure is systematically capi-
talized upon. The notion of play here is also very specific as firstly opposed 
to work, secondly as belonging to childhood, thirdly as good for ‘develop-
ment’, and lastly - as one sees in Article 31 of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child - as a right (Shackel 2015). 
Contemporary high Human Development Index notions strongly link 
play and childhood (Kline 1998: 96). In contrast to the feudal European 
worldview where the community shared work and leisure as well as games, 
macro- and micro-level concerns with children’s rights, leisure and plea-
sure manifest themselves in an extravagance of toys and objects specially 
designed for children filling up children’s own rooms (ibid: 97; emphasis 
by author). The nineteenth century in particular gave way to a specific view 
of child development, whereby children are innocent and in need of forma-
tion, learning and protection from harsh realities of industrial society (Kline 
1998). Here the early seeds of a new self-conscious conception of chil-
dren’s culture are noted. 
Through systematic and structural social exclusion - the idea of child-
hood as a life phase (Närvänen & Näsman 2004) or generation (Qvortrup 
2009) or even class (Oldman 1994) and children as the chronologically 
determined age-based categorised group was compensated by gran-
ting them specific rights, separate institutional spaces with a new training 
agenda. 
Within this agenda literacy and ‘knowledge’ became objectives of socia-
lisation and the state began to assert its own interest in communication with 
children (Kline 1998: 98). According to historian DeMause (in ibid.), “the 
very idea of the family and schools as [...] agents of conscious attempts to 
shape and mould children into civilized beings by orchestrating their lear-
ning and social experiences - gains its full force precisely during this intense 
period of upheaval. [...] In literature and popular writing of the period, child-
hood became both a way of understanding the changes of industrialization 
and a fitting metaphor for growth and development”.
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In structurally excluding this certain life phase and its members, childhood 
and children are also in a way made visible in a specific way. For example, 
they are much more easily recognisable in twentieth-century art and pho-
tography for the very reason that special spaces and products were created 
for them (ibid: 104; emphasis by author). The commercialisation of child-
hood and corresponding child-rearing products tips and directives through 
catalogues began to address the educational interest in child develop-
ment and welfare (ibid. 103), of course according to identifiable stages. 
New items of furniture to make children sit more erect at the table are also 
among design innovations of the nineteenth century (ibid.)25. 
A distinct work/play divide (in this case the divide between school and 
play) starts to be integrated into individual and collective worldviews. ‘Toys’ 
become a distinct cultural signifier which changes the experience of being 
in the world in relation to objects (Barthes 1975: 53). For Barthes ‘toys’ 
are perfect illustrations of how the child is viewed as another self vis-à-vis 
adult. “ [...] Faced with the world of faithful and complicated objects, the 
child can only identify himself as owner, as user, never as creator; he does 
not invent the world, he uses it: there are prepared for him actions without 
adventure, without wonder, without joy. He is turned into a little stay-at-
home householder who does not even have to invent the mainsprings of 
adult causality; they are supplied to him ready-made: he has only to help 
himself, he is never allowed to discover anything start to finish. [...] French 
toys are usually based on imitation, they are meant to produce children who 
are users not creators” (ibid: 54).
Similarly, the construction of a consumer child in the Norwegian context 
can be seen through the example of the firm A/S Riktig Leker (Proper Toys), 
established in 1946 by the national preschool teachers union in order to 
provide kindergartens and parents with pedagogically ‘correct’ toys. Influ-
enced by the developmental psychology trends, the firm conceptualizes 
‘proper’ (toys) through its material quality, pedagogical value, creating indi-
viduality by enabling the child to ‘master the toy’, representing ‘reality’ and 
nostalgia-generating by referring to parents’ own romanticized memories 
of childhood (Bomann 2007). 
Contemporary childhood in Norway is no exception to the market- 
enhanced, post-war, consumer society, in so far as money is spent on buy-
ing and organising spare time - also noticeable in the bedrooms of Norwegian 
25 One sees here how objects are designed to physically produce specific positionalities 
and consequently shaping physicalities- here as ‘postures’ - based on age. 
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children (Blom 2004:133). In the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
Norway distinguished itself from other high Human Development Index 
context economies for addressing the inexperienced vulnerability of chil-
dren through special market and marketing regulations in order to protect 
its minor citizens. Nevertheless, Norwegian child citizens (as its adult citi-
zens) remain part of a high consumer culture context (Blom 2004; bracket 
insertion by author). 
Mass consumer culture also provides children, both nationally and glo-
bally, with the possibility to have distinct tastes and preferences for objects, 
media and activities which set them apart from adults. In turn this induces a 
sense of power: “something they know, but of which adults are ridiculously 
ignorant” (Seiter 1998: 298). At the same time, mass cultural goods and 
practices created specifically for children can be studied as “complex mani-
festations of adult culture which are engaged with in various and contradic-
tory ways by different children under different circumstances” (ibid.:299). 
Similarly, in the realm of children’s fiction literature it has been argued that 
it is the adult world that comes first as author, maker and giver (Rose 1998: 
58) and through language, which has an institutional history (ibid:63). 
Consequently, there are dimensions of children’s culture that are sys-
tem immanent. In other words, they form part of the macro level institu-
tional and structural aspects, as well as the micro-level adult-child aspect. 
Childhood culture refers to that which is for and in order to re-produce 
specific childhood constructions. Children’s culture refers to how children 
engage creatively within constraining facticity of the childhood culture they 
are born in. This is what is meant by the system immanent nature of chil-
dren’s culture. Children’s interpretive philosophical agency is understood 
through this fabric. 
3.2.1.  Interpretive philosophical agency  
of children-in-the-world 
Unlike Barthes’ description, whereby child-specific objects do not allow 
children to invent the world, only to use it, children do in fact invent their own 
worlds and innovatively challenge the network of meanings within which 
they find themselves. This occurs in the micro-level child-child dimension 
that Frønes has marked out.
The movements, dynamics and comparatively evident temporality of 
the nature of invention of worlds in the child-child (or just child) dimen-
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sion point out to an interpretive philosophical agency in children. There 
is without doubt always an existential facticity within which every human 
finds herself, for example a time and place, a language, environment, previ-
ous choices and prospect of death (Sartre 1992). But there is an agency in 
terms of the possible meanings of the given facticity that could be created 
and dissolved. 
For example, within institutionalised spaces such as Norwegian kinder-
gartens (Norwegian: barnehage) children construct social relationships 
through a sense of we-ness (Nilsen 2005) by sharing knowledge, interests, 
objects, engaging in joint play using their bodies and voices to commu-
nicate by sitting closely, emphasizing sameness and breaking adult-initi-
ated rules (ibid: 123). Or the way child-addressed objects such as ‘toys’ are 
actually used by children in combination with ‘non-child addressed’ spaces 
such as kitchens or dining rooms also entails innovation of new worlds (e.g. 
the case of Captain Duke in Biswas 2017). 
It is through this micro dimension that this inquiry questions the unders-
tanding of what constitutes philosophising with reference to institutiona-
lized PC practices. It was through this particular dimension of children’s 
playfully co-constructed worlds that I briefly entered as a guest through the 
course of this study. 
This was possible firstly by somehow arriving at a position where I made 
conscious efforts NOT to view the child as a default addressee of pedagogy, 
who is inevitably (and especially philosophically) addressed in the develop-
mental context. The micro level, playfully constructed worlds of the child 
participants of this study was the context where I could ask: what is the 
scope of philosophical blossoming of adults when they play in children’s 
playfully constructed worlds? The question itself emerged as a result of 
firstly recognizing my participants as citizens26, and secondly by opening 
up my investigation to including them as co-explorers who influenced the 
methodological course of my study - including changing the focus of my 
research question. 
In other words, nearing the playfully constructed worlds of my co-explo-
rers by taking conscious distance from my own instrumental pedagogical 
gaze implied engaging with notions of children’s participation and inclusion 
in lay society as well as academic communities from a more liberal position 
than I could previously imagine.
26 As in high Human Development Index contexts like Norway where children are 
individuated right bearers i.e. beyond their belonging to the family institution. 
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3.3 Children as Citizens and Co-explorers
Traditionally, children are not seen as social actors in their own right. In 
research contexts too, they have conventionally been denied rights of par-
ticipation and their voices have remained considerably unheard (James and 
Prout 1997; Alderson 1995). Childhood and children’s lives have been 
explored through the understanding and concerns of their adult caretakers, 
by excluding them from the research process itself (Christensen and James 
2008:2; Bluebond-Langner 1978:5). 
In 1989, the Treaty on Children’s Rights was accepted by the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Consequently, the 
convention gave way to further progression of standardizing childhoods 
globally and allowed children to present themselves as individuals with 
their own rights (Jans 2004). The UNCRC has been seen as a milestone 
for new ways of thought and actions concerning children (Verhellen 1994). 
Ensuing participation and inclusion discourses not only began to re-posi-
tion children (especially high Human Development Index contexts) as citi-
zens, but also uplifted their status in the scientific contexts (Powell & Smith 
2009: Ennew et al. 2009).
Thereupon, researchers within the childhood studies paradigm respond 
by engaging in a re-examination of conceptual frameworks that influ-
ence children’s representation and participation in research (ibid.:3). The 
convention on children’s rights had a direct influence on childhood rela-
ted research, whereby participatory methods are favoured and new ethi-
cal considerations such as empowerment have become an integral part of 
research with children (e.g. Ennew et al. 2009; Cheney 2011). Methodolo-
gical designs themselves reflect innovations by finding ways to make space 
for children’s voices (e.g. the Mosaic approach by Clark 2017). Similarly, 
global PC culture has also been aimed at democratic citizenship (Lipman 
2003, in Jasinski & Lewis 2016: 2; Echeverria & Hannam 2017) i.e. inten-
ded to support children’s participation and inclusion in society through cri-
tical thinking.
Articles in the UNCRC such as Article 13 (conf. Cohen 1989; United 
Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner) link children’s par-
ticipation and inclusion with the right to freedom of expression; accordingly, 
they bear implications for research with children (Ennew et al. 2009). As 
stated in Article 13, “The child shall have the right to freedom of expres-
sion; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart informa-
tion and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing 
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or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of the child’s 
choice.” For research, among other things, this implies that methods need 
to be discovered to promote children’s capacity for free expression (ibid: 
1.18). The discoveries need not be limited to methods i.e. research tools 
only, but could also involve methodological shifts such as the possibility 
to ask questions, that in turn makes it possible to include children at vari-
ous stages of research. Here, the role of the adult researcher too becomes 
susceptible to redefinition.
In a nutshell - recognition of children as citizens with rights implies that 
children are citizens just as their adult counterparts, and therefore calls for a 
re-positioning of the adult-self as a citizen. Hence, the ways in which one’s 
own adult citizenship plays out as a result of making space for child citizens 
change. Similarly, including children in research implies methodological 
shifts as well as the re-conceptualising of the adult researcher-self.
3.3.1. Re-conceiving the Adult Researcher-Self
One of the basic concerns for childhood research is whether research with 
children is differs from research involving adults (Punch 2002; Norozi & 
Moen 2016). In my work, I proceed to apply the epistemological standpo-
int that what is known is determined through how it is known (Biswas 2017: 
90) to scientific engagements with children and childhood among else. The 
how-ness is a methodological matter that includes the way one sees not 
only children, but also oneself in relation to children. The reason is that, in 
encountering a human other as a child, one also simultaneously encounters 
oneself as an adult (Biswas 2017:94). Similarly, the way one sees children 
influences the choice of methods and the way one listens to them (Punch 
2002). Insofar as one addresses children as actors in a social world (Waks-
ler 1991: 62), as any other group, somehow research with children does 
not have to be considered different at a methodological level. In any case, 
the methods need to be tailored according to the groups and the possibi-
lities that the researcher has. This is a matter of contextualisation which 
would hold true for working with any group of human beings. Furthermore, 
ethical considerations such as positionality, reciprocity, consent and confi-
dentiality also need to be taken into account depending on the group. 
There has been a tendency in childhood studies to view children as ent-
irely the same or different from adults (Punch 2002). Treating children as 
indistinguishable from adults (e.g. James et al. 1998, in Punch 2002) would 
65
entail using the same methods with children that are used with adults. The 
responsibility of the adult researcher, then, is to treat them as mature, com-
petent people as one would do with adults (Alderson 1995, in ibid.). Howe-
ver, such an approach to treating children as ‘equals’ of adults can leave the 
power imbalance between adult researchers and child subjects inadequa-
tely addressed (ibid.; Morrow 1999). 
Taking ‘different’ group-specific considerations into account while con-
textualising research with children can be regarded as a step that is neces-
sary in order to arrive at a way to appreciate them as actors in a social world. 
Taking the step of course implies that the positions of the researcher has to 
be re-conceived. 
3.3.2. Instances of Research Designs with Children
Opening up to methodological and methodical inclusion of children’s par-
ticipation on these lines is based on the guiding principle that research 
with, not on children, cannot not take age-based child-adult distinction for 
granted. Consequently, a significant emphasis in most innovative research 
designs is placed on how not to reinforce the child-adult power imbalance 
(conf. especially, Punch 2002: 326-327). Interpretations and applications 
of the guiding principles differ widely, although they form a common refe-
rence for experimental attempts to overcome the border of chronological 
age in research with children. 
Solberg, for instance, deliberately ignored chronological age as a signi-
ficant marker in her research on child work in order to explore doing rather 
than being (Solberg 1996). Although one may make such a strategic move, 
the modern islanded nature of childhood does not simply disappear. Chil-
dren, especially those living in high Human Development Index contexts, 
remain individuated and institutionalised individuals just like other members 
of high Human Development Index societies. Co-creating spaces whereby 
the deliberate ignoring of age is realisable constitutes a major challenge for 
actively including children in research processes. 
However, fundamental conceptual differences (Carey 1988), as well 
as material and perceptual differences in child and adult spatiality (Hollo-
way & Valentine 2000), also exist. Consequently, power imbalances arising 
especially due to the research settings themselves - e.g. institutional time 
and spaces allocated to them based on chronological age - deserve dis-
tinct attention. School as a research setting, as Morrow describes/remarks/
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points out (1999), particularly poses obstacles that implicitly and explicitly 
refer to children’s chronological age-determined position in society. Issues 
related to curriculum, adult-gatekeepers, school routines or working in the 
presence of teachers - whereby the children might see the researcher as a 
teacher too -are problems that require methodological attention (Morrow 
1999: 206). 
New research designs keep emerging as a result of acknowledging 
children as participants and the need to include them in knowledge pro-
duction, especially as this affects their lifeworlds in relation to adult life-
worlds. All emerging approaches are experimental in their own way and no 
specific method is being suggested, but rather methodological strategies 
which tend to lean towards the qualitative, ethnographic side of the human 
research spectrum. A significant emphasis in most innovative research 
designs is placed on how not to reinforce the child-adult power imbalance. 
Larger social and structural inequalities do of course play out in inter-
generational research encounters (Nairn et al. 2007: 2), but it is precisely 
to respond to those power imbalances that child and youth researchers 
attempt involving their child-counterparts in order to work with them and 
not on them (Christensen & James 2008). Nairn et al. adapted their metho-
dology to include the sub-cultural capital (Nairn et al. 2007:4) of youth in 
New Zealand in what is termed peer-research. 
It is in the same vein that the project Deconstructing the Canon with Ele-
mentary School Students: Participatory Research in Practice unfolded: the 
project by Deszcz-Tryhubczak et al. (2018 accepted) involved extending 
the methodological scope of their research and working with children as 
co-researchers in the field of children‘s literature studies in order to contri-
bute to children’s participation in Poland. Their work is, in their own words, 
“purposely confrontational” as it is “directed against the adultism prevailing 
in children‘s literature studies” (ibid: 1 of accepted version). 
Deszcz-Tryhubczak’s intergenerational research team was comprised of 
ten minor child researchers from grade five and six, all of whom were also 
avid readers and members of the Educational Discussion Club at Primary 
School No. 28 in Wrocław, and three adults including two children’s litera-
ture scholars and a teacher of Polish language. The team had three strategic 
meetings in a classroom where the setting of the desks was reorganised into 
a circular constellation and during the first two meetings the child mem-
bers learnt about different forms of qualitative and quantitative methods. 
After that, the child members divided themselves into three groups, selec-
ted their preferred research tools and agreed upon the course of action. 
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Some months later, the teams had procured 124 survey respondents from 
primary school, staged a focus group discussion with 4 pupils from grade 
4 and conducted observation in school corridors and libraries to know how 
many peers read during breaks. The child researchers were also conse-
quently involved in the dissemination of their findings to the school com-
munity and policymakers. Here, one observes more evident manifestations 
of overlaps between new forms of citizenship and research that emerge as a 
result of children’s status as right-bearers. 
While the project Deconstructing the Canon with Elementary School 
Students: Participatory Research in Practice can be considered as a strate-
gic inclusion of school children in organised peer-research activities, War-
ming‘s ethnographic work in a Danish Day-Care centre (Warming 2011) 
may be seen as a strategic inclusion of the researcher-self in children‘s 
life-worlds. All in all, Nairn, Warming and Deszcz-Tryhubczak’s works are 
examples that belong to a body of scholarship based on research with chil-
dren as opposed to on children. Such a variety of scholarship is also ori-
ented towards children‘s empowerment in acknowledging the asymmetri-
cal power relations between children and adults that are played out in both 
scientific as well as social and pedagogical realms. 
As in Warming’s ethnographic work (2011), my study also entailed a 
conscious and strategic inclusion of the researcher-self in children’s life-
worlds. Further, as in Nairn’s work, I tried to draw upon children’s subcultu-
ral capital in every phase, except towards the conclusion - as I re-turned to 
my question and sought support in literature that resonated with the directi-
ons my research consultants and co-explorers had pointed towards.
 
3.3.3.  Ontological Reconsiderations  
of Pre-positionality 
Apart from the obvious differences in participant constellations, research 
questions and agendas, what distinguishes my approach in this study from 
the aforementioned exemplary works, as well as my own former work with 
child monks (Biswas 2013; 2016), is that it does not directly address chil-
dren’s worlds in order to improve them. Instead what I address here is the 
adult and adultist position after following engagement with and inclusion of 
children, and after due reflection on the nature of childhood. In this sense, 
its contribution to discussions in methodology as well as pedagogy is rela-
ted to discussions regarding self-reflection and self-positioning. In abstract 
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terms, this work has been about re-turning afresh to where one started, 
after having been somewhere else.
The work may also be seen as participatory research, although children 
were not co-researchers as in Deszcz-Tryhubczak’s case, but co-explorers 
- accompanying me into a journey, trying to understand other ontological 
dimensions of their mundane realities. It also did not hold onto an agenda 
of empowering children through research. There is a value in such projects, 
but empowerment concerns both sides. In this sense, discussing ways 
for adults to shift their pre-positionalities - after having ontologically and 
epistemologically validated their child counterparts - could compliment 
research directly intended towards children’s empowerment.
The question of empowerment concerns the side that is recognised as in 
need of empowerment as well as the side which empowers. The latter is con-
cerned insofar as it requires conscious shifts in the pre-positionality in both 
the material as well as the ontological sense of the term. By ontological sense 
I mean first and foremost the acknowledgement that something exists on the 
other side regardless of whether or not one can grasp it. In other words, I mean 
an ontological validation that is indispensable to the how-ness of knowing. 
In his work on the secret lives of trees, Wohlleben (2015) presents a per-
spective that recognizes thinking, feeling and communication networks in 
the lifeworld of trees27. While this could be recognised as a form of anthro-
pomorphistic understanding, it is at the same time an ontological valida-
tion of historically silenced cultures28 that ‘speak’ different ‘languages’. It is 
only through an ontological validation that the horizons of an epistemologi-
cal engagement with a particular lifeworld could come forth. 
An ontological validation and the epistemological gains that spring forth 
(from it) necessarily imply shifts in the pre-positionality. In practical terms, 
it implies that a new relationship between oneself and the other emerges. 
It is something that simply happens as a result of a new-found awaren-
ess. One may continue taking regular trips into the forest while on holiday, 
but the experience of being in a forest of trees will play out differently. The 
changes may well be highly subtle, for example in the way the feet now start 
touching the ground during the act of walking, or a slightly deeper breath 
or longer gaze at the greenery one is surrounded by. Thus, this undertaking 
27 I digress here by bringing in this example in order to show that positionality and onto-
logical validation calls for alterations in methodological considerations and broadens 
epistemological horizons in natural sciences too. 
28 The word culture here signifies both - its biological as well as social sense. 
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gives way to knowing (appreciating) new things within that which one takes 
for granted (as already known).
A simultaneous process of how I sense29 and make sense of the other 
side transforms. For a scientist concerned with forests, the shift in pre-posi-
tionality will lead to methodological shifts as well. This includes, for instance, 
new ethical considerations in scientific processes. It is not only the episte-
mological stance that is transformed as a result of an ontological validation, 
but along with it the ethical positions too. In this manner one can see that one 
can in fact observe the unfolding of a holistic philosophical foundation (onto-
logical, epistemological and ethical) that transforms itself30.
For childhood research, the ontological validation of children‘s lifeworlds 
on its own terms called for a paradigm shift that emphasized research with 
rather than on children (Christensen and James 2008). As a result, quali-
tative approaches that were primarily ethnographic and co-exploratory in 
nature began emerging. New self-positionings, redefining the researcher 
such as the ‘least adult role’, came forth into empirical research (Mandell 
1988; Corsaro 1985). Corsaro (ibid.) suggested that participating in chil-
dren‘s life worlds by among other things playing with them included letting 
them define and shape the role of the ethnographer. 
The significance of bodily experience in taking on the least adult resear-
cher role, as discussed by Warming (2011), further opens up possibilities 
of access to children’s experiences in order to come back and reflect from 
positions of adulthood.
3.3.4.  Warming and The Significance of Bodily  
Experience in Least Adult Researcher Roles
Warming (2011) argues that taking on the least adult role gave her access 
and allowed her to acquire a familiarity and identification with children‘s 
perspectives, which wouldn‘t have been possible by assuming a detached 
observer- or other adult positions. “Despite the impossibility of dissolving 
power relations in the ongoing negotiations to gain access, the ‘least adult 
29 Through sense experience i.e. through touch, smell, sight, sound and such.
30 These ‘branches’ of what constitutes the philosophical tree need not be as strictly 
distinct as Western academia has traditionally categorized them. Classical schools of 
Indian philosophy are an example of how such categorizations may not always apply (conf: 
Chatterjee & Datta 2016).
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role’ constitutes a mis-reiterating performance which enables the researcher 
to gain access to areas of children‘s worlds which would otherwise not be 
accessible through the ‚contextual constructed natural adult role‘” (ibid: 44).
The how-ness of knowing includes the position one assumes with 
respect to that which one seeks to know something about. Warming (2011) 
illustrates this through her discussion on the epistemological implications 
in light of the “positioned nature of experience”. During her ethnographic 
undertaking in a Danish day-care centre, Warming as a ‘least adult’ was 
seated around a long oval table to sort out Lego bricks by colour. The task 
was given by one of the teachers who provided the objects required in order 
to complete the task. Several children could not reach boxes placed in the 
middle of the table without leaving their chairs. Some of the children did 
nothing, some called attention to the problem without receiving a response 
and some began to play with the bricks instead. One of the children began 
looking into a book, but was retold to sort the Lego bricks out. The boredom 
was becoming evident to Warming as the children began messing about, 
fighting, trying to sneak away or playing farting games and singing about 
who farted. Warming experienced the boredom too and instinctively star-
ted playing a magic game with some of the children. 
The game constituted using an imaginary wand and coming up with as 
bizarre a wish as possible, which would then be rendered true by the magic 
wand. While it felt nice to respond to the experience of senselessness and 
boredom with an imaginary magic wand, it was equally an experience of 
doing something dangerous. This was mainly because Warming was afraid 
that the teacher would realize that she was taking part in sabotaging the 
Lego-sorting project. As a result of the positioned production of expe-
rience, participation in the children‘s sabotage of the teacher’s pedagogical 
agenda just happened. 
The experience of being unable to comply with the demands and rules 
of the situation was a result of the physical and social position i.e. sitting on 
a small chair from where she could not reach the boxes. Moreover, in per-
forming a child-like position, Warming was not actually allowed to do so 
either, in the first place. From this position, the situation did produce a sen-
seless and absurd experience. From the position of a detached observer, 
the situation would have been perceived differently. “The point is that expe-
rience is positioned, so that my experience as a participant positioned in a 
child-like position was different to that of performing a more normal adult 
role. I do not claim that this experience was identical to the children‘s (mul-
tiple) experiences; however it does constitute a very good starting point 
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for reflecting on and asking about what it means to be a child, or rather to 
perform a child‘s position. Thus, bodily experience gained through perfor-
mance of the least adult role opens up access to children‘s perspectives” 
(Warming 2011:45). 
The positioned nature of bodily experience through role-performance 
and the epistemological accesses it allows for - necessarily occur in inter-
dependent role-constellations in a setting. The role constellations in War-
ming‘s case included, according to the description, the day-care teacher, 
the day-care children, and the researcher in a day-care center setting. One 
of the reasons that the least- adult researcher role allows for greater pheno-
menological access is due to the context-specific fluidity it implies. 
One is methodologically allowed to cross taken-for-granted borders and 
engage as if one were a child in a day care among other children in rela-
tion to the teacher. The experience cannot be identical as it occurs within 
the confines of separate physical bodies, but it is the closest one can come 
to simulating experiences which can broaden epistemological horizons. In 
other words: to know approximately what is from another perspective. The 
basic question being asked by the adult-researcher is -/: what role to take in 
relation to the settings and roles I find myself in? 
As a researcher, who is herself regulated by adult-determined processes 
of democratic knowledge production, performing this question in practice 
can augment ambiguity and start unconcealing one’s own ignorance and 
immaturity. Here, the dominant position of both the adult and the resear-
cher as expert and research becomes a process of muddling through. 
3.3.5. Childhood Research through Ignorance
Gallacher & Gallagher (2008: 504) point out that encouraging children to 
participate in knowledge creation about themselves paradoxically implies 
encouraging them to participate in processes used to regulate them. The-
refore, children’s participation in both democracy and research cannot simply 
mean that children start replicating what adults do. The inclusion of chil-
dren implies re-conceptualisations of democracy, research and participa-
tion itself.
For example, recognising children’s participation through play and lear-
ning, whereby they give/are challenged to bestow active meanings upon 
their environment, implies recognising playful and ambivalent forms of citi-
zenships (Jans 2004). Furthermore, adult-centred ideas of democracy 
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based on clear-cut rights themselves fall into question. Consequently, 
the horizons of cultural criteria of democracy need to be altered to include 
representation and participation regardless of age (Wall 2011; Moosa-
Mitha 2005).
Consequently, the recognition of children as citizens and children’s cul-
tures implies shifts in adult-centric cultural criteria of democracy (Wall 
2011; Moosa-Mitha 2005). In the case of research methodology, the re-
positioning extends beyond adopting child-friendly tools of research, but 
implies re-thinking the researcher-self and the methodological attitude 
itself (Gallacher & Gallagher 2008). Similarly, the inclusion of children and 
childhood into specific criteria of philosophising has given way for adults 
to pedagogically engage with children on philosophical topics. Nonethe-
less, despite recognising their existential sameness to adults (Schjelde-
rup & Olsholt 2002) and the idea of considering children as philosophical 
co-explorers (ibid.), a strong attachment to word-based dialogue as The 
form of philosophising is evident. Moreover, this attachment reinforces the 
pedagogical gaze whereby children are invariably addressed in the deve-
lopmental context.
Including children in any field of study implies a structural realignment 
of that field (Duane 2013:1). To include any silenced group in the broadest 
sense in any field of study is to realign the very structure of that field. The 
methodological and theoretical realignments apply first and foremost to the 
institutionally-nested individuals who perform a study. The realignment is 
possible through questioning, asking what it means to be a researcher and 
simultaneously what is asked of a researcher in that field. It is a shift in the 
how of that which is to be known, as it emerges as an ontologically reflexive, 
back-and-forth relationship between the knowledges and the knowers. 
For childhood research, the inclusion of children has meant a shift 
from various discussions regarding child-friendly methods and strategies 
to include children (Barker and Weller 2005; Weller 2006, O’Kane 2000; 
Punch 2002; Clark 2017; Clark & Moss 2001; Burke 2005; Greenfield 
2004; Hart 1997; Lancaster and Broadbent 2003; Kellett 2004; 2005; 
2010) to giving attention to the methodological attitude itself (Gallacher 
and Gallagher 2008). Following Lee (2001) and Horton (2001), Gallacher 
and Gallagher (2008) emphasize the aspects of interdependence, incom-
petence, incompleteness and vulnerability. 
The emphasis is not on these attributes in children and childhood; 
these attributes are rather located within the adult researcher and resear-
cher community as a result of having encountered such properties outside 
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themselves and the community. In other words, it is about coming back to 
the self after having acknowledged something about the other. “Like ‘beco-
ming’, ‘immaturity’ has been largely sidelined in ‘new paradigm’ childhood 
research, viewed as an unhelpful product of the hierarchisation of the adult–
child binary. Yet, within the ontological framework suggested earlier, the 
distinction between maturity and immaturity becomes as irrelevant as that 
between being and becoming. If all being is becoming, then ‘we’ are all 
constitutionally immature – and this is not to be seen negatively, as somet-
hing lacking, but rather in terms of potential” (ibid: 511). Consequently, 
a position of methodological incompleteness and immaturity comes forth, 
whereby the dominant status of the researcher as an expert dissolves and 
research fundamentally becomes a process of muddling through. 
 
3.4. Summary 
Keeping in mind that major critiques of PC recommend taking adult posi-
tionality more seriously along with the desirability of asking what educa-
tion and philosophy can learn from children and childhood, I have presented 
some theoretical and methodological considerations that bring about a re-
conceptualisation of adult positions in childhood research as well as larger 
democratic state constellations within which modern islanded childhoods 
are system-immanent. 
In contemporary high Human Development Index contexts, children and 
childhood are invariably addressed in a developmental context and thereof 
positioned as default addressees of pedagogy. The address comes from a 
position of entitlement to teach; I have expressed this as the pedagogical 
gaze which is evident when it comes to philosophically intended engage-
ments with children and childhood too. 
Recognising both children and adults as everyday-philosophers at par 
doesn’t alone seem to simply nihilate the existential power imbalance of 
the child-adult dynamic. Insofar as those who have the status of adults in 
a given society team up to perform and maintain normalized realities, the 
scope for interpretive philosophical agencies of children get systematically 
constrained. Consequently, taken-for-granted ways of seeing become uni-
versalized partly by keeping game changing actors like children at bay.
Broadly speaking, the entitlement to teach and cultivate a ‘not-yet-
developed’ subject can be observed with regard to children as well as non-
white people as in the case of Kant’s comparison of children to inhabitants 
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of Tahiti. It appears as though qualities such as being natural and emotional, 
which can also be perceived as freedom, facilitated such comparisons from 
a pedagogically entitled point of view. Additionally subjective, non-analyti-
cal and organic orientations where fantasy, i.e. the realm of counterfactuals, 
precedes a particular kind of logic, contributed to empowering the peda-
gogical authority of those having the status of developed adults. Bluebond-
Langner’s axioms, however, reveal that the interpretive agency of children 
is in profound motion since the earliest ages, especially in so far as an epis-
temological balancing between knowing and concealing i.e. mutual pre-
tense is concerned. 
Within larger democratic contexts, especially after the ratification of the 
UNCRC, the position of children in society, education as well as research 
beckons re-conceptualisations on matters of participation and what one 
participates in. Moreover, re-positioning children invariably implies re-posi-
tioning adults in society, education as well as research. Therefrom, not only 
new ways of knowledge reproduction are manifested, but also the possibi-
lity of asking new questions. The scope of asking consequently need not be 
limited to improving modern islanded lifeworlds of children, but can also be 
directed towards what adults can learn from them. In practise, matters of 
child-adult power imbalance across philosophical, academic and educatio-
nal realms still continue to receive focused considerations.
In childhood studies, the least-adult role has conventionally been widely 
discussed and strategically assumed in order to respond to questions of 
power. Proponents of the least-adult role have generally emphasised let-
ting the researcher be influenced by her participants. Especially Warming’s 
work sheds further light upon the positioned nature of bodily experience in 
terms of including children in research dynamics, as well as coming closer 
to understanding what it could be like to be in a child’s position. Here, one 
can observe a methodological and epistemological movement that brings 
the gaze of the adult researcher back to herself. By way of explanation, this 
broadly refers to coming back to the self after having acknowledged somet-
hing about the other. 
As Gallacher and Gallagher (2008) have pointed out, the aim of inclu-
ding children as co-explorers in research processes is not to make them act 
like adults31. Accordingly, an emphasis on ignorance as a point of departure 
31 The same can be said about doing philosophy with children, insofar as the aim of 
such projects cannot be to teach children how to act in a way that constitutes philoso-
phising from adult perspectives. 
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is made, whereby interdependence, incompetence, incompleteness and 
vulnerability are validated as belonging to doing research with children. 
Correspondingly, viewing children as beings illuminates the becoming-
ness of adults, who are traditionally understood as complete and develo-
ped. Therefore, an emphasis on interdependence, incompetence, incom-
pleteness and vulnerability does not mean focusing on these attributes in 
children, but rather recognising these attributes within the adult resear-
cher and research community. In this manner, a position of methodological 
incompleteness and immaturity comes forth, dissolving the dominant sta-
tus of the researcher as an expert. Research with children as co-explorers 
then becomes a process of muddling through the mysterious. 
Hereinafter, I move forward to present the phases of exploration at the 
intersection of philosophy and childhood. The exploration has taken place 
through both pre-systematic and systematic phases. All along, the ende-
avour has consisted in exiting class-based philosophising with children i.e. 
a context in which the child is positioned as the default pedagogical addres-
see. Simply desiring a more equal pedagogical child-adult relationship tur-
ned out to be, however, insufficient. External and internal borders intersec-
ting at multiple levels deter the desirability of inquiry itself. External borders 
included literal borders such as national borders, as well as with bureau-
cratic and financial borders of inquiry. Scientific artefacts i.e. disciplinary 
borders formed part of the cohort of intersecting external borders. Inter-
nalised borders of chronological age, my embodied child/adult binary and 
especially the way it played out in trying to exit class-based philosophical 
relationships with children were also determinant factors). Chance, as I will 
recount in the following, has played a significant role in how every frontier 
could be crossed in the course of muddling through this inquiry. 
Before presenting an account of the trajectory of the exploration starting 
at the embryological Phase 0, I will provide a description of the attributes of 
the study in order to make the theoretical fibre (of the nature of) this explo-
ration visible. Thereafter, I will give an account of the phases that firstly led 
to the possibility of asking what the scope for the philosophical blosso-
ming of adults is when they enter children’s playfully constructed worlds, 
and secondly allowed me to in fact briefly enter those playfully constructed 
worlds in order to answer the question I had raised.
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4. Phases of Exploration
Conventional positivistic attitudes and expectations towards qualitative 
research might tend to articulate a problem that is defined and articulated 
through a research question, followed by an application of tools gathered in 
for data collection, which is analysed in order to produce results or solutions 
for the problem that was posited. However, especially for exploratory pro-
jects that have a philosophical interest in a particular phenomenon, in this 
case child-adult pedagogical relationships in the light of philosophising, one 
is not actually dealing with a problem. Rather, one is invited to participate in 
the mysterious. According to Marcel (1949), “A problem is something which 
I meet, which I find completely before me, but which I can therefore lay siege 
to. But a mystery is something in which I am myself involved, and it can the-
refore only be thought of as a sphere where the distinction between what is in 
me and what is before me loses its initial validity” (ibid: 117).
In the same vein, Gallacher and Gallagher’s (2008) approach of muddling 
through research with ignorance as the point of departure in order to include 
children as co-explorers requires a sustained ambiguity tolerance towards 
something as mysterious as assisting self-reflexivity. Data, in such a vein of 
approach, need not constitute some sort of building block for research, but 
is a “a potential dialogue partner, a source of questioning, doubt, and a pro-
blematisation of existing/dominant expectations and frameworks” ( Alvesson 
and Kärreman 2011: 120). Therewith, the nature of this self-reflexive explo-
ration can be grasped through the following attributes.
4. 1. Attributes of the study at hand
The attributes of this study are essentially nomadic, hybridic and pluralistic, 
wherein the primary means of knowing has been the adult researcher-self 
(set) in a dynamic relation to children who were gradually and deliberately 
allowed to influence the course of this work and my positions. 
The consistent interest has been in the subject of philosophy and child-
hood in the early 21st-century global context. Particularly, it as directed at 
exiting forms of class-based philosophy with children usually found in the 
spatio-temporality of institutionalised schooling. I started ignorantly, with a 
relatively unproblematic view of children as default pedagogical addresses 
and the conception of doing philosophy as bound with spoken language. 
The exploration went through systematic phases over a period of four 
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years travelling back and forth between Germany and Norway. These sys-
tematic phases were preceded by a non-systematic stage over a period of 
approximately ten years going back and forth between India and Italy, cul-
minating in Norway. All along, I was in contact with children and childhoods 
directly or indirectly concerning this particular exploration. Here, the term 
children is not limited to a static age-group. It refers to the temporal others 
whom I first encountered as children and in reference to whom the self-
reflexive exploration could travel. 
4.1.1. On Nomadicity 
Nomadicity, in the context of this study, refers not only to the geographi-
cal localisations and multiple language-scapes that I travelled with curiosi-
ties and doubts. The reference is also to the academic disciplines that have 
contributed to this study, namely: 
philosophy as was taught at university in Pune 
childhood studies as was taught at university in Trondheim32 
general pedagogy as approached at university in Bayreuth. 
While my first two academic roles put me in a position of being a stu-
dent whereby I was taught, the third role as a junior researcher in Bayreuth 
enabled me to align my work with a peculiar approach to pedagogy. The 
approach was primarily to view educational science as a cultural science 
(Clemens 2015) that is not restricted to specific institutions. Moreover, an 
emphasis was placed on the need for global perspectives in educational 
sciences (Clemens 2008). And lastly, my experience pivoted on a recogni-
tion of the dysfunctionality of specific educational models due to the limited 
singular, Western logic that underlies it (Clemens & Biswas 2019). 
Clemens’ work opened the way to realising that educational institutions 
like schools and universities are in fact culture-specific practices of kno-
wing and learning. This resonated with the social construction approach of 
childhood studies. Further, it also promoted a more contextualised unders-
tanding of the individuated, individualised and institutionalised nature of 
32 By the time I concluded this project, however, the new paradigm of childhood studies 
had become old and discussions regarding new directions had come to the fore. Conf: 
Spyrou 2018; Spyrou et al. 2018
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education in high Human Development Index societies within which the 
child citizens of my study were nested. 
Geographical localisations with reference to the academic fields have added 
to the specific complexity of my task. Had I studied philosophy, childhood stu-
dies and researched for general pedagogy all in the same university, this would 
have been a very different work. Academic approaches differ from continent 
to continent, country to country, county to county, city to city and university to 
university – this much has surely become evident to me in this journey. 
Studying philosophy from high school until master level in Pune (India) 
firstly meant seven formatory years of systematically studying Western 
and Indian approaches side by side. One did not just study metaphysics, 
ethics, epistemology, logic, aesthetics and so on. All these themes were 
systematically and equally delivered from the perspectives of both Wes-
tern and Indian schools. This implied that one was constantly made aware 
that highly diverse Western worlds of ideas are not the only ones available 
– there are diversities. In European institutions however, it is unlikely or rare 
to find such an approach to studying philosophy. Usually the non-Western 
Schools of Thought are something extra or otherly departmentalised like 
Indology and Tibetology, or included as part of religion. 
Childhood Studies, which is interdisciplinary in itself, presents significant 
international variation, with overlapping strains from North America to Eng-
land (Wall 2012) and also from Norway to Germany, as I noticed. Until then, 
it had not been obvious to me that theorisations themselves happen within 
particular languagescapes and networks. So while in the Norwegian context 
English and Norwegian were languages for developing Childhood Studies, in 
Germany most work remained within the horizons of the German language. 
Traditionally speaking, the (former) Norwegian Center for Child Research 
tended to take its point of departure from the new paradigm of childhood 
studies (e.g. James, Jenks and Prout 1998; Qvortrup 1994; the Childhood 
Journal of Global Child Research), as a strong reaction to the developmental 
psychologisation of children. 
But Germany had its own specific tradition of childhood research coming 
from the early 1900s (e.g. Die Kinderfehler: Zeitschrift für Kinderforschung/ 
The Child-Errors: Journal for Child Research) and oriented towards the psy-
chologically corrective handling of children in pedagogical contexts. Con-
temporary childhood research seemed largely influenced by the work of 
Manfred Liebel (e.g. 2009; 2017), which is rights-oriented and concerned 
more with applications of children’s rights in the global South. The emphasis 
at the (former) Norwegian Center for Child Research was on a strong rejec-
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tion of Piaget‘s developmental approach to childhood, which I wouldn‘t have 
possibly inherited had I done my degree in Germany. 
So, while childhood studies borrows from fields like sociology, anthro-
pology, psychology, philosophy, geography, literature, political science, and 
economics – the way this interdisciplinarity itself played out in Norway and 
Germany showed remarkable differences. 
In terms of General Pedagogy too, there has been a geographical and 
disciplinary specificity. My exposure to educational theories prior to Bayreuth 
was solely through philosophy of education and childhood studies, mainly 
with reference to Article 28 of the UNCRC: the right to education (as schoo-
ling) (conf. Cohen 1989; United Nations Human Rights Office of the High 
Commissioner). The term Allgemeine Pädagogik, translated as General 
Pedagogy, was a categorisation that I was not aware of because I had neit-
her encountered it in India nor in Norway. Within this specificity, the Univer-
sity of Bayreuth clubbed Psychology, School Pedagogy and General Peda-
gogy under the rubric of Educational Sciences under one faculty unit which 
fell under the Faculty of Culture Sciences. 
It took me a while to grasp exactly what it was that I was being academi-
cally relocated to and to orient myself accordingly. Understanding education 
science as a cultural science wherein constructions of pedagogical addres-
sees had a history and played a pivotal role in educational projects (Clemens 
2015) was a result of coming in contact with General Pedagogy as a field 
specifically in Bayreuth. 
The oscillations in my mindset were not only between the intersections of 
geographical and academic localisations with respective language-determi-
ned scientific activities, but the differences of language use in every field itself, 
too. This constituted one of the main intellectual challenges in the research 
process. At the same time, it offered me, first, extremely rich and diverse 
resources to draw upon. Secondly, I was not directly limited by the borders 
of specific academic ‘fields’. Lastly, it paved the way for an organically emer-
gent hybridity that could make an innovative contribution to discussions per-
taining to philosophy and childhood in the broader context of education as a 
cultural science.
4.1.2. On Hybridity
One of the main areas that the hybridity of this work directly influenced was 
both methodology and choice of methods, as well as the nature of  analysis. 
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Another area where the influence is evident is in the choice of literature. 
This particularly slowed down the writing process, as it was impossible 
to know beforehand what kind of academic readers of education phi-
losophies and sciences this work would address. In addition to this, it 
took time to engage with questions regarding an appropriate format and 
language-use that could communicate the complex and complicated 
trajectories of this project in the simplest, graspable, yet academic man-
ner across disciplines. As I did not always manage finding timely creative 
responses to such challenges, the shortcomings resulting from them are 
an integral part of this text. In terms of methodology and methods, this 
work draws and builds upon mainly, but not only, philosophy and child-
hood studies. 
Among philosophical methods – the method of doubt was present 
with respect to the dominant institutionalised practises of PC. It doubts 
the very possibility of doing philosophy in a classroom (Hinman 1975) 
and it doubts the epistemological entitlement of the adult to be philoso-
phical guides for children. Within a classroom context, argumentation, 
specific systems of logic and performative acts such as formulating ques-
tions, debating, discussion and dialogue can certainly be taught. Further, 
an adult does have something to teach a child in this regard, due to their 
experience and capacity to articulate (it) through language. 
However, as I have discussed elsewhere (Biswas 2017), argumenta-
tion, applying specific logical principles and sitting and talking belong to 
the realm of communicating philosophical ideas to others. In turn, they 
alone cannot be used to define what it means to philosophise. 
Furthermore, I have drawn upon philosophical methods especially in 
the third phase of the research i.e. immersive playing. Namely, that entails 
the performing of phenomenological bracketing (Husserl 1962) with the 
help of an observation technique based on Vipassana meditation as taught 
by S.N. Goenka (Hart 2011). This approach brought co-existing worlds 
into being that called for an ontological validation i.e. a confirmation that 
they exist. Two-valued, either-or logical principles could not meaningfully 
support such a validation. Therefore, I switched to pluralistic principles of 
the Jaina school of Indian logic (conf. Shastri 1990; Chatterjee & Datta 
2016; Shah 2000; Ganeri 2001; Ganeri 2002) when needed. 
Childhood Studies has been the primary field informing the qualita-
tive approach to research with children that I engaged with for this work. 
Firstly, because it is state of the art in terms of:
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a. addressing the power imbalances between children and adults, b. its 
emphasis in doing research with and not on children, and c. the metho-
dological openness of the field to innovation of methods. 
And secondly, because of the minimum contextual gap between where the 
theories come from and where I was applying them. The phenomena of 
childhood studies are something that comes from the high Human Develop-
ment Index context. Particularly, the (former) Norwegian Center for Child 
Research, Trondheim has been an important factor in the development of 
the field in Scandinavian and the Anglo-Saxon academic traditions. Ideas 
of children’s participation in society as citizens or in scientific projects as 
researchers are relatively common for these contexts. 
Children in the Norwegian context are viewed as equal rights bearers 
and adults are obliged to take their voices into account even in institutiona-
lised, pedagogical contexts. For example, the third section of the National 
Kindergarten Framework (Norwegian Directorate for Education and Trai-
ning 2017) is devoted to the child’s right to be involved (Norwegian: med-
virkning). Political commitment to institutionalised child-centeredness in 
the Norwegian context is also evident through the establishment of a Chil-
dren’s Ombudsman in 1981 (Nilsen 2008:40). Therefore, the question for 
society is not whether children can and should have a say regarding their 
own lives, but how such a directive should best be realised (e.g. Bae 2009). 
Not surprisingly, my experimental approach and questioning of the 
adultist position was encouraged by parents, fellow academics and the city 
municipality. Moreover, there was friction-free room for communicating the 
development of the project to the local community (e.g. Biswas 2016 b; 
discussions with the Child and Youth Research Seminar in 2017, 2018). 
Contextualisation in this light was not only in terms of theory, but also a 
reflexive engagement with the larger lay and academic community wherein 
the empirical parts of this project were primarily realised. Moreover, it pro-
vided a balancing element to the inherent hybridity of the project.
4.1.3.  Ontological validation through Pluralism 
The immersive experience of entering children’s playfully constructed 
world as a guest was performed through a phenomenological bracketing 
of my own world as a network of meanings. In addition to the suspension, 
I had to ontologically validate the worlds that were being constructed. It 
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is not that ‘my world’ in fact completely ceased to exist as a result of me 
suspending it. This was simply a strategy to let the other world be more 
evident as real in my experience. How can play, however, be as real as the 
real world? And yet, how can play be as real as the real world? Something 
can either be real, or not real. It certainly cannot be both. Such an expec-
tation of ontological and epistemological singularity would have been an 
obstacle in taking those playfully constructed worlds seriously.
Consequently, I adopted the many-sidedness position to reality based 
on Jaina logic33. This particular approach allowed me to ontologically vali-
date the ‘play’ worlds without negating the existence of the ‘real’ world. 
There are no absolute truths according to Jaina logicians and hence pro-
positions are qualified by the term somehow. Somehow, the playfully 
constructed worlds and the ‘real’ world both exist as well as do not exist. 
They are also somehow indescribable. What the Jainas propose in the 
face of perceived inconsistency, is that there is an internal consistency in 
each standpoint (Ganeri 2002:274). 
Qualitative research seeks to understand the inner logic from the 
standpoint of the parties involved. Such inner logics may often be in con-
tradiction to the standpoint of what constitutes logic for the standpoint 
that conducts the research. For this, as I have emphasised - an ontolo-
gical validation of the other side is indispensable. Precisely due to this 
need - qualitative research cannot adhere to a taken-for-granted position 
on logic. Two-valued logic promises researchers a limited form of consis-
tency that is possible only by negating the aspects that produce an expe-
rience of epistemological ‘inconsistency’. The either-or thinking is suc-
cessful only in so far as it conceals the pluralistic nature of social reality 
itself. Distinctions like real worlds and play worlds also belong to this kind 
of social reality. 
Especially if children are to be involved in philosophical negotiations in 
child-adult interactions - a philosophical commitment to pluralism seems 
necessary. Otherwise, the exclusion of children in order to reaffirm adult-
team based performances of ‘reality’ as Reality (Goffman 1990:96) conti-
nues to be reproduced. Here, philosophical negotiations are not taken to be 
33 Jaina logic is not the only school of thought that can support an engagement with 
pluralism. I chose it as it was available to me through my academic resources. Ganeri 
(2002) also discusses an example of pluralism from Western philosophy. There are limit-
ations to my application of the Jaina view in this project. Notwithstanding this, it is primarily 
engaged as part of a larger recognition for the need for an epistemologically grounded 
pluralism in research, as well as educational practices such as philosophy with children.
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just talk-based or argument-bound, but rather as done with the whole body. 
So, the entry of the child in Professor Robert Kelly’s BBC live-telecasted 
Skype interview (BBC News 2017) is an example of a tiny act that disrupts 
the flow of an adult-team based performance of ‘reality’. It can be interpre-
ted as a ‘disruption’ or a result of ‘ignorance’ and the naive child-other ‘not-
yet knowing’ how the world works. Somehow.
At the same time, it is also a de-construction of one of the many reali-
ties that exist. Furthermore, it is an invitation for the adult to further reflect 
on their performed roles as roles (Goffman 1990). Perhaps, it amounts to 
considering that the ‘developed’ self is often mistaken with developed roles 
at the base of which lies the identity of being an adult. In this sense too, the 
little things that children do matter much more, especially in light of de-
constructing adult philosophical commitments. Consequently, an attempt 
to confront the many-sided nature of reality is called for - even though it 
means not knowing what to do with it. 
 
4.1.4. Thematic and Geographical Routes 
Here i.e. section 4.1, I have explained the theoretical fibre of the nature of 
this study, namely: nomadicity, hybridity and ontological validation through 
pluralism. The following sections aim at presenting the empirical phases of 
this longitudinal study.
The purpose of the empirical account is not to produce an accurate 
chronological timeline, but to illustrate overlapping aspects of qualitative 
research processes such as: 
a. Motivation
b. Access to thematic and geographical fields
c. Ethics e.g. rights, reciprocity, consent
d. Data collection
e. Analysis (here, self-reflexive and interpretive)
Moreover, the account also accounts for the challenges that I met with in the 
process of recognising and traversing class-based philosophy with children 
who have generously accompanied me through the ambiguities inherent to 
a nomadic approach to qualitative research in an overheated world. While 
the written voice is mine, I cannot claim that the subjectivity behind it solely 
belongs to my individuated individual researcher self. The reason for this is 
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that my reflections and insights would not have been possible without the 
active and passive interactions that led to a shift in my perspective at the 
end of this endeavour. In this sense, this is an intersubjective, interpretive 
account based on the geographical and thematic routes cartographically 
represented as below:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In what now follows, I offer an account of relevant experiences and  phases 
that contributed to my arriving at a childist perspective on philosophising 
with children after muddling through the aforementioned thematic and 
geographical fields. 
Illustration 8:  Geographical routes, Graphic by Emma Neumeyer 
Illustration 8:  Thematic routes, Graphic by Emma Neumeyer
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4.2. Phase 0: Embryological Stages 
Impara l'arte e mettila da parte (Learn the art and put it aside) 
- Italian proverb
Phase 0 presents the course of experiences, encounters, relationships and 
positionalities that constituted the pre-conditions for this exploration to 
evolve. Not only can the originary motivation for this project be located in 
this phase, but also its progression. Conventionally, such accounts may be 
silenced or considered irrelevant to the textual presentation of academic 
research. In other words, the embryological context i.e. who, when, where, 
why and how of the unfolding of a particular questioning typically remains 
unaccounted for.
Insofar as it accounts for access to the thematic and geographical fields, 
the embryological context of the text is vital because it appertains to the 
relational field that made rationalising possible in the first place. During 
the unfolding of this particular questioning, the embryological Phase 0 is 
where momentums of fielding, reciprocity, consent and ‘data collection’ 
began. Phase 0 took place over approximately 10 years, starting from Pune 
(India) to Trondheim (Norway) via Arco (Italy) and culminating in Bayreuth 
(Germany), where the project found institutional support enabling me to 
keep returning to Trondheim to meet my co-explorers Ole, Enaya, Emma, 
Captain Duke, Finn, Thor, Amelie, Gullveig and Aida. At the same time 
Sungjae, with whom I entered into a pedagogical relationship in Pune, may 
be seen as the first co-explorer in my nomadic course of inquiry34.
4.2.1.  From Mi Kyong’s Child to Sungjae Kim:  
Alternative class-based philosophising
To mark the pre-conception of my empirical explorations on the inter-
sections between childhood and philosophy in the light of pedagogy, I 
have taken as a starting point the moment when I met Mi Kyong Kim - a 
school pedagogue from South Korea. The following recollection intends 
to introduce:
34 Other than Sungjae Kim and Enaya Mubasher, whose names are mentioned in original 
with their informed consent, names of other participants have been changed.
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1.  The first experiment in practising a child-friendly curriculum  
for doing philosophy outside the formal school context.
2.  Initial experiences of myself in the role of a philosophy teacher  
in relation to a child as a pupil.
3.  The first consciously experienced performative deconstruction  
of my pedagogical adult perspective by a child.
Mi Kyong Kim had recently moved to the city from South Korea with her 
nuclear family. We first met as classmates in the Bachelors of Arts, Phi-
losophy programme of Fergusson College, Pune. It was mid-2000s and I 
learned with time that the decision of her family was partly due to an econo-
mically fluctuating situation in South Korea and partly to the fact that India 
would offer her the opportunity to have her child enrolled at a private Eng-
lish medium school within the family’s financial capacity. 
Mi Kyong, however, was aware of the general limitations of modern 
schooling models and wished to offer her child an exposure to creative thin-
king based on a philosophical approach. That is why I was invited to be a 
private philosophy tutor for her child. At that time, Sungjae worked as a pri-
mary school pupil in Pune. In exchange for my service, Mi Kyong offered me 
meals with the family and introduced me to Korean food culture. This inclu-
ded participating in Korean tea ceremony rituals and learning about philo-
sophical aspects of this practise. 
My participation in the Korean tea ceremonies was mainly out of respect 
for what Mi Kyong’s family wanted to share with me and born from my curio-
sity towards understanding diverse forms of philosophising. The greater 
incentive, however, was the unique opportunity to eat delicious and healthy 
food once or twice a week. As a single university student, living alone on a 
small budget, I often tended to ignore eating properly. So I was more than 
delighted that, twice a week, I would be relieved of having to think about 
what to eat. Apart from the fact that I would save spending money on food, 
in my view, being served delicious food which was home-cooked with care 
made Mi Kyong’s offer very attractive. 
The task itself that I was being assigned with gave me a sense of self-
confidence and motivation. Having chosen to study philosophy full-time 
at university often implied being looked down upon by peers and challen-
ged by family, elder acquaintances and even strangers. Natural and for-
mal sciences were more respected than social sciences and humanities in 
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Pune. In my understanding, this was linked to their future professional value 
on the promising job market for IT, medicine, engineering etc. 
Among social sciences, students of economics and psychology were 
usually (the ones that were) taken seriously. Philosophy students were 
generally perceived as wasting their time hanging around on kattas (para-
pets), drinking chai (Indian milk tea), talking for hours, reading useless stuff 
or coming up with absurd arguments and critically doubting social norms 
for no good reason. As a philosophy student, one rarely had a concrete ans-
wer to the question, “What are you going to do in the future?” Furthermore, 
what we did - was not perceived as doing. All in all - philosophy students 
were perceived as people with no real future opportunities or anything wor-
thwhile to contribute to others. Being on the receptive end of such percep-
tions often affected my confidence and motivation. Therefore, Mi Kyong’s 
unique invitation came as much needed support as well as a unique oppor-
tunity to evolve a special curriculum for doing philosophy with children. 
MiKyong gave me the freedom, time and trust to plan lessons for Sung-
jae. We talked beforehand about the kind of content and formats that would 
be part of Sungjae’s philosophy curriculum. Our agreement was that the 
main pedagogical direction was meant to strive for free thinking, with space 
for imagination. As a result, we initially labelled it ‘creative thinking’. The 
main components of Sungjae’s open-ended curriculum were:
1. Free, playful and imaginative thinking
2. Exposure to Western philosophical approaches
3. Exposure to Eastern philosophical approaches 
4. Debating and argumentation 
My focus during the first year was on building our rapport, letting  Sungjae 
find his comfort with me and tuning into his personality. The first component 
was comprised of methods associated with the term child-friendly, such as 
drawing, colouring and playing, and improvised as well as arranged games. 
Although philosophical themes were allowed to emerge and I tried to 
pay attention to Sungjae’s inclinations, I had a very clear idea what the first 
philosophical theme would be, namely, the Self. The theme was introduced 
through the intertwined questions: Who am I? ←→ Who are you?. I dealt 
with these intertwined questions through a game. We would both sit face 
88
to face with closed eyes. One person would open their eyes and ask, “Who 
are you?”. The other would think up any thing that came to mind, open one’s 
eyes and answer, “I am ______.” Then both would close their eyes again. In 
the next round the previous respondent would ask the question, and the 
previous questioner would answer. We kept repeating the sketch until we 
got bored or it was time for dinner. Sometimes we switched the question to 
“Who am I?” and the partner had to say any thing that came to their mind 
e.g. “You are _______”. The goal was to imagine different versions of the idea 
of one’s self.
The idea of making the Self our first philosophical subject came from 
my early experimentation with polyglottism. Growing up in a multilingual 
environment, I had knowledge of some regional Indian languages. As is 
common in Indian curricula - learning languages had been a regular part 
of my formal schooling and university education too. When I met Sungjae, 
I was learning French and was noticing that formal language studies usu-
ally began with personal pronouns and the verbs: to be and to have. Fur-
ther, one usually began with describing one’s self and gradually the scope 
of description was extended to other people and objects. Language tea-
chers spent a lot of time on understanding meanings of nouns and verbs - 
but what pronouns such as I, you, us, them etc. and basic verbs such as to 
be and to have meant were usually treated as self-explanatory. So I applied 
formal insights from my linguistic education and transferred it to Sungjae’s 
philosophy curriculum, but emphasised aspects that were treated as self-
explanatory by my language teachers. 
As time progressed, I started to introduce philosophers and philoso-
phical perspectives under labels of Western and Eastern traditions. My 
choices were influenced by my own tastes and university education as 
well as resources that were available on the market. I discovered a book 
series in a popular book store that offered introductions to Western philo-
sophers in comic forms. And I began giving them to Sungjae to read at his 
own pace. They included some classical names like Socrates, Plato and 
Aristotle, but we quickly moved to existentialists such as Kierkegaard, 
Heidegger and Sartre. Whenever Sungjae felt prepared, I would visit him 
and we talked about what he had read. For Eastern traditions, I could not 
find any analogous reading materials he could use. So, I showed him pic-
tures of monks meditating or in yoga postures and facilitated talks on what 
Sungjae thought they were doing. 
The following is the first section of a short two-part memoir that Sung-
jae (now a university student) wrote on my request, for the purpose of this 
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dissertation. My request to Sungjae was for him to share his side of the 
experience of those years as he now remembered. Three reasons for my 
request were:
a.  To not depend solely on my personal memory as there was no acces-
sible material evidence of that time e.g. learning  materials, notes, 
diary entries, photographs, videos, recordings etc.
b.  To include the ‘other’ perspective and co-construct the past (memory) 
for a more credible intersubjective account. 
c. To broaden the scope for reflexivity in the reflective analysis.
The memoir describes the evolution of our dynamic as a teacher-pupil rela-
tion to a sort of a pedagogical friendship: 
“I was first introduced to Tanu as a friend of my mother in my primary school 
years. I was supposed to embark on years of indeterminate classes without 
much description of what the class was going to be on. According to my 
recollection, it was going to be about philosophy but also about getting 
to meet a friend who wanted to philosophise with me. In the first class to 
my best recollection, Tanu spoke about the openness of the class not sim-
ply in terms of content the we shall embark on, but moreover, it became 
clear to me at the time that it was going to anything but a class. I remem-
ber that although I hadn’t been to a lot many ‘classes’ as such, but knew 
from my school experiences, classes always had a sense of direction but 
more importantly a sense of tutor-pupil dynamic. But already as Tanu and I 
began to simply discuss, it was becoming apparent that I felt neither like a 
pupil nor Tanu a tutor. She didn’t sit with me for half an hour (probably) try-
ing to teach me or establish the one way student-teacher dynamic. Instead 
it felt like she wanted me to share my thoughts and experiences about 
topics and have a conversation of some type. Even the activities that we 
ended up doing, it was more of her outlining a rule of a game and us playing 
along with it. One of such activities that I remember for instance was about 
a word game where we tried to associate certain words (not clear of which 
kind) into a bubble. And it was as though she had no such intervention or 
regulations but improvisation as we would do playing a game with just the 
mutual understanding of the rules. After each session we would have a meal 
together with my family and then generally continue into dinner conversa-
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tions. Thus, that was another element of our interactions — there wasn’t a 
sense of duty. Furthermore, these sessions never had a set schedule as far 
as I remember and by the end it was less regular and felt more like friends 
meeting up to talk about certain philosophical topics. Later on through our 
connections, she also began lending me some comic books about philoso-
phical thinkers and I remember we used to talk about these thinkers. These 
sessions felt a bit more like classes as she was better aware of the contents 
of these books and obviously I was on the receiving end having never heard 
of these before. […] “
Sungjae’s account highlights aspects I was unaware of during that phase. I 
believed then, that our pedagogical relationship was equal and free. Furt-
hermore, since I used child-friendly methods, simplified things and was 
playful - I masked my interventions cleverly. In other words, I was playful in 
order to mask my pedagogical gaze and lead him towards the next planned 
components i.e. 
a. exposure to Western and Eastern philosophical ideas, and 
b. debating and argumentation.  
The lessons were not framed in the logistical context of a ‘class’ as in the 
process of formal schooling. So it was a comparatively freer alternative. 
Nevertheless, I brought the class mentality with me insofar as the pedago-
gical vision was mine (formed in dialogue with Mi Kyong’s vision). The tea-
cher-pupil roles were hierarchical, even though I managed to create a space 
where the pupil was protected from a sense of our hierarchy or duty. 
The logistical freedom in terms of clock time and space was more fluid 
than school or after-school classes. As Sungjae points out - the family 
meals, meant to be my incentive for teaching, also became an extended 
and unintended context for the lessons. Nevertheless, as Sungjae’s account 
confirms: we moved in the planned direction of class-like activities aimed at 
teaching Sungjae about Western and Eastern philosophical traditions. 
Somehow, this curriculum could be seen as an alternative to class-based 
philosophy. In hindsight though, I see that I viewed Sungjae as someone’s 
child whom I had to educate. I brought with me the principles of the class-
room, although I concealed them cleverly. Sungjae by default remained a 
pedagogical addressee for me. In this sense, what was going on was simply: 
an alternative class-based philosophy. 
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After the first year or so, as part of giving exposure to Eastern philosophical 
traditions, I organised an excursion to an ashram (a spiritual hermitage cen-
ter) near Pune. The community practised systematic silence following their 
master Meher Baba. The intention was to introduce Sungjae to an example 
of philosophical engagement that did not use words. Forms of language-
based philosophising i.e. thinking, reading, writing and talking are no doubt 
found in Eastern traditions. At the same time the role of internal and exter-
nal silence has also been emphasised in long term philosophical engage-
ments through various practises. So both Mi Kyong and I agreed that this 
trip could be a fruitful experience for Sungjae. 
According to the planned curriculum, in this phase Sungjae was only 
supposed to learn about Western and Eastern philosophical approaches. 
Systematic debating and argumentation were going to be the next step. 
But when we reached the ashram, within the first few hours of our arrival - 
Sungjae not only broke my pedagogical agenda, but also revealed my own 
philosophical commitments to me by deeply challenging both Mi Kyong 
and me together. It was our first philosophical debate and for me - the first 
philosophical debate as an adult with a child. I was not prepared and had Mi 
Kyong not been on my side - I don’t think I could have defended my posi-
tion. It became very clear to me that Sungjae knew how to argue. So my 
plan of introducing argumentation and debates seemed unnecessary. All 
he needed was space to argue and debate, but I was hesitant to be challen-
ged regularly by someone I was supposed to teach. 
The difference between introducing debates and argumentation as part 
of the curriculum and debating organically as it occurred would be: 
In the first case, I would represent opposing positions for the sake of 
practice and occasionally put Sungjae on the spot in order to improve his 
debating skills. In the second case, Sungjae would have identified and pul-
led me up on my own philosophical commitments - in turn putting me in the 
defence. At that time, I resisted the experience of being personally challen-
ged by someone I believed was still lacking maturity. 
Our first debate was a series of connected subjects which began with 
Sungjae questioning the possibility of internal silence i.e. absence of 
thought. It moved into questions of body-mind relation and whether the 
body is identical to the self. In the second half of his memoir Sungjae descri-
bes his perspective: 
“ [...] Beyond these in the category of the continuation of such interactions, 
I remember going on a retreat to an ashram with Tanu and my mother. I was 
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probably in my middle school years, and during this trip, probably because 
of the philosophical connections she and I had or the contextual situations 
of being in an ashram, we organically embarked on a philosophising discus-
sion. But this interaction felt less like the interactions we’ve had previously. 
Furthermore, it did not feel like an activity nor in the nature of a personal 
conversation. What picked this interaction apart from previous instances 
were, primarily to do with the fact that we were conversing with different 
opinions and ideas — we were debating (the topic does not recall to me in 
clarity but it was roughly about the nature of being able to have a consci-
ous state without ‘thinking’. I was in the position that one cannot be consci-
ous while not thinking, and Tanu and my mother in the contrary position). 
Secondly, the nature of activity was definitely a lot more sophisticated than 
the previous instances of interactions with rules that we were abiding by. 
Although it was still a play of a kind, strictly in terms of philosophising for 
the sake of philosophising and vocational element of the interaction, it was 
still much more broadened in scope and organic. Thirdly, tutor-pupil dyna-
mic of argumentation had mostly if not completely dissipated within this 
interaction. It was more of an interaction of dialectics than anything.”
What Sungjae remembers as an ‘activity’ was not in fact planned for him as 
other activities - where Sungjae believed something spontaneous was hap-
pening. It was triggered largely by his highly emotional disagreement with 
what was put forth to him. 
The high degree of dissipation of our teacher-pupil dynamic was also, 
in my reflective view, a result of him taking a bold argumentative plunge. In 
turn, the event lead to the performative deconstruction of my imagination 
of him as Mi Kyong’s child and my pupil. 
From that point onwards, my view of Sungjae and our relationship also 
started to change. An immediate consequence for my planned curriculum 
was that I simply continued sharing information about philosophers once 
in a while. The last component i.e. debate and argumentation was never 
implemented and the frequency of the meetings decreased. 
My contact with Mi Kyong and her family continued. Sungjae and I also 
continued to interact and stay in touch with new projects in each other’s 
lives. The focus of my engagement with children started turning more 
towards performance-based activities as I had come into contact with a 
street theatre artist and pedagogue from Italy who regularly visited India to 
travel and train in Vipassana meditation. 
To encapsulate the above, my first experiment of practising a child-friendly 
93
curriculum for doing philosophy outside the formal school context made 
way for initial experiences of myself in the role of a philosophy teacher in 
relation to a child as a pupil. Within the frame of this experiment itself, I was 
confronted with a strong performative deconstruction of my pedagogical 
adult perspective by a child pupil. The practical consequence was that I did 
not continue pursuing Sungjae’s planned curriculum. Moreover, I guarded 
my view of children as immature vis-à-vis adults. 
4.2.2.  Playing by Chance: Early recognitions  
of positionality and power
Around the same period in mid-2000s that I met Mi Kyong, I had also got-
ten to know Erica Vicenzi, the co-founder and director of a street theatre 
company called ‘Teatro per Caso’ in the Trentino region of Northern Italy. 
Erica and I met in a Vipassana meditation centre near Pune where we were 
both students in a ten-day course. 
On the last day of the course, we talked about each other’s lives and 
interests. Erica was going to transit through Pune before her next destina-
tion. So I suggested that, instead of a cheap hotel, she stayed at my place. 
Erica accepted my invitation. There was no explicit intention of welcoming 
her except that this person was very interesting, due to her knowledge and 
experience regarding children. Further, we were students training in the 
same school and she educed trust in me. 
Erica and I spent a day in various conversations, shared meals, prac-
tised Vipassana and visited a park in the city. She also met my mother, 
who was visiting at that time. So the sense of familiarity and trust grew 
even more. 
 Erica was, for some unintelligible reason, convinced that I had to go 
to Arco - the town in northern Italy where she was based. As a citizen and 
resident of India, the bureaucratic steps required to cross continents alone 
were sufficient to keep me from even entertaining the idea of travelling 
to Italy. Dealing with the financial aspects i.e. thinking through the stron-
ger Euro currency from a comparatively weaker Indian Rupee position was 
unthinkable. Erica, from her position as a citizen of Italy, understood the 
situation in India and did not pressure me further. 
Instead, she returned to Italy, worked more, saved money and assumed 
the role of an official sponsor, taking care of the bureaucratic steps such as 
preparing an invitation for a visa application, giving an official guarantee for 
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the temporary nature of my visits. All that was required on my part was to 
trust further and take a leap of faith. So I accepted my new friend Erica in 
her new roles as official sponsor, informal guardian and mentor who would 
be responsible for me in Italy. From this point on, for about four chrono-
logical years, I spent between one to three chronological months every 
summer in Italy. 
Under Erica’s mentorship and with her logistical support, I was given 
access to the opportunity to discover ‘real’ European lifeworlds and child-
hoods. On many levels, it was as though I was starting afresh, while at the 
same time previous knowledges served as building blocks. An example of 
this simultaneous movement of starting new and building on old is relating 
to the world around me through sounds generically termed as Italian and 
Basso Sarca dialects. I could refer to my knowledge of French, but at the 
same time I had to adapt to a new set of rhythms, tones and sound patterns 
simply paying attention to what sounds cause what sort of behaviours. Ini-
tially I could make sense of this new system of sounds, then gradually I 
repeated the sound-patterns myself and found myself ‘talking’ and ‘com-
municating’. My capacities grew to fit my tasks which did not require much 
reading and writing. For all practical purposes for the first two years I was 
somehow ‘illiterate’ in Italian. 
In formal terms, my new linguistic capacities would not be easily 
re-cognisable or tested through the standardized order put forth by the 
Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (abbreviated 
as CEFR; Trim 1997).
Somehow, this opened up new experiences of relating to childhood 
and children. In terms of relating to childhood, the experience of enter-
ing a new lifeworld and learning to communicate and navigate in it through 
new systems of sounds - among other aspects - somehow put me in a 
child-like position associated with something primitively natural, emotio-
nal, free, subjective and organic (Bøyum 2002). Having someone from this 
life-world as guardian, mentor and official sponsor attributed a renewed 
sense of interdependency to my child-like position. 
Further, I had to allow a re-ordering of my bodily senses and cogni-
tive sensibilities to start performing new roles in new teams addressing 
children. The new roles I assumed included modifications of conventional 
characters from Italian street theatre e.g. a noble court jester named 
Fiorellino, a nameless bubble-fairy, a majestic lady on stilts and a clown, 
illustratively summarised in the following caricature:
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These new roles enabled unusual positions and consequent relationally 
contextualised powers. As an example, I highlight one episode, namely the 
time I performed the Majestic Lady on Stilts in a street festival near Lake 
Garda for public entertainment, including children, as seen on the right 
hand side in the image below.
Illustration 10:  Experimenting with new roles and positions in relation to children, 
Graphic by Mihir Ranganathan
Illustration 11:  Supra-adult, Majestic Lady on Stilts. To the left, Erica Vicenzi, co-founder 
of Teatro per Caso. Image by Paola Marcello
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Learning to carry my embodied self on stilts required going through the 
micro-scale ambulatory process of learning to walk again. Gaining new 
ambulationary capacities began with discovering that extended ‘parts’ atta-
ched to ‘my’ physical structure move in balancing relationality to other parts 
named head, shoulders, arms, stomach and so on. The balancing relationa-
lity was not limited to the conjoining parts of ‘my’ bodily entirety. It involved 
the maintenance of constant awareness of direct contact to material surfa-
ces e.g. the sole of my extended foot (base of the stilts) and the ground and 
well as an environment which regardless of direct contact permitted basic 
ambulation. The curious will to stand tall and move like Erica, to be able to 
touch and see things from a new level, was a primordial impulse for the pro-
cess of discovering the complex internal and external material relationalities 
that made basic ambulation possible. This synesthetic primordial impulse 
was coupled with repeated oscillations between subjective states of fear of 
falling and the courage to stand up in responsiveness to the enthusiasm and 
encouragement of others that I could recognize through gestures coupled 
with facial expressions and tonalities of the sounds they were making35. 
Literally step by step, ambulatory efforts became ‘walking’ and opened 
way to further sequential movements termed - dancing. The scales of my 
positioned mobility became larger. Consequently, the world around me loo-
ked smaller. Even the tallest persons appeared like little child-like humans. 
Further, I could now play new roles. While this brought an increased sense 
of power, freedom and self-determination, it required that I remained in a 
teamed-up constellation of new roles that could also protect the larger sca-
les of vulnerability and fragility. The more the scales of my physical being 
and performatory possibilities grew, the larger my dependence on social 
and material resources and risk of falling became. In turn, that contributed 
to unveiling new scales of vulnerability and fragility that made the relational 
power possible. 
Basic material aspects like clothing the body demanded more resources 
to performatively sustain the powerful role of the big Majestic Lady. Addi-
tionally, other smaller roles without stilts were performed to facilitate, ena-
ble and protect the performative navigation e.g. the characters of a little 
clown and a hybrid ribbon-fairy. These smaller roles contributed to the total 
impression management of the team (Goffman 1990) aimed at entertai-
ning the team called ‘public’. The smaller roles carried out logistical func-
35 Although Erica and few friends could communicate in English, others communicated only 
in Italian. Such contexts also constituted spaces where I grasped linguistic expressions.
tions like moving around an amplifying sound-box for music. There was an 
even more primary contribution to sustaining the bigger roles. The smaller 
roles freed the crowded way in ensuring that our territorial space to walk 
was obstacle-free and mediated my contact with those passively perfor-
ming common public roles in order to be entertained. In the absence of the 
smaller roles, the bigger roles would be exposed to an upscaled vulnerabi-
lity and fragility of simply walking tall - where the positioned nature of bodily 
experience of power (Warming 2011) was coming from in the first place. 
In stark contrast to the least-adult role (Warming 2011; Mandell 1988; 
Corsaro 1985), I was in a supra-adult role which was experientially revea-
ling an upscaled vulnerability and fragility on the bigger side of the role-
spectrum. In fact, the interconnectedness of vulnerability and fragility was 
also upscaled. If I fell, the consequences would very likely not be limited to 
the borders of my individual embodiedness. There was a larger chance that 
the vulnerability and fragility of the ‘little humans’ and things contributing to 
my position would also be triggered. The entire constellation was a highly 
delicate web of interconnectedness between the small and the big. What 
was apparent on the surface however, was the powerful and entertaining 
energy of the situation it was the doing of individual larger-than-life units 
e.g. the Majestic Lady on Stilts. Rather, the power occurred and was rela-
tionally sustained through the form and not specific individual content(Jaa-
ware on Foucault 2011). 
To summarise, the mentorship of Erica Vicenzi and collaboration with 
Teatro per Caso gave me the possibility to cross continental borders and 
gain access to a direct sense experience of ‘real’ Europe for the first time. 
Entering a new lifeworld was a highly synesthetic experience. Especially 
coming into a new languagescape as an almost illiterate person, and being 
dependent on others, brought me closer to a child-like position. 
New roles that I began performing for children and adults included the 
role of a supra-adult on stilts, which put me in the position of having to learn 
how to walk again, in turn making me aware of the relational power that 
could come with the ability to perform basic postures such as standing tall 
and walking. Further, the positioned nature of experience (Warming 2011) 
and the relationally constituted knotted experience of power and vulnerabi-
lity, revealed themselves itself to me at macro- and micro-scales i.e.
1.  The influential role of geographical and socio-cultural position of 
birth on my navigation possibilities in a globalised era.
98
2.  The actually situated bodily positioning and navigation in relation to 
other bodies e.g. in a particular room, on a street etc.
These two positional scales invariably relate to each other insofar as the 
geographical and socio-cultural place of birth pre-determines access to 
rooms or streets where one can be in the first place. In other words, appro-
ved bureaucratic and structural individuation common for modern societies 
(Näsman 1994; Frønes 1994) - forms a prerequisite for gaining access to 
navigation within particular rooms or on roads within the context of inter-
related national borders. Thereafter, as demonstrated with the example of 
the Majestic Lady on Stilts, the actually situated bodily position occurs in 
an interconnected web in relation to other bodily positions. Consequently, 
oscillating experiences of power and vulnerability are experienced. 
Such interrelated scales of positionalities also come together with 
regard to a lifeworld turning into a research field, certain people getting 
positioned as research participants, inner landscapes of curiosity turn-
ing towards academic disciplines and a messy web of resulting questions 
conjoining into a singular research question. In turn, the self starts being 
positioned as a researcher. 
Inter-personal mentorship, encouragement and material support from 
individuals like Erica Vicenzi or Mi Kyong Kim in phase 0 is indispensable 
to attaining relational positions that induce processes of exploring, lear-
ning and studying something one is interested in. However, for it to become 
something scientific, structural provisions and institutional networks across 
national borders must be in place that offer support to access spaces where 
modern science conventionally takes place. 
The Norwegian Quota Scheme for Capacity Building (now discontinued) 
is an example of such a provision. The Quota scheme, as I will describe in 
the following, made it possible for me to navigate further in a high Human 
Development Index context - both as a space for institutional scientific acti-
vity as well as a field of research.
4.2.3. Hjerneflukt: Fielding by chance
Hjerneflukt is the Norwegian term for the global phenomenon of human 
capital flight, also known as ‘brain drain’. Although brain drain has been 
used to describe migration of qualified human capital from low develop-
ment contexts to high development contexts, the term itself was coined 
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in the 1960s by the Royal Society of Britain to describe post-war emig-
ration of qualified British citizens to North America (Brandi 2006; 2004). 
In theory, the term is contested because it treats the embodied human 
brain as a commodity (ibid.; Rizvi 2005). Post-colonial perspectives sug-
gest taking deterritolisations of cultures and subjective dilemmas arising 
from the global labour market into account while thinking about transnatio-
nal mobility (Rizvi 2005). In practise though, as in the case of the Norwe-
gian Quota Scheme, contributing to capacity building and NOT brain drain 
in low development contexts was strategically integrated into the funding 
contract. 
My interrelated scales of positionalities had enabled me to be a member 
of a Norwegian partner university from the low Human Development Index 
context. Consequently, I qualified to apply for funding for the international 
research-oriented Mphil Childhood Studies programme hosted by the for-
mer Norwegian Center for Child Research, Trondheim. The funding con-
tract formally required repaying 60% of the loan in case one resided outside 
one’s country of citizenship36 after completing the study programme. The 
debt-contract applies to all Norwegian citizens upon entry into the work 
market, on completion of higher education. Furthermore, the debt peris-
hes with the individuated individual i.e. it is nullified when a person dies 
and is not transferred to any other related person. Formally, the same con-
tract applied to quota students. A special provision permitted full cancella-
tion of the education loan, in case the receiver returned to their country of 
citizenship and resided there for a minimum of 10 years. Residence in any 
other country, regardless of its position on the Human Development Index, 
implied debt.
Informally, quota students were obliged to conduct research in home 
countries and maintain focus on childhood and children-related problems 
in their own countries. Norwegian students had freedom to choose field-
work locations in both high as well as low Human Development Index con-
texts. A long Western tradition of fieldwork abroad or in far off, foreign loca-
tions put Norwegian students in a better position to choose. 
The Quota Scheme was a unique, generous and considerate provision 
to contribute to global equity. However, the focus on capacity-building and 
resistance to brain drain ironically contributed to maintaining inequity in 
science. Traditionally, the so-called ‘developed’ ones researched the so-
called ‘developing’ contexts, while the ones from the ‘developing’ contexts 
36 Often referred to as home country.
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are expected and encouraged to do indigenous research37. With the acce-
leration in the growth of the global tourism industry (Eriksen 2016:61), the 
one-way scientific traffic increases as access to ‘fields’ in cheaper locations 
also expands for those with appropriate documents and currencies, in turn 
reproducing the inequity in terms of who gets to play the ‘objective’ resear-
cher and where. The first couple of images that show up on a Google search 
for <anthropologist in the field> can illustrate this asymmetrical tendency 
of one-way scientific traffic and access. Access in the etymological sense 
nearing, coming closer, approaching, a passage or an ingressing is related 
to the word accede which means to give consent and belongs with what I 
term fielding. 
Fielding is the process through which a thematic or geographical area 
becomes a field for a researcher. Entering Norway as a quota student gave 
me access to reading in a highly technologically advanced, state-of-the-art 
university context. Since the Quota Scheme made it possible for students 
from various continents to be in one room and exchange worldviews, it also 
gave me access to a (class)room with a high global demographic diversity. 
Moreover, I could be in rooms where established names in the field of child-
hood studies lectured and could access state-of-the-art literature through 
the library. This access could be possible over a period of two years because 
the university had consented to giving me a funded place as a Quota stu-
dent, followed by the Embassy of Norway consenting to my departure from 
India and finally getting a Norwegian national identity number in Trondheim. 
With this number especially, navigation and participation in day-to-day life 
was possible. The number also gave me access to public and private lan-
guage courses which gradually helped me navigate the languagescapes of 
the new lifeworld I was permitted to be in (Larsen 2013). Consequently, 
two fielding processes began in this new lifeworld i.e.
a.  Thematic and intentional: Children and Childhood
b.  Geographic and unintentional: Norway, particularly  
the city of Trondheim.
37 The developmentalist tendency in childhood research operate along similar lines. 
Children are included in academic research, but their voices are usually restricted to their 
own worlds. Nevertheless, in the public sphere, and especially in high Human Develop-
ment Index contexts, one finds growing occurrences of child citizens coming to the fore 
and commenting on adult structures e.g. the Greta Thunberg-inspired #Fridaysforfuture 
movement that was mentioned in Part 1. 
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The first initiation into fielding children and childhood began with an auto-
reflective memoir exercise with Anne Trine Kjørholt. Our class members 
were requested to write a memoir and reflect on their own contextualised 
childhoods wherever they grew up. With a demographic of participants 
from nearly fourteen different countries from five different continents - 
our discussions very soon revealed that childhood is a social construct and 
it is untenable to blindly accept age as a universal category for grouping 
human beings (e.g. Aries 1962; James and Prout 1997; James, Jenks 
and Prout 1998; Qvortrup 1995, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 
2009; Alanen 2005, Corsaro 1993, 1997; Sorin 2006; Wyness 2000). 
The primacy of such an exercise in fielding children and childhood 
goes beyond overcoming the natural attitude (Husserl 1962: 95) towards 
the temporal category of age as a ‘scientific’ fact. As adults, we tend to 
relate to children through our own conscious and subconscious memo-
ries of our respective childhoods. Our epistemological authority38 partly 
stems from a been-there-done-that attitude. Furthermore, our own unex-
amined past baggage is superimposed on our perceptions of children. 
Thus, training to be a researcher of children and childhood necessitates 
going through auto-reflective processes of re-visiting their childhoods as 
remembering adults (Briod 1989; Lippitz 1986). An actively underta-
ken, self-consensual access to one’s own childhood by means of travelling 
through one’s own consciousness i.e. memory, is the closest one can get 
to a lived experience of the temporal otherness (Beauvais 2018) of child-
hood. The consequently gained self-awareness not only facilitates nea-
ring human beings termed children - it also decreases the probability that 
the temporal other before our temporal self evokes either a nostalgic sen-
timent of childhood (Aries 1962; Gullestad 1997), or the epistemological 
authority we tend to derive by default due to our ‘years of experience’ of 
existing and navigating as human beings on Earth. 
Upon recognising the importance of Kjørholt’s auto-reflective memoir 
exercise for fielding children and childhood - I decided to extend it beyond 
the class. I did this by creating a passport-picture timeline of myself and 
I also gradually integrated it into my experimentation with polyglottism 
over the years that followed. As mentioned in section 4.2.1 - the Self is 
an important curricular component, especially in institutionalised Wes-
tern language learning methods. Invariably, one is usually asked to write 
about where one comes from or an essay on one’s childhood. Apart from 
38 Including the broader philosophical authority.
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the passport-picture timeline of the self and the memoir in English that 
I wrote for Kjørholt’s exercise - I kept revising the exercise in every new 
language I would learn. The reason for such an exercise is to be able to 
access consciousness (in this case memory) through different language-
scapes. Since as humans we dwell in Language (Heidegger 1990: 193), 
we tend to start mistaking word for world. Playing with our multilingual 
capacities to think about the world through diverse words, helps a little 
to not take our worded adult worlds too seriously. In turn, to overcome a 
singular sense of our personal historicities which mediate intergeneratio-
nal relating. 
Phrasing it another way, singularising limitations of worded language 
as a medium of accessing consciousness can be overcome to some extent 
by pluralising language itself. The collage below provides a partially sum-
marised representation of the extended version of Kjørholt’s auto-reflec-
tive exercise I carried out39:
39 Components include English texts written for Kjørholt’s exercise and texts in Danish 
and Portuguese as part of language courses in Bayreuth. Due to unavailability of docu-
mentation - the collage neither includes the exercise as performed in Norwegian, nor 
the Tibetic language Ladakhi (Bhoti) with the guidance of philologist Bettina Zeisler, 
University of Tübingen. However, the attempt in Ladakhi deserves a special mention 
because - unlike the mentioned languages - Ladakhi uses special evidential markers 
i.e. the verb ‘to be’ has five different forms that depend on the kind of knowledge one 
is expressing e.g. description on the basis of 1. feeling and sensation (rak) 2. one’s 
self and own things (in) 3. general facts about the world around (inok) 4. what one 
has seen or heard (duk) 5. what one has authoritative knowledge about (yot) (Norman 
1994: 31-32). I cannot then claim to have authoritative knowledge about my place 
of birth like my mother or father can because they know directly, while I know it indi-
rectly because it was told to me. Consequently, for the first time I could perceive an 
onto-epistemological deconstruction of my own sense of childhood history. In turn, 
revealing modes of our own existence that we take for granted as remembering adults 
(Briod 1989; Lippitz 1986). 
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The second process of fielding in terms of geographic locality i.e.  Norway 
happened unintentionally, but also largely during the course of  learning 
Norwegian and other languages. Without a national identity number that 
rendered me the temporary entitlement of an individuated individual 
personhood40 in a particular local community welfare system - I would 
not have received access to rooms where native general knowledge about 
society is imparted. 
The unintentionality of formalising the process resulted from the fact 
that I did not actually intend to take language lessons in order to turn Trond-
Illustration 12:  Extended version of Kjørholt’s auto-reflective exercise.
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40 E.g Näsman 1994; Frønes 1994.
heim into a research field. Travelling in languagescapes had become habi-
tual to me and the philosophical paradoxes of the ‘Norwegian’ society that 
were gazing at me pushed me further into wanting to understand the parti-
cular lifeworld where and from where I was allowed to be positioned. 
Norway, as I had learnt in India, was the place where the Nobel Peace 
Prize was awarded and where Deep Ecology41 was philosophised to ext-
reme lengths. I learnt about Norway’s highest Human Development Index 
status only after I got permission to arrive there in 2011. 
The first philosophical paradox of Norway already captured me during 
the visa application process in India. In July 2011, the Norway massacre 
took place in Oslo. How could it be that one of the world’s worst mass mur-
derers was raised in the same lifeworld where peace is given the world’s 
highest honour? The mass-scale deconstruction of philosophical values 
that the mass murderer single-handedly performed exposed a philosophi-
cal paradox not just of the Norwegian society, but Christian societies across 
national borders. 
 The second philosophical paradox of Norway showed itself in a com-
paratively gentler and subtle manner within the first week of my arrival in 
Trondheim. The nature in and around the city appeared pristine and clean. 
There were not the slightest, immediately visible signs of poverty. The 
fjord and river waters had a piece or two of plastic, if one happened to 
spot them. Even the roads had no garbage, which showed a high degree 
of ‘educated’ civic sense in inhabitants as well as almost perfect munici-
pality management. Something did not add up though, when I would see 
random spots of garbage or tiny overflowing city garbage containers on 
the banks of the city river or in the city forest. Garbage items were pecu-
liar and included: aluminium trays filled with coal, varieties of packaging 
waste, beer cans and bottles, disposable plates and cutlery. The Engangs-
grill barbecue-picnic culture in the city was a faster, more convenient, but 
more garbage and garbage management generating way of doing barbe-
cue in summer. It didn’t add up mainly because it didn’t appear ecological, 
especially in a context where deep ecological philosophising (in my for-
mer view) was happening. 
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41 Arne Naess, the philosopher who coined the term Deep ecology, reportedly chained 
himself to a rock to the Mardalsfossen waterfall area (Mardøla-aksjonen 1970; Seed et al 
1988) in order to argue in favour of land and water, in opposition to the construction of a 
dam (Seed et al 1988). His theory was a curricular part of the Environmental Philosophy 
component at University in Pune and applied in the universal township Auroville on the 
Eastern coast of the Indian peninsular.
A third philosophical paradox showed itself as a comedy evoking laughter 
in my body - the tragedy of which I began grasping as I spent time lear-
ning to dwell in the languagescapes of that lifeworld. 
In the flight to Trondheim in August 2011, I was surrounded by peo-
ple who demonstrated a high ‘educated’ civic sense. They appeared very 
calm, content, polite and peaceful. The children on the flight whom I obser-
ved since boarding in Copenhagen appeared incredibly ‘well-behaved’ 
and ‘tantrum-less’. As soon as we alighted the flight and walked towards 
baggage claim, I sensed a nervous excitement rising in the people around 
me. Within a few more steps - the speed of the crowd accelerated, so my 
speed was accelerating too. Within a flash of a moment, the majority of 
the crowd ran to the duty-free section. One lady uttered a series of sounds 
pointing a direction to her child. The series of sounds ending in something 
like ‘gotterreee’42. Then, big bodies moved in frenzy to the alcohol section 
and the small bodies moved in frenzy to the candy section. 
In December 2011, another tragic comedy occurred, driving many 
citizens around me, including children, into desperate states, oscilla-
ting between what I perceived as deprivation and panic. The Norwegian 
Butter Crisis occurred when the state-subsidised Norwegian dairy sec-
tor was acutely short on butter, causing not only high inflation, but also 
making way for butter smugglers to start illegal cross-border operations 
from neighbouring countries. An acquaintance in Trondheim drove to the 
Swedish border to line-up before a secret truck. Approximately 250 g of 
smuggled butter could cost between 1000—1500 Norwegian Kroner (ca. 
100—150 €). If that meant there could be Christmas bakes in the house, 
people were willing to go to the clandestine market. I had seen people in 
India and on Indian television lining up for water and staple diet products. 
The idea of a butter crisis couldn’t be real - although I was in fact witnes-
sing it. It induced laughter in me, but eventually the lifeworld context cau-
sing such uniquely desperate reactions became a little graspable. 
Specifically – during the course of my structured Common Euro-
pean Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR; Trim 1997) level B 
and C education in the Norwegian language in Trondheim - I was able to 
access some inner logics of the lifeworld. Owing to its minimalistic gram-
mar, relative absence of linguistic hierarchy and high social tolerance and 
42 The very commonly used word in Norwegian lifeworlds - Godteri, refers to cheap 
candy or similar sugar-based products. The word is constructed by adding a suffix ‘eri’ 
to the noun ‘godt’ meaning good.
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respect for diversity in oral language use43, navigating through the lang-
uagescape was comparatively easier. The following collage gives a glim-
pse of my notebook on the social realities of the particular lifeworld that I 
collectively studied and reflected on in a class of ‘outsiders’ taught by an 
‘insider’ in 2013: 
Having gained knowledge more or less comparable to at least that of a Nor-
wegian teenage citizen, I could start nearing some philosophical paradoxes 
of this particular high Human Development Index context. As part of a com-
mon formal university exercise called Semesteroppgave, we were instruc-
43 Norwegian languagescapes were historically standardized for written purposes. 
Therein too diversity was maintained in so far as two standard forms are officially 
accepted. Speaking in dialects is normalized even in public sphere and state educa-
tional institutions. In this sense it appears to be a multilingual languagescape. As a 
consequence, Norwegians are able to grasp sense of spoken words even when the 
pronunciations are ‘wrong’ i.e. not standard. At NTNU level B comprised reflective 
learning of general knowledge about society that is imparted to teenage citizens in 
schools. Level C was dedicated largely to dialects with a focus on the regional varie-
ties of Trondersk. Other CEFR-based applications for imparting social and linguistic 
knowledge such as the cases like French, German or Portuguese give peripheral or no 
attention to inner linguistic diversities of their respective lifeworlds.
Illustration 13:  Notes on Norway
 Translated summary of  
selected themes: 
•  Wealth
•  Urban spaces
•  Schooling History
•  Food & Health
•  Habits 
•  Traditions
•  Stereotypes
•  Political context
•  Minority history
•  Global & local perceptions  
of  Norway
•  Changing familyhood
•  Environment
•  Socio-linguistic history
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ted to read a book and write an essay about it. The aforementioned philoso-
phical paradoxes that I had sensed in the prior two years lead me to a book 
addressing teenagers after the 2011 Norwegian massacre. Unlike philo-
sophical addresses to younger generations that focused either on impar-
ting a particular history of philosophy, abstract themes through stories or 
rhetorical training etc. Det som står på spill (That which is at stake; Erik-
sen 2012) was different. The address was not intended to teach philosophy 
or critical thinking, rather it contextualised the locally experienced philoso-
phical paradoxes of the overheated Anthropocene neoliberal world (Erik-
sen 2016) for new positionally scaled Norwegian generations. It presented 
the philosophical dilemmas that anyone born in a high Human Development 
Index is unfortunately bound to inherit and sense on a daily basis throughout 
their lifespan. Further, it contextualised those dilemmas to the lifeworld of 
its new generations without educing guilt in readers. By undertaking a brief 
reflective textual dialogue with this intergenerational communication, I met 
the questions I was wording from outside - from an insider point of view. 
The image below shows the abstract of my task. The sentence underlined in 
red represents the primary collectively shared philosophical dilemma of the 
Norwegian society arising from the 2011 massacre:
Underlined in red:
How is it possible that a society 
which is so proud of its morals and 
values produced one of the worst 
mass murderers in the world?
Subsequently, Eriksen (2012) 
reflects on possibilities of main-
taining the valuable in the face of 
an undesirable global future which 
Norwegians are partly responsible 
for. Themes include: community 
of disagreement, fairness, poverty, 
freedom of expression, sense/ 
reasonability, differences between 
humans and ideas and so on. 
Illustration 14: Early reflections on Eriksen’s address to youth after the 2011 Massacre
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With this, I could make sense of Norway as a field in a global context - wit-
hin which particular macro and micro dimensions of children and child-
hood (Frønes 1994: 148-149) could be contextually accessed. Further, I 
could get a firmer grasp of the particularly fielded triangular constellation 
i.e. state, family and the child within which the child citizens I met nee-
ded to be understood. Lastly, due to the case of Norway, I began grasping 
some philosophical paradoxes that are specific to high Human Develop-
ment Index contexts. With especially the work Det som står på spill (That 
which is at stake; Eriksen 2012) - it became evident that there is a need 
for honest intergenerational dialogues regarding responsibly responding 
to those paradoxes.  
To recapitulate, I have briefly presented how, as a consequence of my 
interrelated scales of positionalities, I was permitted to access two fields, 
namely:
a. Children and Childhood
b. Norway, particularly Trondheim. 
Subsequently, I gave examples to describe two fielding processes that 
began intentionally and unintentionally. Through these processes the the-
matic area of children and childhood and the geographic area of Norway 
started turning into fields. In the course of doing exercises as part of the 
CEFR (Trimm 1997) determined level B and C application of language 
learning at NTNU, I was able to better grasp the philosophical parado-
xes of Norway as a high human development context. Along with that, 
the need for honest intergenerational dialogue regarding those paradoxes 
became evident. 
Just as a subject of curiosity became a thematic field and a lifeworld 
became a geographic field - there were persons I accidentally got to know 
who eventually became what is broadly categorised as research partici-
pants in my project. The preliminary contacts with each respective person 
was either through their primary caregivers, who were friends, colleagues 
or acquaintances. My part-time job as a kindergarten substitute, occasio-
nal work as a babysitter44, voluntary engagements with community projects 
or supporting friends with care-giving also made space for regular contact. 
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44 The right to work for 20 hours per week for Non-EU members is integrated into the 
study residence permit on acquisition of a national identification number in Norway.
Being an amateur polyglot, I tended to come into contact with persons who 
were themselves dwelling in multilingual micro-lifeworlds. Norwegian was a 
language they all had in common, but the additional language combinations 
differed according to specific backgrounds. 
The time I spent with and around these persons made me aware of attri-
butes such as interdependence, incompetence, incompleteness and vulne-
rability (Lee 2001; Horton 2001; Gallacher and Gallagher 2008) within my 
institutional researcher-self which is first and foremost a product of the hie-
rarchization of the child-adult binary. Additionally, it gave me experientially 
lived insights beyond what I had pluralistically accessed as a remembering 
adult (Briod 1989; Lippitz 1986) or through research including children 
(e.g. Barker and Weller 2005; Weller 2006, O’Kane 2000; Punch 2002; 
Clark 2017; Clark & Moss 2001; Burke 2005; Greenfield 2004; Hart 1997; 
Lancaster and Broadbent 2003; Kellett 2004; 2005; 2010) that I had done 
in Ladakh (Biswas 2013; 2016) as part of the Quota Scheme determined 
Mphil Childhood Studies requirements. 
In the following two sections, I will introduce some of the experientially 
lived insights. Starting from birth, as something that took me back to syn-
esthetic and temporal basics of existing as human, I will proceed to a pre-
liminary rediscovery of the ludic ontological structure of human existence 
i.e play.  
 
4.2.4. Babies, Toddlers and Playing with Time 
Ole started his lifespan in this world in the municipality of Trondheim in 
the Gregorian-calendar year 2012. He became the first child member of a 
local household established by a couple born and raised in France, residing 
in Norway. I had gotten to know his biological parents, who were also his 
legal primary guardians, through a common friend-circle of persons who 
were interested in Italian language and culture. We met regularly to cook, to 
discuss culture and politics, play music or go for hikes in local and regional 
forests. Our gatherings also paved the way to become closer parts of each 
other’s mundane lives in the city. As a consequence, we began relating to 
each other beyond our shared interest in Italian. 
Since Baby Ole’s family migrated from France, we also spoke French 
and I could be included in French/Norwegian gatherings. After Baby Ole’s 
arrival (birth), our common activities changed as we had to adapt to a new 
temporality and respond to a new sensibility that Baby Ole came with. 
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Already in the prenatal phase, children and childhood had become a sub-
ject of conversation in the circle. Particularly, Baby Ole’s mother and I sha-
red our views on the matter. Philosophical themes in relation to childhood 
became part of our conversations due to my engagement with child monks 
in Ladakh that time. With Baby Ole’s arrival, I began helping his guardians 
in care-giving. As both guardians were employed researchers at university 
and their respective families were far away, close friends helped out when- 
ever possible. 
Baby Ole’s guardians were well aware and supportive of my curiosity in 
understanding childhood. I would often have my handycam with me and had 
begun actively experimenting with anthropological filming. I had no parti-
cular research agenda with neonate Baby Ole, except that I had the urge to 
understand his neonatal and post-neonatal45 being-in-the-world as closely 
as possible. Filming served as documentation for reflecting on what I was 
experiencing and observing with him. Sometimes I also wrote entries in my 
private diary after having spent time with Baby Ole. In this regard Baby Ole 
was the first person whom I could closely observe in the social life-phase 
called infancy with active attention. 
Although it prompted some of the conversations I had with other adults 
around Baby Ole, the focus of my interest was not really the topic of ‘child 
development milestones’ (e.g. Behrman et al. 1996; Kohlberg 1966, in: 
Lewis 2011). Rather, I was drawn to the ways in which Baby Ole showed 
signs of sensing the world around him. Further, during times I took care of 
him I was becoming aware of aspects of my human condition which I took 
for granted in my mundane life e.g. breathing, sleeping, waking, sensing 
and experiencing spatio-temporality through my body. The most striking 
experience, however, was coming closer to a completely different tempo-
rality. Was there even a sense of temporality in Baby Ole? Certainly, there 
was no sense of a socially constructed clock and calendar time that human 
beings begin to experience as real time as they are socialized into being 
‘grown up’ (Ennew 1994; Wall 2010). The rational adult, singular, universal 
ordering of temporality i.e. clock time is only possible because there is tem-
porality in the first place (Lippitz 1983). 
Time, derived from temporality, did not tick the way clocks do, in the 
presence of Baby Ole. Clocks had to be respected, because our adult team 
(Goffman 1990) co-navigated in a specific timely world according to it. 
45 Terms borrowed from osteological categorizations (Lewis 2011: 1; Table 1) and 
referring solely to the physiological age, not social categories.
Baby Ole’s time-less, temporal scale often conflicted with our timely, tem-
poral scale. Erratic temporal flows of sleeping and waking were turning into 
timely cycles mediated by synesthetic sight, sound, touch and movement. 
Entering his perceived spatial field, making melodic sounds, touching gently 
or moving around holding him firm and close to the body helped tuning his 
cycles into our time. Such ‘rituals’ gradually initiated him to start being in 
time with us. Placing a little piece of red wool in his palm, or keeping it close 
to his convenient reach had also become part of Baby Ole’s timely sleeping 
and waking initiation. 
In terms of visual attention or making and maintaining eye contact, 
Baby Ole showed an impressive capacity to maintain a large attention 
span. By the time he could be placed in an eating-chair, it often seemed 
like he was distracted from the food. But then he would hold my gaze and 
smile playfully. If my attention moved to something else in the room, his 
gaze would follow mine. There were occasions where I noticed that Baby 
Ole’s capacity to hold mutual gaze was in fact greater than that of most 
adults, who would easily look away or not look into my eyes46. Especially 
his capacity to look was really considerable. I made efforts to let myself be 
guided by him by looking where he looked, empathising with the immense 
joy he took in the smallest things, listening more carefully to ‘meaningless’ 
sounds. When I sometimes allowed my attention to be captured by see-
mingly banal objects like a spoon and engaged in an activity invented by 
him e.g. him throwing the spoon and me fetching it - Ole used eye contact 
and babbling to maintain connection with me. Unlike Piaget’s egocentric 
approach to infancy, as Scaife and Bruner (1975) have argued - babies 
are not as egocentric as especially developmental psychology traditionally 
believed. Infants, according to Scaife and Bruner, have some knowledge 
of the other’s perspective in so far as they can follow the gaze of the adult 
caregivers. “In so far as mutual orientation implies a degree of knowledge 
in some form about another person’s perspective then the child in its first 
year may be considered as less than completely egocentric. The source of 
such abilities (for example, imitation) remains to be investigated but utili-
sation of another’s gaze direction may be a very basic process. [...] Such 
observations need careful investigation but it may not be entirely unex-
46 The same holds true for my own capacity to make and maintain eye contact with other 
adults. However, with children, especially in the absence of adult interference or presence 
of adult ignorance - making and maintaining eye contact with babies and small children 
across specific geographical contexts e.g. Ladakh or mainland India, Italy, Germany or 
Norway, is much easier than with adults. 
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pected that human infants should also have greater abilities than has been 
supposed (ibid.: 266).” 
Early 21st-century investigations, being relatively distant from tradi-
tional developmental and evolutionary narratives of infancy, confirm that 
infants do in fact have greater abilities than adults suppose (e.g. Gopnik 
2009). These abilities go beyond having knowledge of other perspectives 
and the capacity to look or maintain visual attention. According to Gopnik’s 
study with infants and infant brains, the scales of neuroplasticity47 are far 
higher in babies than in adults (ibid.). Further, infants perform active pro-
cesses of changing their mind48 and are not simply changing passively 
(ibid.). The difference in physical, social and temporal scales between 
adults and children (including babies) is vast, but it doesn’t therefore follow 
that childhood is a primitive state of adulthood. Children and adults are dif-
ferent forms of homo sapiens, who have different, yet equally complex and 
powerful minds, brains, and forms of consciousness serving diverse evo-
lutionary functions. Accordingly, unlike in the traditional understanding of 
development as simple growth, development is better grasped as consis-
ting of processes of metamorphosis e.g. caterpillars becoming butterflies. 
In the case of humans it seems more as though we were “the vibrant, wan-
dering butterflies who transform into caterpillars inching along the grown-
up path (Gopnik 2009: 9).” 
The temporal scales of both these forms of being human differ and often 
clash, although they are interdependent. Tuning into moments of harmo-
nious intergenerational temporality with Baby Ole required disempowering 
my own clock-time temporality and opening up to a fair negotiation of tem-
poralities. In other words, getting the timing right. Consider the following 
example of our interaction around sleeping and playing:
Baby Ole and I were spending time in a room for children and their care-
givers at the student village of the university while his primary caregivers 
were busy attending to other responsibilities. According to the clock, that 
time should have been allocated to ‘playing’ and socialising with other chil-
dren within his age-group. But Baby Ole did not seem to want to join the 
activities. He crawled away every time I encouragingly placed him among 
other children or tried to direct his attention towards other ‘toys’. Initially he 
maintained eye contact with me, made sounds or showed notorious smi-
47 The capacity of the brain to change throughout the lifespan. 
48 Assuming in accordance with Western scientific models that the mind is ‘located’ in 
the physical body part identified as brain. 
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les when he crawled away or resisted me carrying him to spaces that he 
resisted. Gradually, he stopped making eye contact or addressing me with 
sounds and got cranky. My restlessness and irritation began co-responding 
to his resistance. Of course, he couldn’t ‘understand’ my imposed import-
ance of socialising with other children in the clock hour when it was planned. 
Eventually, I let him crawl in the direction where he wanted i.e. away from 
the designated play area. I sat on a reclining chair in the same area and wai-
ted, clueless about what to do as the clock ticked. Baby Ole explored ‘not-
hing’ in the corner and crawled towards me and reached out for my knee. I 
lifted him onto my lap, facing his body towards me and we stared at each 
other. He then neared my chest and I could feel the difference in the tempo 
of our respective breathing. Baby Ole’s breath was far gentler and subtler 
compared to mine. I then deliberately changed the tempo of my breath to 
tune into his and stopped focusing on the clock-time which I was empha-
sising in my mind. As our breathing tempos came closer, Baby Ole’s eyes 
began closing and he fell asleep. I remained tuned into his breathing tempo 
which in turn was transforming my temporal sense. I remained in the still-
ness, my eyes open and aware of my surrounding world, yet removed. My 
body was like a breathing mattress with palms on Baby Ole’s head and back. 
Supporting Baby Ole’s temporality to tune into the precise mathema-
tised time of the adult world, i.e. the mathematisation of nature itself, was 
often a very conflicting process. The first negotiation between child and 
adult, it seems, starts with the embodied negotiation of time itself. Who 
plays along with whose sense of ‘real’ time seems to be the beginning of an 
embodied philosophical tension between two temporal kinds of beings cal-
led child and adult. It was in such tensions that the temporal otherness of 
childhood (Beauvais 2018) began to reveal itself to my adult self. Ambigu-
ous child time and temporality in a contemporary overheated world is par-
ticularly hyper-regulated. Historically too the speeds, rhythms, and dura-
tions of childhood have been fixed and modulated by adults (e.g. Foucault 
1975; Ball et al. 1984; Adam 1995; Symes 2012; Duncheon and Tierney 
2013, in ibid.).
It wasn’t and is not possible to access what went on in Baby Ole’s mind. 
What is known through work that has somehow managed to step out of a 
strict developmentalist paradigm is that the realm of internal consciousness 
i.e. the realm of thoughts, feelings and plans is in motion since even before 
‘nonsensical’ babbling begins. This internal consciousness is also where 
our subjective temporalities are mediating our relationships with external 
consciousness of the ‘real’ world. Subjective temporalities are to a large 
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extent mediated through counterfactuals expressed in articulated language 
through words like might, should, could, would and if. Unlike traditional 
developmentalists, who were convinced that little children are limited to the 
here and now, cognitive scientists seem to be discovering that even very 
young children already consider possibilities, distinguish them from rea-
lity and use this knowledge to change the world around them. Sophistica-
ted counterfactual thinking which lies at the heart of philosophising is not 
just part of ‘grown-up’ consciousness. Even babies can sense that there are 
rules in the external world, but that they can be negotiated and changed 
(Gopnik 2009). 
While I continued meeting Baby Ole once in a while, I started working 
regularly as a substitute in a barnehage (Norwegian kindergarten). Among 
other things, this was a hotspot of counterfactuals and alternative realities 
that I could hear in languages I could follow as an adult. It was there that I 
first met Enaya, who accompanied me until the fourth phase of this study. 
The barnehage was without doubt a space where I re-learned to play like 
a child, in the conventional sense of the term. Furthermore, it was also a 
space where I found myself in philosophical conversations with children 
similar to Matthews’ philosophical dialogues (1984). 
In the following section, I will focus on presenting a reflective account 
of some child-adult tensions that I observed during my time in the barne-
hage. In my analysis, the complex power struggles emerged from and circ-
led around conflicting temporal senses, at least to a large extent. My princi-
pal insight in the barnehage was a shattered myth that women are ‘naturally’ 
more inclined to love children and act in their interest. With the example of 
Ms. X, I began asking what love in a pedagogical child-adult relation was in 
the first place.
4.2.5. Playing more by chance: Barnehage with Enaya & Co. 
Visiting the barnehage for a year in the position of an on-call substitute was 
also primarily possible because of my interrelated scales of positionalities 
that gave me access to a Quota student status in Norway, permitting me 
in turn to be individuated as a temporary resident with a national identifi-
cation number. The particular barnehage I was accepted into was mostly 
visited by multilingual children from diverse backgrounds. There were 
children from ‘pure’ Norwegian families with USA-return-migration back-
grounds (conf. Stugu 2012) or ‘half’ Norwegian backgrounds with either a 
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parent or ancestor who was not born in present day Norway. ‘Non-Norwe-
gian’ children belonging to skilled-labour families which had migrated from 
the European Union, Africa and Asia also attended the kindergarten. With 
the exception of one child who had just arrived in Norway from China, all 
children understood and spoke Norwegian and English, with most having at 
least one additional language. 
Regardless of their origins, they formed a highly cosmopolitan team of 
Norwegian child citizens. Since I shared language clusters with most chil-
dren, many seemed to feel comfortable approaching me and I was often 
invited into their playfully constructed worlds. However, I could not always 
accept invitations as I was a formal member of the adult team (Goffmann 
1990), hired to perform roles of watching and counting children as well as 
helping them or other adults with daily tasks. 
Child-adult temporal tensions often arose from the child not understan-
ding the precisely mathematised long and short time-bound future visions 
of the adults around them. As for the children, they didn’t seem to reserve 
specific time-slots and spaces for an activity called play (as also observed 
by Bae 2009:15). Instead, they brought in playful aspects into all activi-
ties and situations (ibid.). They played with and in time, which provoked the 
need to bring in order, control the situation or reinforce defined spatio-tem-
poral borders49 in the adults. 
The ideal of autonomy in children seemed to be realised through spe-
cific behavioural markers that the children were expected to achieve within 
adult-determined projections of time. For example, within the first calen-
dar-year and a half of being in the institution, children were expected to 
demonstrate autonomy by dressing or eating on their own. While the justifi-
cation on this emphasis was usually that this is something children need to 
learn for their futures, it was never acknowledged that children eating and 
dressing themselves saved adult caregivers a lot of clock-time. The sooner 
it happened, the more convenient it was for the adults who could go about 
their business. The behavioural markers on part of the children firstly freed 
the adults from the interdependent dynamic. There was no doubt that the 
source of urgency was in the adult experience. The children seemed to have 
no problem ‘whiling away’, a little bit more ‘toying around’ with their atti-
res, rolling on the ground, running around or using the spatio-temporality of 
those moments in ways that did not fit into the temporal ordering scripts of 
the adult-world. 
49 Conf. discussion on grensesetting (boundary-setting) in section 1.1.4.
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Despite highly egalitarian practices and participation of men in sharing 
responsibility towards children in the Norwegian private spheres, most child-
work positions in the kindergarten seemed to still be occupied by women. 
Consequently, the clashing temporal child-adult scales usually manifested 
between children and adult women50. Invariably, the  smaller side surrende-
red to the bigger side, that claimed to know what is ‘true’, ‘right’ or ‘good for’ 
the smaller side. With the following example, I present a reflection on the 
probable power dynamics underlying the ‘loving’ disciplinary approach of a 
kindergarten teacher Ms. X , whom I observed. 
The kindergarten was comprised of three internally connected rooms 
and a dressing area leading to an outdoor play area. Each room was designa-
ted to specific age groups and had one adult teacher and assistant in charge 
of it. Substitutes like me either filled in for absent teachers and assistants 
or were called in for extra support in respective rooms. The substitute posi-
tion was the only one that moved between rooms, while teacher and chil-
dren positions were fixed. For the children, moving from one room to anot-
her signified a temporal change in terms of growing up or becoming small 
again. Some either felt an anticipation of going to the next room or took 
pride in having friends in the ‘older’ rooms who occasionally invited them 
over. Others were either attached to their spatiality or simply didn’t focus 
on this theme. Going from an ‘older’ to ‘younger’ room was possible only 
in terms of visiting. ‘Older’ children seemed to take relatively more liberty 
to walk into ‘younger’ rooms spontaneously. The spatio-temporal borders 
seemed to be explicitly reinforced from the adult side. The method of spa-
tio-temporal border reinforcement used by Ms. X was noteworthy due to its 
juxtapositioning of fear and love.
In cases where a child would not obey Ms. X’s daily plan for the mem-
bers of her room, Ms. X would never show signs of anger or force. Instead 
she turned to emotional appeal. For example, Ms. X had started an after-
noon ritual of reading to members of her room during nap time. The youn-
ger room did not have this ritual, but instead its members were allowed to 
do ‘quiet activities’ after lunch. An assistant usually read to those who wis-
50 It might be assumed that what is good for women is good for children, or that 
women are ‘naturally’ inclined to act in the best interest of children. However, modern 
women gaining equal rights to participate in the labour market and political life doesn’t 
automatically lead to empowerment of children and childhood. It is noteworthy that 
children and childhood have not been sufficiently theorized on their own right in 
feminist theories (conf. Burman & Stacey 2010). The relationship between childism 
and feminism has only recently begun to receive attention in theoretical discussions 
(Rosen & Twamley 2018).
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hed to join. Eden was a member of Ms. X’s room and was obliged to stay 
in the room during nap time. Instead, one day Eden crossed over into the 
‘younger’ room to play and ended up sitting with a reading circle there. 
On having realised that Eden was missing in the room, Ms. X came to 
the ‘younger’ room looking for her. As she saw Eden, she went to her and 
approached her in an affirmative, but highly anxious tone. Ms. X told Eden 
that she has to stay in her room during nap time for stories, otherwise Ms. X 
gets worried that something could happen to Eden. Ms. X asserted that she 
cared about Eden’s well-being and Eden should think about this too before 
she decides to go somewhere else during nap time. Eden started showing 
signs of guilt and began crying. Then, Ms. X took Eden into her arms. She 
started soothing Eden’s back assuring Eden that she was not angry because 
she saw that Eden had understood. 
Eden exiting the defined spatio-temporality, i.e. the room where nap 
time for her group took place, did not represent a particular threat to her 
well-being. However, it was probably a source of anxiety and loss of power 
for Ms.X, whose sense of ‘truth’ was performatively deconstructed by Eden 
fearlessly navigating the spatio-temporality following her own terms. Ms. 
X’s sense of real time was a precondition for her project of spatio-tempo-
ral positioning in the kindergarten for the well-being of the children as she 
understood. She was philosophically committed to that particular spatio-
temporal reality derived from the natural attitude that clock-time is real 
time. Her philosophical commitment further made it possible to be in an 
empowered position to define truth and thereof influence how Eden’s right 
to self-determination could play out in the room she was in-charge of. 
As my early recognitions of power and positionality51 had already revea-
led to me, “power occurred and was relationally sustained through the 
form and not specific individual content (Jaaware on Foucault 2011)”. It 
follows that Ms. X’s use of ‘love’ to educe guilt in Eden so she understood 
how to cooperate with Ms. X’s definition of mathematised time as The 
truth cannot be credited to the individual Ms. X. Foucault (1980) explains 
that exercising power is bound together with the production of truth as 
well as the possibility to exercise rights. The sides that represent truth, 
in this case clock time as real time, are also the ones who get to control 
where and when what should be done. Loss of control, especially over 
clock time-determined activity, can often lead to high levels of fear and 
anxiety in adult women like Ms. X working closely with children. Regard-
51 As presented in section 4.2.2.
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less of their conviction in ‘love’ as a motivation to act in the interest of 
children, from the perspective of power dynamic it becomes evident that 
fear and anxiety facilitate interventions aimed at teaching children about 
‘borders’. 
In so far as modern childhoods, especially high Human Development 
Index ones, must be considered within the triangular constellation of the 
state, family and the child - the philosophical project of truth produc-
tion, e.g. clock time as real time, amplifies the temporal tensions. The 
first philosophical negotiation between child and adult is temporal. One of 
the ways one can create fairer spaces for philosophical negotiations is by 
tuning-into children’s temporalities, something that in early 21st-century 
times of overheated acceleration becomes more and more challenging for 
adulthood and childhood. 
Ms. X’s anxious attachment to protecting children, determining plans 
and activities that were best for them, and teaching them about coopera-
ting with her border-setting agenda lead to some turbulent situations in the 
barnehage. Power conflicts often took place among adult caregivers them-
selves. They were however focused on different adult interpretations of how 
children’s spatio-temporal navigations in the barnehage should ideally be. 
Ms. X’s room and ‘loving’ approach were particularly questioned. Assistants 
and substitutes on temporary contracts usually played along because they 
did not want to lose their jobs. Whenever differences were voiced, usually 
the assistants and substitutes were either transferred or asked to leave in 
the best interest of the barnehage management and children’s well-being. 
That is to say that the power constellations were maintained by keeping the 
central authority figures in place and simply moving out smaller figures that 
were not playing along as the adult team required. 
My reason for departure from the barnehage too was due to questioning 
the peculiar ‘loving’ approach of Ms. X and her defenders. Prior to that, her 
permanent assistant had also been pressured to leave. Other on-call subs-
titutes disagreed with Ms.X too, but preferred staying silent to protect their 
jobs. Getting the secure hours of paid work was part of the silenced tempo-
ral negotiations among adults in the barnehage. Additionally, there were, as 
I have described, child-adult power struggles revolving around performing 
certain activities or reaching specific developmental milestones within a 
given period of clock or calendar time. All of us, not just Ms. X, claimed 
their motivation was ‘love’ for the children. Still, tuning into their tempora-
lities, which could have created more room for a fairer child-adult co-ope-
ration (Norwegian: medvirkning; conf. Bae 2009), didn’t come easy within 
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the power constellations we (mainly adult women) found ourselves in. The 
barnehage was a space that brought these difficulties to the fore of my awa-
reness. However, my own pedagogical gaze towards children and childhood 
didn’t simply disappear. 
Some children and their families expressed interest in maintaining con-
tact beyond the barnehage. Enaya’s family was one of them. However, wit-
hin a few months of my departure, life-circumstances put me in a posi-
tion where I had a Norwegian degree, but no job in Norway enabling me to 
continue research on the intersections of philosophy and childhood in high 
Human Development Index contexts. Applying for childhood-related jobs 
outside academia, mostly via online job portals, brought no success either. 
No job contract, in my case, meant I would have to leave Trondheim and exit 
the country altogether. 
Although the Norwegian academic context was a promising place to 
continue research drawing upon the new childhood studies paradigm, my 
social as well as legal contract as a Quota student was putting pressure 
on me to ‘go back’. Further, the coming of Solberg’s Norwegian cabinet in 
autumn 2013 coincided with reduced job-seeking time for non-EU degree 
holders from Norwegian universities. A representative of the government 
did come to assure international students of NTNU that the new govern-
ment welcomed qualified foreign job-seekers like ‘us’. The assuring and 
welcoming address was primarily directed towards scientists who could 
contribute to technological and industrial progress e.g. the oil and energy 
sector. It seemed as though ‘foreign’ researchers in humanities and social 
sciences, both according to the academic as well as political expectations, 
were supposed to go back and contribute to fixing ‘real’ social problems 
found in their own countries. 
Going back to India to do research with high Human Development Index 
context childhoods, as based on the new childhood studies paradigm, was 
an unrealistic option. The paradigm itself would also be way too progressive 
in a context where even philosophical concepts of adult rights and emp-
owerment are seriously malnourished in practice. Critical, democratic, rati-
onal thinking associated with scientific temper itself had entered into a new 
violent era of unfreedom which accelerated as the Modi ministry assumed 
majority political power in spring 2014 (Biswas 2014). 
A stroke of luck again opened up an appropriate skilled-labour passage 
to Germany within academia. The newly tenured professor of the depart-
ment of General Pedagogy in Bayreuth and I had gotten to know each other 
at a summer school on Philosophy for Social Sciences in India before I 
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moved to Norway. The professor gave me a contract that would make it 
possible for me to start formalising my explorations into a doctoral study. 
With this contract, I could go to the German Embassy in Oslo to ask for per-
mission to move to Germany. 
In the last segment of this section, I will present how this move could 
further support me to sustain the access I had gotten to Norway, as repre-
sentative of a high Human Development Index context society. Further, the 
new contract I entered made it possible to start thinking again about phi-
losophising with children. My thematic return to the subject was influen-
ced by Sungjae52, who had in the meantime moved to South Korea and was 
sharing his observations and reflections on being in this overheated world 
through letters. Sungjae had decided to temporarily exit institutional lear-
ning and was experimenting with autodidact learning in order to prepare for 
writing high-school exams as a location-independent candidate. I will con-
clude the next segment with a reflection on one of Sungjae’s letters which 
made me further reconsider the role of children in philosophising.  
4.2.6. Die Talentabwanderung: This is not America
The Norwegian Quota Scheme no doubt created opportunities, but also 
curbed freedom of self-determination and movement insofar as it reprodu-
ced the tendency to commodify the ‘brain’ within national borders, in both 
theory and practice (Basford and Van Riemsdjik 2017). My application for 
an extension to the Utlendingsdirektoratet (UDI; Norwegian Directorate for 
Immigration) had officially put me in a position of waiting. The status was 
visible on a computer screen and the suffering caused by ambiguous wai-
ting only increased every time I called. 
Phone lines were always busy as there were probably many others in 
similar positions for different reasons. Waiting on the phone was accom-
panied by music - a soft hotel lounge cover of David Bowie’s This is not 
America. It was a dark tragic comedy, not perhaps as dark as it was for 
many other cases. The tune had become an ohrwurm (a catchy tune) in 
my mind and the only way to get rid of it was to stop calling. Police head-
quarters of Trondheim informed waiting candidates like me that the UDI 
was overworked and issued a special document assuring the legality of 
our stay. The document gave one restricted access to residence i.e. cros-
52 Introduced in section 4.2.1
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sing the Norwegian border meant being denied the possibility to reenter 
the country.
What next? was a pragmatic question I was overwhelmed with; to the 
extent that working theoretically on intersections of philosophy and child-
hood in this overheated world just could not flow. However, correspon-
dence with Sungjae sustained the questions on those intersections. 
The following letter is representative of our correspondence in that 
phase. Sungjae’s actions, observations and reflections arising from being-
in-this-world usually faced me with questions of positionality and power. 
With this particular letter, though, he began articulately poking at:
a.  the arbitrariness of demarcating the child-adult positions based  
on legal age. 
b.  the limitations of the adult pedagogical gaze when it comes to  
teaching children philosophy, particularly ethics. 
c.  the consideration of intergenerational interconnectedness in  
light of justice.
d. the distinction between logical and real in the light of power. 
e. diversity of temporal experiences of ‘Time’ in this world.
What stood out the most however, was that Sungjae - still a child to me - 
was philosophising on justice drawing upon his observation of a child. Sim-
ply watching a child had set off a series of philosophical reflections in adult 
Sungjae. They were of course questions that were usually important to him, 
but that such profound reflection could be triggered simply by watching a 
child was a crucial input for me.
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Dear Tanu,            25th Oct 2013
 [...]
 My ‘Time’ here in Korea so far (as Michael would refer…) flew by. 
I really had to do lot of things but the main thing being ‘adapting’. 
Adapting to my new somewhat independent life. As you already know 
I’m in Korea just months before serving the army. [...] 
Anyway, so the answer to the question you asked might be very much 
temporary. Apart from the question – What next? What next? Which 
I ask myself almost on hourly basis, I also am stuck on the question of 
what is Justice. [...]
A child who barely knows how to count could prove all the latter. A 
week ago I was at a market, then there I saw a small boy with his 
mother. I’m sure the boy might not have been above four years old. 
The mother was pretty much occupied with her own grocery shop-
ping and I was busy observing the toddler walk around the market-
place. (Of course I also had my own grocery shopping to do.)
Now that I visualize that moment from the child’s point of view as 
I write this letter I can develop some kind of empathy for the boy. 
A market place full of colorful and new things, with his own mother 
busy enough not to restrict his free will to do what he wants in this 
attractive exotic foreign surrounding. Then there it was a small red 
cherry tomato glowing if not dazzling. His hand reaches out for it, 
grabs it and the next moment it’s inside his right jacket pocket (which 
barely even lets the small tomato unnoticed). Now I’m not sure if he 
had planned this or if it was that amazing moment of coincidence 
that helped him escape everyone’s eyes, even the eagle eyes of the 
shop owner. It might well have been a perfect piece of crime if he 
could have escaped my eyes too. It would probably be too harsh to 
call it a crime but then I thought of highly hypothetical possibilities. 
Firstly, what if the boy had carried out similar activities in the past or 
would be carrying out in the future too.
Due to his lack of understanding of moralistic value and the concept of 
boundaries he might be susceptible of getting used to the idea of stea-
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ling and feel nothing wrong about it. Now what if the mother of this boy 
actually noticed the scene but chose to ignore it with her own various 
valid reasons. What if she fails to notice similar situations in future or 
fails to introduce the term of right and wrong to the child, or what if she 
herself don’t know what’s wrong and right. As a matter of fact I myself 
cannot be sure what is actually right or wrong. All I try is just escape 
situations where my act of my interest creates problems to others, as 
much as possible. 
[...]
Do we just blame the child for being too mentally weak to find moralistic 
values all the while his childhood passed by, all the while time flew by…
Even though I see most of the legal adults by age including myself are 
no different from this clueless boy. It’s just that the situation rose that 
the boy committed a crime and was caught red handed. If laws, cor-
rupted and honest lawyers or corrupted and upright politicians, teach 
us anything about Justice, it would be only measures and knowledge 
that Just is maintained and controlled. More of like a post-measure. 
Advices from parents, childhood education or gut feelings that rise 
include our self to act ‘moral’ are more of pre-measures to remain Just.
If the boy who stole a tomato at the market was scolded by his mother 
or was taught correctly he might as well turn more legally clean even 
though he probably still doesn’t know the meaning of Justice. It would 
be his habit that would judge him after all not the fact he knows the 
meaning of Justice and moralistic values. Just like habits of stealing 
or like the habits of not stealing. I’m not ‘just’ talking about this boy nor 
this case, but collectively. These are happy stories where good parent-
ing and educations lead to cleaner societies there are also hopeful sto-
ries where the law and government actually manage to bring logical or 
satisfying judgements. But there are still a lot of unfortunate cases, 
cases lot enough to appear in news or books and to worry about. 
 [...]
Warm Regards,
From ‘excited and thrilled’ Sungjae             Seoul, Korea
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Sungjae and I had come a long way beyond our experiment in practising 
a ‘child-friendly’ curriculum for doing philosophy outside the formal class-
room context. My initial experience of seeing myself in the role of a phi-
losophy teacher in relation to a child had also evolved as Sungjae started 
acting like a thinker. Already with his early performative deconstructions of 
my pedagogical adult perspective, he challenged me to re-think. My res-
ponses were usually resistances to the challenges that he would throw at 
me. Moreover, I reserved my view of children as default addressee of peda-
gogy vis-à-vis adults. 
With this letter especially, Sungjae gave me access to seeing a child in 
this world through the eyes of someone whom I considered a child-in-rela-
tion-to-me. From this distance, he pointed my attention towards the epis-
temological play of knowing and concealing that happens between children 
and adults. Furthermore, he pointed out to the fluid boundaries of moral 
principles that humans in adult positions systematically play with themsel-
ves . Sungjae also pointed out to me the vulnerability that came with power-
ful positions i.e. the fear of losing power. 
Drawing upon what the child in the Korean market had triggered in him, 
Sungjae was philosophising on macro-level corruption and injustice. Adult 
power games could occur in relatively innocent spaces like Norwegian kin-
dergartens too, as I was seeing with the case of Ms. X,53 who managed 
to negotiate her powerful position through a discourse of love for children. 
In spite of disagreement, most adults in smaller positions played along in 
order to secure their paid working hours. The adult truth of clock-time as 
‘real’ time, it seemed to me, was the philosophical spring of conflicting tem-
poral scales of childhood and adulthood. Temporal power was invariably in 
the adult hand that held the calendar and the clock. 
These insights did not immediately enter my project of doing philoso-
phy with children. That is to say that, when I finally had my papers in place 
to move to a new academic home in Germany,I still maintained that children 
could and should be taught philosophy. Lastly, I believed that spoken and 
written word with occasional silent pauses in between was the only form 
of philosophising there was. The only shift that I had arrived at through my 
time as a student of childhood studies was sensing a need for more equita-
ble ways of having philosophical conversations with children. 
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53 As presented in section 4.2.5.
4.3. Phase 1: Muddling through the Mystery 
Following the aforementioned, the point of departure of the systematic 
stages of this exploration was critical towards both class-based philosophi-
sing with children i.e. the community of inquiry model, as well as the tra-
ditional developmental attitude. However, as I will show in the following, it 
could not overcome its own critical attitude, primarily because the question 
that I was intending to formulate was in itself attached to the pedagogical 
gaze which, as I explained through the experiences with Sungjae, was an 
internalised border that I was ignorant of. What was it about both the com-
munity of inquiry model, as well as Sungjae’s alternative class-based philo-
sophy, that seemed to stand in the way?
Firstly, both models were based upon spoken language, which follows a 
pre-determined blueprint of logical argumentation. Further, in both cases 
the philosophical thematic i.e. question itself came from the adult facilita-
tor. Consider the following two models, the first is a simplified illustration 
of the community of inquiry and the second of Sungjae’s alternative class-
based philosophy:
Illustration 15: Simplified illustration of the PC community of inquiry
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As explained, the limitation seemed to be that the philosophical control - 
mainly through the projected vision, the themes and questions - is housed in 
the adult position. This in turn limits the scope for philosophical negotiation. 
Particularly, the method of the standard community of inquiry model 
coming from the high Human Development Index context, as I explained in 
part 2, entailed an epistemology rooted in white ignorance. An open con-
versational interview with the critical cultural and education scientist from 
the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Stine Helene Bang 
Svendsen, based specifically upon her work on historically silenced matters 
such as race, gender and sexuality in Norwegian classrooms (conf. Svend-
sen 2014), further confirmed the generic need for the suspension of the 
epistemological sovereignty of the adult teacher in order to respond to, in 
Svendsen’s words (personal communication), “the white Norwegian her-
editary perspective” and make way for a more “plural concept of knowledge 
that understands that two things can be a case at the same time.” 
According to Svendsen (ibid.), diversity in the Norwegian society and 
thereof educational institutions is not viewed as a resource, but a problem 
that needs to be handled. Svendsen describes her culture as a culture where 
“people had the privilege to presume that their language, cultural way of 
life is best. And, because of that, they normally do not need to learn from 
other people.” The entire institution and culture, according to Svendsen, 
supports this embodied truth and hence especially if educating for demo-
cracy is desired it requires that “ your own position and your knowledge and 
Illustration 16: Sungjae’s Alternative Class-based Philosophy
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your authority is tested by students. And, eh, and that you allow the process 
of, you allow yourself to be included in the process of becoming, you know, 
that you actually, you know, let your, your own, eh, view on the world change 
in the classroom (ibid.).”
As the experience with Sungjae had shown me, even outside the spatio-
temporality of the classroom, risking authority was not easy, let alone let-
ting one's view on the world change. Nevertheless, in the light of the bigger 
picture where it is finally being asked what education and philosophy can 
learn from children and childhood as opposed to the conventional contrary 
(Kennedy & Kohan 2016; Kohan 2014; Kohan 2011), it seemed important 
to try to find spaces where a more philosophically equitable pedagogical 
child-adult dynamic could unfold. 
 
4.3.1.  Muddling through with Interlocutors  
and Co-explorers 
The systematic stages of the inquiry began with a definition of philosophi-
sing with children as questioning and talking about philosophical subjects 
such as being, knowing, doing within the contemporary overheated high 
Human Development Index context in consideration i.e. Norway. The spa-
tio-temporality of instrumental schooling, as explained in section 1.2., was 
exited relinquished. Svendsen’s input was however necessary to unders-
tand important aspects of the philosophical shortcomings of the singular 
white hereditary perspective, which was immanent in the society wherein 
the educational context is nested. 
Having further acknowledged the need to take adult positionalisties in 
PC more seriously (Biesta 2011; Kohan 2011; Jasinski & Lewis 2016; 
Reed-Sandoval & Sykes 2017; Chetty 2018), I sought a space and medium 
that would allow child participants more room to negotiate philosophical 
questioning and meanings with adult participants as well as more room to 
exercise their interpretive philosophical agency. In order to do so, I needed 
to chalk out a research plan that included children.
Following the shared concern regarding ‘participatory’ approaches in 
research with children voiced by Gallacher & Gallagher (2008), I opted 
for a methodologically immature direction creating the possibility to 
allow being influenced by children, but not at the cost of turning them 
into adult-like researchers. So, children like Ole (formerly Baby Ole in the 
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embryological phase 0, here on Ole), whom I had watched over, as well as 
Enaya & Co., whom I had gotten to know through my time in kindergar-
ten were requested to help me in my project with the informed consent of 
their parents. 
At this stage, I refrained from even articulating a research question 
and determining particulars such as where and what should be explored. 
The motivation was not simply to include children in order to “report a 
world that was out there (Gallacher & Gallagher 2008: 512), but rather to 
continue an exploration towards finding a more equitable room for chil-
dren to negotiate philosophical questioning and meanings with adults. 
Thus, research was deliberately conceived of as experimentation (ibid.) 
and I first approached children as interlocutors whom I consulted in order 
to determine what the central question would be and the consequent 
research design. 
The goal at this stage was simply to understand how children and 
adults could talk together about philosophical subjects on more equitable 
terms such that children could have more room to negotiate the questions 
and themes. As far as possible, I documented exchanges with interlocut-
ions using either audio or video recorders. The role of such ‘data’ however, 
has been to support my memory in the reflective processes that followed. 
I still strongly adhered to the talk-based (Gespräch) view of what consti-
tutes doing philosophy. Hence, my questioning was directed towards the 
content of discussion and not the form of doing philosophy itself. 
I also avoided using the word philosophy or suggesting ideas, but since 
my co-explorers were often present when I talked to their guardians, that 
was not entirely avoidable. Interlocutors often pretended to be occupied 
doing something else, while sitting around in the same room as I enga-
ged with the adult-teams (Goffman 1990). However, I would later disco-
ver how intently we had been observed, for example by being sketched as 
seen below in the work of one of my interlocutors and co-explorers:  
Such sketches sometimes served as a tool for interlocutors to invite me to 
further engage and I rarely turned down playful invitations. Through one 
such invitation I was invited for a tea-party by Emma in her room, who was 
aware that I researched with children and it was something with the word 
philosophy. Initially I saw it as an opportunity to sit for an informal interview 
with Emma in her habitual lifeworld, as with other interlocutors too. 
Despite trying to avoid starting off our conversations with terms like 
‘philosophy’ or ‘research’, I had to invariably do so because either the 
observant interlocutor would ask, and/or, as in this case, the guardian 
would already introduce the interlocutor to what we were going to do. In 
the following, one can see Emma and me in the tea party, followed by parts 
of the conversation54 which contributed to the emergence of an idea that 
streamlined the consequent direction of the exploration. 
Illustration 17: Adult-teams intently observed. Illustration by Interlocutor 
54 Transcribed in Norwegian by Mira Myhr; Translation by author.
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Illustration 18: Emergence of an Idea 
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Emma:  We didn‘t start with the potato chips!
 
Tanu:  No, I mean potato sticks too and ..
 
Emma: But we also have to eat it up
 
Tanu:   But you‘re very fond of lentils, right?
 
Emma:  Mhm (affirmative)
 
Tanu:    Yes. Here (gives milk). Okay. Can you, uh, can you 
say, do you have any questions in your life Emma 
which you have no answer to…
 
Emma:  Many thousands
 
Tanu:    Yeah? Can you give an example? Or two examples or 
three examples?
 
Emma:   That eh, here‘s the first example, question 1, it’s … 
what should we talk about again?
 
Tanu:   What?
 
Emma:   Oh yeah, if anyone asks, how many cupcakes do you 
want? Or, how many, how many, how much, how many 
slices do you want with tomato soup, then have no  
answer as I even don’t listen to her ..
 
Tanu:    Mhm (affirmative). Is there more ... answer?  
No, questions. For example.
 
Emma:  Yes.
 
Tanu:    And can you just tell me, you can think of all the  
questions that you have that don‘t have an answer,  
a right, one right answer.
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Emma:  You, I have no answer to a thousand questions I ..
  […]
 
Emma:   Also point, and you say you can get a (*inaudible*) 
first. Then they do it. And then it can give you an exam-
ple also choose the next one. And the same on each.
 
Tanu:    Already asking a child „do you have any idea“, you 
mean? That I say, „Hey, you, do you have any idea or 
topic you are going to discuss,“ do you mean that?
 
Emma:  I mean.
 
Tanu:   And then ask the others „ok do you have one ...“
 
Emma:   If they say no then you can go to the next. And if they 
have, they can tell you and… Yes.
 
Tanu:   So you just ask?
 
Emma:  Mhm (affirmative). It is the simplest.
 
Tanu:    One problem here is that, um, do you mean to say that 
now we are going to discuss a philosophical theme, then I 
must explain what I mean? With the philosophical theme, 
not true, it does not van .. it is not easy to explain.
 
Emma:   Mmmm (thinks). Oh don‘t really know but, uh, don‘t 
really know. Oh don‘t really know it all.
 
Tanu:   eh…
 
Emma:  Oh, just want a little milk I.
 
Tanu:   What? Yes..
 
Emma:   But, it‘s best to have a tea party during the day, that’s a 
long time ago I did that.
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 Tanu:   Yes, (laughs a little). Yes, it‘s been a long time since I 
did too.
Emma:  There I put water in all things.
 
Tanu:   Can I just take some tea?
 
Emma:  Just take it.
 
Tanu:    Ehm, do you think maybe tea party is a good idea  
to have?
 
Emma:  You must have milk in it (takes the milk mug)
 
Tanu:    Yes. Do you think a tea party is a good idea to have  
philosophical conversations?
 
Emma:  eh?
 
Tanu:   Yes.
 
Emma:   For conversation? Makes you think of tea and it is good 
when you have a conversation. So always think about it 
nicely with a tea party.
 
Tanu:   Yeah?
 
Emma:   Because then one has to eat and drink, and yes. It‘s 
that and it is fun.
 
Tanu:    Yes it‘s fun. It actually is (laughs). And me, think about it, 
that, children, and adults can have a tea party together.
 
Emma:  Mhm (affirmative).
 
Tanu:   Yeah? Ehm.
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Emma:   You can ask what they want, whether they want a tea 
party or whether they should look in a book while you 
talk or, or you can say what they can do. But I am going 
to do a tea party anyway.
 
Tanu:    Yeah, anyway? So whether you have a discussion or 
not, you want a tea party?
 Emma:   Mhm (affirmative). This is a good idea. .. oh put them 
in here (puts something on a plate). When this one is 
empty we put that up in that way.
 
Tanu:   Yes.
 
(pause, puts candy and potato chips in bowls and eats a little about 30 sec)
 
Tanu:   It actually might be a good idea.
 
Emma:  What then a good idea?
 
Tanu:    Yes, with a tea party. And do you think that maybe, that 
is, who will organize tea parties, then, who will, or?
 
Emma:  Just ask what they want.
 
Tanu:   mhm
Emma:   For example, what they can do and what you think what 
they can do and what suits them. What they can do and 
what suits them as they hear what you say and how.
 
Tanu:    But, okay, eh, it‘s a good idea and I think maybe tea 
party might be a good idea for having philosophical  
conversation, okay?
 
Emma:  Oh I give you some milk up here again
 
[...]
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Taking the cue from there, I began looking into the possibility of including 
interlocutors in experimenting with a tea party format, where children and 
adults could sit with each other and talk without a predetermined thema-
tic agenda. The Trondheim municipality, with whom I had been in touch 
regarding the project, offered to support the experiment by offering us 
space within the frame of a children’s festival where we would get a room 
and logistical support. I met with interlocutors either in small groups or 
individually depending on their availability to think of how the tea party 
would be realised. 
Interlocutors had the possibility to talk about how the tea parties would 
be organised, communicate via email or to draw their ideas as seen in the 
example below:
Interlocutors had their own preferences and distinct opinions on how the 
tea party should play out. At the same time, there were identifiable influen-
ces from children’s literature such as Alice in Wonderland, the Norwegian 
children’s market where tea party sets are sold or as specifically in Trond-
heim during that phase - a niche culture of practising oriental tea ceremo-
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Illustration 19: Planning the Tea Party Experiment. Illustration by Interlocutor
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nies akin to what I had learnt with Mi Kyong. In addition, the anti-racist Tea-
Time campaign, which had been enthusiastically embraced by the royal 
family mainly in the Oslo region (Det Norske Kongehuset/ The Royal House 
of Norway 2013; 2011) and was also celebrated by some of the internatio-
nal family circles in Trondheim, was also mentioned. 
The actualisation of the child-adult tea parties were also limited by the 
budget and logistical framework laid out by the Trondheim Kommune itself. 
Eventually, as we had the tea parties, few moments of child-adult tea time 
in fact occurred, leaving barely any realistic prospect for exploring the tea 
party as a possible space for children and adults to philosophise together. 
 
4.3.2. Failure of The Tea Party Experiment
 
The Tea Party Experiment failed due to several factors at child-child, child-
adult and structural levels. At the level of child-child interaction, gender dif-
ferences affected the tea party in so far as the male participants could not 
satisfactorily realise their ideas. One of the male participants, who insisted 
on having footballs in the room, could not successfully challenge the con-
victions of the female participants - who outnumbered him - as to the aest-
hetics of tea parties. He managed to negotiate football motives to be part of 
decoration and wore a T-shirt from his favourite team. However, the nego-
tiation itself brought him to tears. Distressed, he asked to be accompanied 
out of the area by his father. 
At the child-adult level, adult participants had either communicated 
their interest in participation beforehand or spoken to volunteers positio-
ned as gatekeepers to the area on the day of the Tea Party. The eagerness 
of adult participants to experience and learn something by participating in 
a tea party arranged by children turned out to be counter-productive. Most 
adult participants seemed to be waiting for something special to happen 
and such moments did not occur in their experience. Some adult partici-
pants were moved by the charm of the experience or a nostalgia about their 
childhood play experiences. Others seemed to have experienced somet-
hing trivial or rather boring. On the other side, some child participants were 
either not particularly impressed with their adult playmates, or felt that the 
adults came more to look at, than to play with them.
At a logistical level, the context of the children’s festival helped to get 
the support of the community to experiment in a new direction. However, 
it also became a hindrance because other organisational considerations 
had to be taken into account and not all ideas that came up spontaneously 
could be realised. For example, Emma and Enaya, who met for the first time 
during the festival, wanted to go for a little tour as part of their tea party. 
Due to security reasons however, they had to stay inside the room. Their 
irritation grew as their spontaneity had to be repeatedly curbed. They found 
a solution by using curtains in the room to go ‘in and out of two worlds’ - one 
where one could be like funny peacocks and the other where one had to be 
like immovable statues. As it eventualised, they preferred to stay in-bet-
ween the two worlds they had co-created and did not show further interest 
in entertaining adult guests in their tea party. 
Nevertheless, the particular failure of the Tea Party Experiment became 
the next turning point for the direction of the exploration. My adherence to a 
view of doing philosophy in terms of sitting and talking (Gespräch) became 
evident to me. The tea party initially seemed like a good idea to me because 
it reflected a practice from the child-child dimension of children’s culture 
(Frønes 1994: 148-149). Furthermore, it still preserved the form of doing 
philosophy, i.e. sitting and talking, that I took for granted as The form of 
doing philosophy.
However, after the failure of the experiment, the scope of my attention 
began to expand beyond the tea party, towards something even more fun-
damental i.e. play. Interlocutors like Emma, Enaya and Ole usually made an 
effort to sit and talk to me because they wanted to help me. At the same 
time, the invitations I received were invitations to play within which my pro-
ject was generously accommodated. Furthermore, the way interlocutors 
were negotiating definitions while planning or re-inventing the direction of 
their play e.g. Emma and Enaya’s peacock world, when they could not go 
on a tour’ during their tea party, was in itself a way of negotiating the defi-
nition of what could or could not be done. If the initial project was to seek 
a more equitable room for children to negotiate philosophical questioning 
and meanings with adults, then reducing the definition of doing philosophy 
as sitting and talking was already limiting the scope giving the adult coun-
terpart an upper hand, since adults are used to sitting and talking for com-
paratively longer periods. Ultimately, I was still conceiving the child as the 
default addressee of pedagogy who had to perform on adult grounds when 
it came to philosophising. 
Thus, I re-considered the very outset of my inquiry once again. Con-
sequently, I turned to muddling through the mystery (Marcel 1949: 117) 
called play.
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4.3.3. Fielding Play with Childism
The English language, like its continental counterparts German, French, 
and Italian, employs a single word to describe the phenomenon called play. 
The verbs spielen, jouer or giocare, with their own variations in how they 
are used in their respective lifeworlds, come closest to the English expres-
sion play. The Norwegian language has two verbs to describe what in Eng-
lish would translate as play - å leke and å spille. A similar distinction can be 
found in the continental counterpart Portuguese - brincar and jogar. The 
former is usually employed to describe something children do, whereby no 
‘structures’ or ‘rules’ are observed - it is usually something ‘just for fun’ or 
in other words, å ha det gøy. Connotations of å spille include acts steered 
by rules and structure - a more ‘grown up’ play. An instrument, a theatrical 
performance or a game of chess would be played in the sense of å spille.
The pervasive influence and significance of play in human life was com-
prehensively laid out by Huizinga, who described human as Homo Ludens 
(Huizinga 1955, in Duflo 1997: 35). According to Feezell (2013) various 
standpoints of studying play are broadly categorized as follows:
a. A behaviour or activity
b. A motive, attitude or state of mind
c. A form or structure
d. A meaningful experience
e. An ontologically distinct phenomenon
Within the Western tradition three broader philosophical approaches to stu-
dying play, regardless of the standpoint, have been further laid out (Wall 
2013: 48-50, 2011):
a.  The top-down approach, which views human nature’s childhood and 
thereof play as a starting point of an animal-like unruliness, passion 
and disorder, requiring an ordered rationality to be imposed from 
above. Kant’s last publication on education reflects this approach in 
so far as it holds that children’s lively imagination “does not need to 
be expanded or made more intense … [but] needs rather to be cur-
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bed and brought under rule”; and “playing and caressing with the 
child … makes him self-willed and deceitful” (Kant 1960: 78, 50, 
52-53, in Wall 2013: 49).
b.  The bottom-down approach, which views childhood and thereof 
play as an expression of humanity’s basic goodness and wisdom 
and its natural spontaneity and simplicity. Children and their play-
fulness, according to this view, must be nurtured from the ground 
up as a way of resisting the corrupting habits of the world. Rousse-
au‘s idea of the ‘noble savage’ reflects this approach; Rousseau wri-
tes, “ Cultivate and water the young plant before it dies [...] its fruits 
will one day be your delights, [...] and all of childhood is or ought to 
be only games and frolicsome play (Rousseau 1979: 38, 125, 153, 
in Wall 2013:49). 
c.  The developmental approach, which views play as a neutral instru-
ment to be used for humanity’s gradual development or as a means 
for individuals, societies and history to make progress. Locke’s work 
on education reflects this approach; Locke writes that children start 
out life “ as white Paper, or Wax, to be moulded and fashioned as one 
pleases [so that] all the Plays and Diversions of Children should be 
directed toward good and useful Habits, or else they will introduce 
ill will (Locke 1989: 265 and 192, in Wall 2013:50). Locke further 
argued that children’s development is the foundation of empirical 
science and democracy, since both rely on the human potential to 
play with new experiences over time (ibid.).
While all three approaches share a developmental tendency, especially the 
instrumental variety based on Locke’s tabula rasa thesis is compatible with 
approaches of developmental psychologists who, following Piaget (1972, 
in Wall 2013: 50), tend to understand children’s play as important to beco-
ming cognitively and morally adult. A similar tendency is found in Sutton-
Smith’s instrumental interpretation of children’s play as a basis for evolutio-
nary development, in which play’s “function is to reinforce the organism’s 
variability in the face of rigidifications of successful adaptation (Sutton-
Smith 1997: 231, in ibid.).” 
The standpoint of questioning, perspectives and approaches to study-
ing play within play theory and related fields are primarily from an adult point 
of view (e.g. Factor 2004; Schwartzman 1976; Singh and Gupta 2012, in 
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Glenn et al 2012). For example regarding play as the ‘work’ of children (e.g. 
Piaget 2007, in Glenn et al 2012) or as a particular activity preparing chil-
dren for adult life (e.g. Elbers 1996). The childhood studies tradition on the 
other hand has studied play as an activity from children’s point of view (e.g. 
Øksnes, M. 2008; Glenn 2012; Lindqvist 2001:7; Evaldsson & Corsaro 
1998). As opposed to adult-centric conclusions, such studies enable gras-
ping children’s interpretive agency in response to adult life (Evaldsson & 
Corsaro 1998) or as pointed out in Section 3.2.2 – the system within which 
their interpretive cultures are immanent. Children are not captivated by 
objects themselves, but the stories which give the objects and actions their 
meaning (Lindqvist 2001:7). They partake actively in creating those mea-
nings. Such studies include children’s perspectives i.e. children themselves 
contribute to the knowledge production process of the researcher’s inves-
tigation (Hallden 2003:14). Taking children’s perspectives into account 
however, would not alone guarantee that the theoretical grounding of the 
concept does not remain adult-centric. Play, had to be approached from 
a perspective such that it could not be understood as either free child-like 
‘lek’ or adult-like structured ‘spill’ , but as a more nuanced continuum of 
what was in between the two terms, namely so that the creative realm could 
be grasped, rendering play as belonging to the ontological structure of who 
we, regardless of age, are.
To illustrate this with a counter-intuitive example, I quote Wall’s telling illus-
tration of the case of Ying Ying Fry who was adopted by an American family 
from an orphanage in China:
“Fry herself tells this story of her infancy when she is eight years old 
in her book for children and adults titled Kids Like Me in China, which she 
wrote shortly after revisiting her old orphanage with her adoptive parents. 
While Fry does not directly remember her infancy, she describes what it 
must have been like in powerful ways: ‘To get people to have small families, 
the [Chinese] government made some rules, and they’re really strict about 
them. But the babies didn’t do anything wrong! Why do they have to lose 
their first families? I don’t think those rules are fair to babies’ (Fry 2001: 
2-3). As both a newborn and an eight-year old, Fry must constantly ‘play’ 
with her own experiences and meaning in the world. As her infancy shows, 
she is shaped by untold layers of relationships, communities, policies, and 
histories. She is partly who she is because of her birth parents, her biolo-
gical ancestors, the Chinese government, global economic systems, inter-
national adoption agencies, her adoptive parents in the United States, their 
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own ancestors, their larger cultures and societies, and so on beyond any 
conclusive reckoning. At the same time, however, none of these conditions 
merely shape Fry passively. She also actively creates senses of meaning 
out of them for herself. As both a baby and an eight-year-old, she invests 
her complex and powerful surroundings with her own responses, ideas, and 
aspirations. She is both ‘played by’ and ‘plays with’ her worlds of meaning. 
She exists, in short, within an endless hermeneutical ellipse: a world that 
shapes the meaning of her experiences even as she in turn reshapes this 
meaning in new ways for herself” (Wall 2013: 51).
The kind of aforementioned ontological experience that starts in child-
hood cannot be understood through the traditional bottom-up, top-down 
or developmental approaches to childhood and play. The continental tra-
dition that emerged as a rejection of the dualistic modern Cartesian view 
of human being as divided into subjective inner reason and objective outer 
nature - phenomenology - fleshes out a more complex sense of play. Howe-
ver, following Wall’s analysis of the three most influential phenomenolo-
gies of play, one finds that they not only entirely ignore the play of children, 
but in doing so assume a rather narrow play perspective of adulthood itself 
(Wall 2013; 2011). Therefore, I was convinced that, for muddling forward 
in the direction that my interlocutors had shown, not only the three traditio-
nal approaches, but also the promising continental phenomenological tra-
dition itself would have to be carefully implored. 
To give a brief presentation based on Wall’s analysis of the phenomeno-
logical conceptualisations of play,
a.  A top-down ontology can be found in Heidegger and Gadamer 
insofar as play is churned into the dynamic existential belonging of 
humans to history. Heidegger writes about how Being (Sein) “toys 
with man” and the role of man is to “play along with” the play; that 
man is caught up in that play (Heidegger 1957:206, quoted in 
Caputo 1970: 34, in Wall 2013: 51). Gadamer presents play as a 
movement of “historical consciousness” that in a somewhat “tragic” 
way is less “something a person does” than something that, “absorbs 
a player into itself” (Gadamer 1989: 104-105 and 110, in ibid.)
b.  A bottom-up ontology of play can be found in Derrida, who pre-
sents the human being as a historical being subjected to constant 
deconstruction. Providing a more comic view, Derrida posits that 
the human being finds meaning only in the “play of differences,” the 
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presence of absences, the mischievous and disruptive “movement 
of play that “produces” … differences’ of meaning in the first place 
(Derrida 1996: 441, 449, and 459, in ibid.)
c.  A somewhat developmental perspective can be identified in Kear-
ney’s suggestion that play is the endless imagination of life’s unfol-
ding “possibilities”; and that to be human is to play with continually 
new possibilities for meaning and thereby constructing over time 
a “narrative identity woven from one’s own histories and those of 
others (Kearney 2003: 188, in ibid.).”
Consequently, muddling forward with my interlocutors compelled me to 
consider Wall’s proposal to open up to the unfinished project of nearing play 
as the in-between of lek and spill, or for that matter brincar and jogar, from a 
childist standpoint. Childism includes children and childhood in a phenome-
nological conception of play by grasping the poetics of play i.e. world-crea-
tivity as the meaning of being human. This perspective understands play 
as the capacity for decentering one’s historically given horizons of meaning 
in tune with one’s own particular and dynamic lived experiences. From the 
mundane life of everyday philosophers such as sleeping, waking, eating, 
talking and so on to powerful works of art and science, human beings play 
with the meaning of their own being by continuously deconstructing and 
reconstructing it afresh (Wall 2010, 2011, 2013). 
Accordingly, childism understands play not only as a legitimate object 
for philosophical study, but as what it means to philosophise in the first 
place. “Philosophy is not just a professional occupation but also an activity 
of being human. And from this point of view, it is practised by all human 
beings from birth to death. To think philosophically is to ‘play with’ the most 
basic meaning of being human (Wall 2013: 56).” 
Ergo, sitting and talking is a form of philosophising, at the same time it is 
playing. Which in turn is philosophising. 
In the phase that followed, I decided to approach former interlocutors 
like Emma, Enaya, Ole and others as co-explorers who could further lead 
me into a form of philosophising I had pretty much forgotten as a remem-
bering adult (Briod 1989; Lippitz 1986). This was a different effort/attitude 
compared with the time Emma had invited me to her tea party, which I had 
seen as an opportunity to ‘interview her in her habitual lifeworld’. However, 
the new intention of playing whatever co-explorers decided was no longer 
to seek their opinions on any specific matter, but to philosophise with them, 
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in the sense of the Norwegian preposition hos or the German preposition 
bei. The desire of seeking a room where a more philosophically equitable 
pedagogical child-adult dynamic could unfold had subsided. The room was 
play itself. Since my prospective co-explorers were by far better than me in 
this form of philosophising, it wasn’t any longer reasonable for them to be 
positioned as default addressees of pedagogy. In turn, I, as the adult in our 
child-adult dynamic, would have to be positioned on the receiving end of 
the dynamic. Thereupon, the central question came to the fore and I finally 
could and therefore asked: 
What is the scope for the philosophical blossoming of adults when they 
enter children’s playfully constructed worlds as guests?
4.4 Phase 2: Immersive Play 
In order to explore the scope for the philosophical blossoming of adults 
when they enter children’s playfully constructed worlds, I now decided to 
approach children as co-explorers. Although I drew upon the least-adult 
role (Mandell 1988; Corsaro 1985; Warming 2011), the conscious deci-
sion was to assume the role of a guest. In doing so, I could emphasise my 
ignorance of the temporally distinct worlds I would enter and consequently 
explore what it is that I could perceive. This new stage also involved conver-
sations with co-explorers who could talk and my own notes and, if the situ-
ation allowed, play sessions were filmed so as to not depend completely on 
memory. 
In the following, I will account for the theoretical considerations and con-
sequent pragmatic choices I made in order to prepare myself for immersive 
play with co-explorers. After that, I will present some representative illus-
trations of selected moments captured through a camera, in order to pro-
ceed to cerebrations on having played which led to the core insights.
4.4.1. Preparing for Immersive Play 
Preparing for immersive play as a least-adult who is an ignorant guest called 
for going back to play itself in the phenomenological sense of the phrase, 
and starting with suspending the graspable natural attitude as far as pos-
sible. The continental phenomenological tradition, despite its promising 
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methodological tools, would be insufficient for such a purpose, because I 
was not about to enter a thought experiment in my mind, but an embo-
died thought experiment in dynamic and unpredictable motion lead by co-
explorers. Hence in the embryological stages of the experiment, following 
Irigary’s critique of the forgotten breath in phenomenology, and inspired by 
the experience with Baby Ole, I drew upon the phenomenological technique 
of Vipassana meditation - which I had also began practising in the embryo-
logical stages with Erica. Since maintaining the stillness of the conscious 
mind in a dynamic state was predicted to be an obstacle, I further drew 
upon Jaina pluralism as an analytical fall-back. These considerations con-
tributed to a systematic preparation for immersive play.
4.4.1.1. Suspending the graspable Natural Attitude
In the continental phenomenological tradition, suspending the natural 
attitude has been the methodological point of departure for the investiga-
tion of phenomena. In a pure, theoretical philosophical project such as the 
fundamental reflection on the world as a phenomenon, performed by Hus-
serl (1962), the world is reduced to a phenomenon for experiencing sub-
jectivity. The natural attitude, in this case, is the consciousness standpo-
int that posits - The world is (ibid; also see Luft on Husserl 2002). Instead 
of simply positing the existence of the world, positing itself is conceived 
of as ‘taking being for granted’ i.e. taking it as it is or presupposing it as 
something independent of us. Here, the interdependent nature of expe-
rience is recognised in so far as experience is always experience of somet-
hing (Husserl 1962; Luft on Husserl 2002; Jaaware on Heidegger 2016). 
In terms of muddling through (Gallacher & Gallagher 2008), suspending 
the natural attitude is then understood as a sense of embracing ignorance 
as a point of departure. 
Identifying a natural adult attitude specifically, as described by Waks-
ler (1986; 1991; 1996), would imply initially tuning into what children 
can do and adults cannot or will not do. Secondly, it entails an awareness 
that, at the level of social being, the role of a child is a role, and correspon-
dingly becoming aware of the adult role vis-à-vis a child role. Phenome-
nological recognition of child and adult roles called forth a suspension in 
the assumption that childhood has some absolute existence beyond the 
social - an assumption that embodies the very topic that it could ende-
avour to study (Waksler 1986: 80). 
Given the embodied positioned nature of experience itself (Warming 
2011), an intellectual suspension could then not suffice for overcoming the 
embodied natural attitude as an adult. The ‘child-friendly’ experiment, in 
trying to exit class-based philosophising in the embryological stages with 
Sungjae, as well as the failed Tea Party Experiment, had already shown me 
my limitations. Clearly, a purely intellectual suspension of the natural adult 
attitude would not be enough, if it was possible for me at all to perform in 
accordance with the continental phenomenological tradition as far as I had 
grasped. Something more would be needed if I had to enter into immersive 
play with my co-explorers. 
4.4.1.2. Remembering the Breath 
A major limitation of the Western tradition and especially continental phe-
nomenology, as Irigary has pointed out, is the forgetting of a fundamental 
aspect of existence, namely the breath (Irigary 1999). Baby Ole had already 
pointed me towards the significance of being in touch with my own breath 
in order to tune into the temporal otherness of a child. 
In order to systematically integrate the breath as a tool into the pheno-
menological approach, it was necessary to look for an approach that did 
not have primarily intellectual goals. Within the Eastern traditions, Buddhist 
mindfulness practices bear an affinity with the phenomenological because 
of the centrality given to the role of consciousness as well as presuppo-
sition-less investigations of the consciousness through the body (Gok-
hale 2018). Therefore, I decided to actively draw upon my practice in the 
Vipassana technique of the Buddhist tradition as taught by S.N. Goenka, 
which I had begun practising during the embryological phase with Erica 
Vicenzi. The Vipassana mindfulness practice entails performing cycles of 
persistent observation of the internal and external body in order to gain in-
sight into the impermanent nature of consciousness. The first step to get 
into the phenomenological self-investigation is to begin with observing the 
breath. As one proceeds with the practise, the breath serves as a point of 
return and renewed departure every time the analytical mind wanders away. 
While at a material level of my embodied participation in immersive play I 
had deliberately chosen breathing as the phenomenological point of return, 
years of training with the school of Vipassana meditation helped me predict 
the default tendencies of the mind to go into analytical mode. I could by no 
reasonable means anticipate that I would manage to hold the silence of the 
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mind through meditative breathing. Such states of complete mental silence 
had only been possible for some minutes after intensive periods of sitting 
meditation during Vipassana courses. Since immersive playing would entail 
bodily movements including sounds as well as my attention towards inclu-
ding the video camera in the process, I had to be prepared with an analytical 
tool that I could fall upon.
Consequently, in addition to the intellectual phenomenological suspen-
sion of the natural adult attitude following Waksler (1986), and integration 
of material breath into my preparations for immersive play, I sought analyti-
cal support from Jaina pluralism.
 
4.4.1.3. Jaina pluralism as analytical fall back
My co-explorers and children I had spent time with especially during the 
embryological phase in the kindergarten in Trondheim often used the con-
ditional Norwegian term på en måte (in a way), especially while planning 
their play. Although I learnt of Jaina pluralism earlier in the embryological 
phase, it came to the fore of my attention only in kindergarten. 
Following the methodological attribute of ontological validation through 
pluralism, I drew upon Jaina logic to counter my own judgements which 
were bound to arise in my mind during immersive play. Specifically, the 
Jaina theory of judgement holds that every judgement about reality can 
only be partially true (Shastri 1990; Chatterjee & Datta 2016; Shah 2000; 
Ganeri 2001; Ganeri 2002). In other words, our judgements hold only for 
the particular aspect of the judged object and with reference to the standpo-
int occupied from where the judgement is being made. Therefore, the term 
somehow is used in the beginning of every proposition in order to make the 
conditionality of judgements transparent (Chatterjee & Datta 2016: 79). 
The approach systematically adheres to a seven-fold propositional model, 
as opposed to a two-fold propositional model of affirmative and negative 
propositions as commonly found in Western logic. 
To elaborate further, in addition to systematic conditional qualification of 
propositions, the seven-fold model of judgement goes beyond the default 
two-fold affirmative and negative template of description through an onto-
epistemological validation of incapacity of a human observer to describe 
reality. Hence, a third conditionally qualified proposition is added in order 
to make the descriptive incapacity transparent. Consequently, indescri-
bability is onto-epistemologically legitimised. In other words, Jaina plura-
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lism entails an epistemological humility which two-valued epistemologies 
regardless of geographical origins fail to offer. 
 It follows that the primary conditional propositions through this approach are:
1) Somehow, X is
2) Somehow, X is not
3) Somehow, X is indescribable
 
 Furthermore, the consequent three conditional propositions are derived by 
compounding the primary conditional propositions as follows:
4) Somehow, X is and is not
5) Somehow, X is and is indescribable
6) Somehow, X is not and is indescribable
 Finally, the following last conditional proposition comes forth as a trinity of 
all three conditional propositions: 
7) Somehow, X is, is not and is indescribable. 
So while the forgotten breath (Irigary 1999), based on the Vipassana tradi-
tion of the Buddhist school of Indian philosophy, would serve as an embo-
died point of return, the anticipated activity of the analytical mind would be 
curbed through falling back upon the conditional seven-fold judgement cri-
teria from the Jaina School of Indian Philosophy. 
4.4.2. Playing 
Having prepared myself mentally to enter into a phenomenologically immer-
sive experience as a least-adult guest in the playfully constructed worlds of 
my co-explorers, I began meeting Enaya, Emma, Captain Duke, Ole, Finn, 
Thor, Amelie, Gullveig and Aida, to play on their terms. 
The play encounters had a temporality of their own and did not always 
meet the schedules that the adult-team of guardians and caregivers agreed 
upon with me. Sometimes when I arrived, co-explorers were eagerly wai-
ting with a plan e.g. a story or objects that would be used to realise what 
they had in mind. On other occasions, either they were already absorbed in 
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playing, or simply in an aloof mood. Or at other times, they were either par-
ticipating in what was going on in the household e.g. waiting for dinner or 
spending time with other people. Even during such occasions, there were 
fleeting moments of playfulness that happened which were captured on 
one of the recording devices I had i.e. A Blackview rugged outdoor smart-
phone55 and a Sony handycam. 
In order to tune-into the specific temporalities that my co-explorers 
dwelt in, beyond the pre-determined schedule of my visits, the first sus-
pension was the suspension of external clock-time. 
The second suspension was a spatial suspension of my taken-for-gran-
ted world i.e. the network of meanings around me, through which I usually 
make sense of everyday life.
In the following section, I will begin with the example of approximately 
6 clock-time minutes of an intense play encounter in Lava Land with Cap-
tain Duke (Biswas 2017), the total of which lasted about 7 clock-time hours 
over a period of three days in Spring 2016. Nevertheless, these 6 clock-
time minutes didn’t feel like 6 clock-time minutes, but indescribably longer. 
 
4.4.3. Cerebrations on Having Played 
Taking my experience as the focal unit of analysis, I describe the encounter 
with Captain Duke in a place which was:
Somehow, a kitchen. ( + )
Somehow, not a kitchen. ( - )
Somehow, indescribable. ( 0 )
Somehow, a kitchen and not a kitchen. ( + . - )
Somehow, a kitchen and indescribable. ( + . 0 )
Somehow, not a kitchen and indescribable. ( - . 0 )
Somehow, a kitchen, not a kitchen and indescribable. (+ . - .0)
In this place, Captain Duke endlessly flew a toy car, as though it were a plane, 
that he was holding in his hand. At first, these repetitive cycles were boring 
for me and did not make sense. But I returned to my breath and intellectu-
55 Since co-explorers tended to playfully incorporate the recording devices themselves, 
I used a rugged outdoor smartphone in order to preclude my adult anxiety of equipment 
being damaged during play.
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ally allowed the other meanings he was bringing to life, through his dynamic 
embodied movement, to enter the horizons of my perception. Gradually, it 
did not feel as boring and senseless, rather exciting and abundantly mea-
ningful. 
Captain Duke flew the car over the kitchen counters and landed it on the 
dining table. He generated onomatopoeic sounds accompanying the moti-
ons. He cautioned me that there was lava on the floor and that all the cars 
were in the lava. Therefore, we had to fly the cars and land them on the dining 
table. He then flew the cars on the same route and I surrendered to his lead. 
Captain Duke’s primary care-giver was present in the room, but supported 
my investigation by staying in the periphery, only responding when Captain 
Duke asked for attention. The presence of the other adult caregiver made 
me conscious of my own adulthood, but I stayed with Captain Duke’s lead 
and played along. This meant that somehow I was observing and immersing 
in the play at the same time. I accomplished this by surrendering to Cap-
tain Duke’s lead as much as possible until at one point our body movements 
became highly synchronised. In superficial words, I copied Captain Duke’s 
moves. When I couldn’t, Captain Duke repeatedly explained to me what I 
should change or do better until I got into a flow.
Eventually, my prior conceptual understanding of the network of mea-
nings i.e. the world around me remained and at the same time ceased to 
exist. Material objects such as the ‚dining table‘, ‚kitchen counter‘, ‚play-
kitchen‘ and so on revealed themselves as co-determinants of our move-
ments, as opposed to the usual sense within which I encountered them. 
Subsequently, my prior conceptual understanding relaxed and a parallel 
world presented itself to me. 
Captain Duke had led me through an embodied thought experiment in 
motion and shown me what else a particular spatio-temporality could be. As 
proposed by Gopnik (2009), sophisticated counterfactual thinking i.e. all 
that is expressed in spoken language through terms like might, should, could, 
would and if etc. is not just part of adult consciousness. Ultimately, counter-
factual thinking lies at the heart of philosophising or playing. From a childist 
perspective, they both refer to the one and the same (Wall 2013). Somehow. 
To attempt a visual illustration56 of what came to pass in my conscious 
experience, I present the following four static frames of a dynamic GIF image:
56 Partly inspired by some of the art works produced by my co-explorers.
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Frame 1: the immediate world
Frame 2: my prior, non-exhaustive, conceptual understanding (PCU) of the  
immediate world
151
Frame 3:my PCU appears to have ceased to exist
Frame 4: a parallel world presented itself to me
Illustration 20: GIF frames of Lava-land. Graphic by author; GIF by Emma Neumeyer
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4.4.3.1. Philosophical Clearings with (hos/bei)Children 
Playing with co-explorers opened up the horizons for me to unstiffen my 
conceptual muscles. I could receive invitations to temporarily be part of an 
immersive lived-experience in co-existing worlds, which my co-explorers 
offered me. As in the case of Captain Duke (Biswas 2017), I experienced 
somehow being and not being in the kitchen at the same time. The expe-
rience is further attributed with indescribability to acknowledge that my lin-
guistic repertoire cannot capture experience completely. Of course, since 
I am not aware of everything, not all concepts through which I make sense 
of my world as a network of meanings can be exhausted. But within the 
scope of my awareness and self-reflection there were plenty opportunities 
that were easily lit up in presence with my co-explorers. These opportu-
nities illuminated the perceived spatio-temporal relationship between my 
self and the surrounding objects. I name these opportunities: philosophical 
clearings.
Philosophical clearings with (hos/bei) children call for relaxing mental 
muscles in a way that can facilitate crossing the borders of one’s taken for 
granted world; subsequently, for experiencing other fleeting, temporal, co-
existing worlds regardless of their contradictory appearances (ibid.).
In everyday life, objects within the scope of one‘s awareness make 
sense within a network of meanings that one experiences as given - in other 
words, that which one takes to be true. For example, the dining table is a 
piece of furniture to sit at, not sit on. The kitchen counter is a place to pre-
pare food which in turn is placed on the dining table. Utensils, appliances 
and so on as well as the space in between the kitchen counter and the dining 
table - all assume meaning in functional relation to each other. This network 
of meanings can be extended to macro and physically absent aspects of 
one‘s world (Heidegger 1977; 1972; 2010). For example, the dining table 
probably came from an IKEA store, where it was bought. It was brought 
there from a factory in a distant nation, which in turn procured raw materials 
such as wood from trees in a forest from another nation. Further, there are 
‚professions‘ and codes of transaction of resources in my world where the 
acts necessary to maintain dining table production are systematically car-
ried out by human beings and other species, and so on. This is one possible 
way which contributes to maintaining the kitchenness of a kitchen one takes 
for granted. While playing, one’s natural attitude of taking the kitchenness 
of a kitchen for granted is put into question. One finds herself in a land of 
lava, where I fly cars in order to rescue them. As a consequence – within 
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the frame of that other spatio-temporality - the distinction between cars 
as play-world things or toys and the kitchen as a real-world thing become 
bleak. The kitchen remains a kitchen and at the same time becomes a play-
world thing, just as the play-world things remain play-world things and at 
the same time become a real-world thing. In so far as one flies planes with 
her body making accompanying onomatopoeic sounds - one’s body is not 
only a doer of kitchen-world acts, instead it is also the doer of for e.g. lava-
land acts (Biswas 2017).
As with Captain Duke, the playfully-constructed worlds I was invited 
into by co-explorers Enaya, Emma, Ole, Finn, Thor, Amelie, Gullveig and 
Aida, opened up the opportunity for me to see the arbitrariness of what I 
usually perceived as a kitchen or a playground or bathroom or bedroom and 
so on. In other words, they were possibilities for me to participate in other 
conceptions of concepts which are an integral part of the way I interact with 
the world, i.e. network of meanings, that I find myself in everyday. I describe 
this as: ‘embodied thought experiments in motion’. During such temporary, 
embodied thought experiments in motion, tools of thinking are toys that 
enable one to toy with taken for granted meanings.
4.4.3.2. Toys are Tools for Toying with Meaning
Philosophising entails fantasy. Fantasy here does not refer to a specific 
genre of fantasising as in tales about fairies, mermaids and unicorns, alt-
hough from the perspective of childism it does include them. Simply kee-
ping a normalised everyday life going, requires embodied participation 
in collective fantasies such as the idea of Time, which remains an eternal 
mystery for philosophers. A collective fantasy of time according to specific 
clocks and calendars makes daily functioning possible globally. Practices 
such as Daylight Saving Time (DST) in the Continent and Scandinavia make 
it possible simply to turn the clock an hour here and there, and entire nati-
ons and economic sectors, including the education sector, from one day to 
the next, simply go on with mundane, seasonal lives, believing that Time 
has been ‘gained’ or ‘saved’(!). 
Questioning also requires fantasy insofar as one has to be able to trans-
cend a given realm of taken-for-granted answers in order to simply ask 
“Why not?” or to overcome fortifying questions that block the possibility of 
new questions like “Can one even ask such a question?” 
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During the immersive play encounters, it became evident to me that co-
explorers used toys as extended tools for thinking. Conventionally recog-
nised philosophy uses words and symbols (as in symbolic logic) to deve-
lop ideas. These words and symbols could be understood as abstract tools 
of thinking. In the context of children’s playfully constructed worlds, the 
‘tools’ are in fact material objects which take on different meanings in order 
to construct fleeting, temporal worlds that one can enter and exit. The Eng-
lish word toy is akin to the Norwegian tøy - which can be compounded with 
other concepts to denote specific kinds of tools e.g. verktøy (work tools) 
or leketøy (toys). The Online Etymology Dictionary also presents a similar 
etymological link with an older form of contemporary Norwegian i.e. the 
Danish word tøj57. Perhaps it is not just a coincidence that these concepts 
are intertwined across these languagescapes.
The following pages illustrate some fleeting moments where co-explo-
rers used toys as tools to toy with meanings: 
57 http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=toy [23/06/2019]
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Illustration 21: Baking in the Kitchen
Illustration 22: Our City Kingdom
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Illustration 23: Tiger Snail
Illustration 24: Flying to Norway Land
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Illustration 25: Poor Woman Cooking
Illustration 26: The World Drowns in Lava
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4.4.3.3.  Relationality: Thinking and letting think  
from and for both sides
 
Thinking is literally and figuratively bound to taking certain positions. It is 
happening both within and with the body.
In many ways the fundamental existential question of being (and simul-
taneously being-with) in the world is inseparably connected to and boils 
down to questions of doing, for example:
 
What shall I/we do?
Why shall I/we do it?
How shall I/we do it?
Where shall I/we do it?
What shall I/we not do?
Why shall I/we not do it?
How shall I/we not do it?
Where shall I/we not do it?
 
… and so on, in relationality with others who are experiencing similar ques-
tioning. 
Further variations of questions of doing can also be grasped in different for-
mulations expressed in a variety of tenses and moods e.g. past and future 
tenses, conditional variations or subjunctive moods. This is not to say that 
every act performed requires explicit articulation of these questions. It is 
to suggest that questions of doing in various forms are relationally alive 
throughout one’s life course. 
Moreover, while not every act performed through basic bodily  postures 
such as sitting, standing and laying down is always done consciously58 - 
these basic bodily postures and their variations are steered and formed in 
and over time by one’s philosophical pre-understandings whether or not, it 
seems, one is aware of them. The natural attitude or that which one takes 
for granted applies not only to concepts at an intellectual level, but also to 
how the concepts become embodied and are repeatedly performed mani-
festing one’s mundane every-day self and the roles one performs. If one 
has to do something with somebody, it implies co-negotiating embodied 
58 Although in principle the possibility exists. 
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meanings as well. Something as basic as sitting still - whether in order to 
have a ‘philosophical’ dialogue as in PC practices or to eat at a table – is 
up for negotiation in a child-adult dynamic. The posture refers to a picture 
one has of what it means to be human in a particular society and also as an 
extension how new citizens in a particular society ought to be-have. 
An illustrative example was the repeated conflicting interactions of adult 
caregivers struggling to get co-explorers to sit and eat at a table instead 
of running around while intermittently eating. In some cases, they would 
negotiate why they could not sit on or under the table and eat. Hypotheti-
cally speaking, while one question arising on part of the adult could be: why 
doesn’t she just sit at the table on a chair and eat? A corresponding possible 
question on the other side was: why do I always have to sit at the table on a 
chair and eat? 
The comparatively stiff adult mind-body doesn’t easily surrender to the 
latter question and holds onto the particular psycho-physical position. While 
there may of course be biological limitations to arriving at the kind of agi-
lity and flexibility the child counterparts can perform, the possibility to put 
oneself in different positions for different activities adheres rather to what it 
means for a particular person to be an adult in a particular lifeworld. Playing 
with children can be demanding but, as my hosts, co-explorers were taking 
my limitations into account so I could play along on their terms.
In playing with the co-explorers I often sensed that they took me into 
consideration as they improvised further59. While being a guest in the child’s 
playfully constructed world was a deliberate undertaking, this implied for 
the exploration that my co-explorers were actively and empathetically hos-
ting me so as to include me. 
Here too, an aspect of relationality in thinking together came to the fore. 
By ‘thinking’ I mean the embodied processes of thinking, which include 
bodily motions. The pluralistic relationality in thinking that occurred by put-
ting myself in a guest position and allowing myself to be hosted by my co-
explorers manifested a spatio-temporality wherein both sides were simul-
taneously thinking and letting think from and for the other side. I had of 
course deliberately given room for co-explorers to negotiate what should 
be done with the body at what point in order to continue playing. 
On my side, a large part of it was facilitated by imitating bodily move-
ments of the smaller embodied host side and being put into positions both 
figuratively and literally that did not make sense or felt ‘awkward’, ‘absurd’ 
59 Enaya’s response in the following section confirmed this aspect in my view.
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and ‘boring’ in my ‘bigger’ picture. While for me this contributed to the 
experience of unstiffening conceptual muscles, it also entailed that my phy-
sical muscles were also relaxing. The experience was akin to when I learned 
to ‘walk for the first time’ as the supra-adult Majestic Lady on Stilts in Italy 
during the embryological phases.
There were moments where a very symmetrical physical coordination in 
my bodily movements with co-explorers was also externally visible, as for 
example while playing Escaping the Tower, in Fieldnotes from Trondheim 
(Biswas 2017a):
In lieu of a conventional single-authored discussion section, in what fol-
lows i.e. Phase 3 of this study, I present selected parts of the retrospective 
discussion that took place in the post-empirical phase with Enaya Mubasher 
in the Child and Youth Seminar at the Department of Education and Lifelong 
Learning at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology in Trond-
heim in March 201760.
60 Conf. https://www.ntnu.edu/ipl/sipp/child-and-youth
Illustration 27: Symmetrical bodily movements during immersive play
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4.5. Phase 3: Retrospections with Enaya 
When I was past the stages of immersive playing, I assumed that that would 
be the end of muddling through with my interlocutors and co-explorers. 
Usually, at this point one should go back to a room and look at ‘data’ and 
carry out analysis taking a distance from the lifeworld and the beings in it. 
However, in Summer 2016, Enaya with the help of her mother contacted 
me via Skype and expressed an interest in wanting to remain involved in 
my project. “Is there something more I can still do?” she had asked me. As 
a researcher of childhood, who aligned with the childhood studies position, 
following the UNCRC, that children have the right to participate in know-
ledge production about their lives, I couldn’t simply say “No, it doesn’t work 
like that.” I could muddle forward a little bit more. 
Enaya and I continued meeting on Skype and I began sharing with her 
mainly the difficulties that I was facing in writing ‘what I had learnt from 
our ‘projects’. Apart from the aspect that academic dissemination of work 
involving children remains a challenge, the question was “How shall I write 
in words what cannot be written about so my teachers and adult peers can 
understand?” 
“Use pictures to show them, maybe you can draw something,” Enaya 
advised me. This particular input became a deciding factor in the presen-
tation of the work in a text format. I also began looking into possibilities of 
co-authoring an article with Enaya, who had started sharing her memories 
of what we did via email, which she had by this time began to use actively 
. As a former interlocutor and co-explorer, she had something to say and 
wanted to. Enaya was eager to go to places where I go to talk about our pro-
jects. So we attempted a joint application for an international conference 
on new directions in PC that took place in the Continent, but our applica-
tion failed to secure a funded place in the main programme. We were given 
the possibility to be part of the non-funded after-programme, but I could 
not manage to procure travel funds for both Enaya and me. This left Enaya 
disappointed, and she was shocked that our project had not made it. On 
this particular aspect of muddling through, I regret having put Enaya in that 
position. However, the Child and Youth Seminar at the Department of Edu-
cation and Lifelong Learning, where I was a regular affiliated guest resear-
cher, expressed an interest in the project and offered us a date in their sche-
dule. 
The Child and Youth Seminar is a regular interdisciplinary research forum 
for researchers interested in child and youth related work. In our presenta-
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tion, we opened with me giving a brief introduction of PC practices, follo-
wed by co-presenting what we had done, me presenting some insights that 
emerged, and followed by Enaya leading a playshop for the adult resear-
chers in the room. In simple words, we all played in the research forum. 
After this, we opened the floor for questions, selected parts of which are 
presented below. 
In reading the following transcript sections, the status of the transcript 
is not that of data to be analysed, but rather to be read as a multi-autho-
red, as opposed to a single-authored, community of inquiry, where crucial 
aspects of doing research with children and resulting issues are raised. The 
concerns are raised in reference to the particular muddling through of this 
project, but in our common understanding applied to research with children 
in general.
Illustration 28:  Child and Youth Seminar 2017, Norwegian University of Science  
and Technology
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Researcher 2: Hello, uhm, I was just wondering what it feels like to 
have these play research encounters with Tanu, uh, like what you 
were thinking when she comes, if you want to teach her something or 
do you want to just, like what are you thinking when …
 
Enaya: Like, I’m thinking like from both sides like I want to help Miss 
Tanu with her studies also and I also want to, uhm, play with, like, get 
better at playing and see how it is to play with grown-ups because 
grown-ups don’t usually play like my mum and dad they don’t play. 
But like my little brother he wants to play, yeah … Anyone?
Researcher 3: You say, uhm, Miss Tanu just disappeared61, right? 
From, uh, the kindergarten and, uhm, nobody gave you the notice.
 
Enaya: Mhm (affirmative). Yeah, it was like I was also like very little 
because I usually didn’t know when people disappeared, so then I 
couldn’t understand anything then. (Video break, confidential discus-
sion ) … Yes?
 
Researcher 4: I know that Tanu comes to you and you discussed 
different things, so are there things .. that is boring or maybe it’s not, 
you should be thinking of that or it’s something you know that you 
don’t like?
 
Enaya: Uhm, I sometimes think like wonder like those science thing 
because I’m not like used to science so when I, uhm, just think it’s 
boring so when I . I like (inaudible) but I think it’s a bit boring that they 
start doing that things so I don’t get bored while I’m listening, so I do 
like really many things at one time.
 
Researcher 4: I can see you put lots of efforts, it’s a good work, uh, 
but is there something that you want to tell Tanu, you know you should 
be doing this rather than doing this boring stuff?
 
61 Conf section 4.2.5 of the embryological phase. Enaya is till date not aware of the reasons 
for my or the unexplained departures of others who were then in similar positions like me.
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Enaya: Uhm no, but because that is like studying, like for example if I 
don’t like school so much but if I like go because I want to play and if 
I learn at home I get better at school so studies are important even if 
they are really boring.
Listener 4: (laughing) Very boring.
 
Enaya: (looking at another listener) Yes?
 
Researcher 5: It’s so interesting listening to you. Now I was just won-
dering about the playing thing is it, because you said that grown-ups 
don’t usually play but you play with Miss Tanu. Does it differ after you 
played with her when you play with other kids? Is it different like, do 
you play differently now you think?
 
Enaya: Uhm not like connected with Miss Tanu, uhm, like, uhm, 
because I’m getting bigger then we play like not so, like with toys, we 
climb trees, run around and jump off big stones and we do like a bit, 
hard things but with Miss Tanu we do like the old stuff that I used to do.
 
(Tanu and the Listeners start laughing)
 
Researcher 5: (To Tanu) So Miss Tanu should start jumping off rocks 
and do hard play as well maybe?
 
Tanu: (laughing) I try.
 
Researcher 6: Sometimes we take it just so for granted you know it’s 
a, I mean they really do the hard things like they climb trees or …
 
Tanu: No, it’s like, for me I am aware that we do the old things (laughs) 
like I can’t catch up with you (towards Enaya), you know all the time 
and it’s a, during the research I saw and I feel the difference of course, 
uhm, myself so then I try to see if I can fit into the game, in my way, 
you know? Which is also comfortable for me because I, we were in the 
park this, the, we were in this park and we were playing escaping the 
like this, tower, I mean we had to do a lot of (makes wave motion with 
her hands) which was much easier for you, but this, getting caught in 
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like spider webs and stuff my body hurt the next day it was like, it was 
a bit like going to a yoga or gymnastics or something and all happe-
ning because there is an idea in the mind and the body is following.
 
Enaya: Because like, when I’m getting older like if I see like when I 
was in kindergarten I saw like other big children like climbing trees up 
to the top and, like last year at school this happened that uhm there 
was a boy who climbed up all the way up the tree I was just staring at 
him when can I do that, when can I do that? (crowd laughs) But then 
afterward I saw that he was, he wa- he couldn’t even come down the 
tree so then the teacher went up to carry him (crowd goes ‘ooh’) and 
he was like in tenth grade or so (crowd laughs). And he would say like, 
mum help me and he was almost like falling down so some things are 
too hard for me and some things I’m getting better. Like my friends 
uhm who had broken their bone or something like that once in their 
life they, uhm, were yesterday we had like a big stone in our school 
and there was really much ice and then they would go and do gym-
nastics off that steep stone so that was really a hard game. And then 
we called that game survival course. And we must try to survive..
 
Researcher 5: Can I ask another question? (Enaya nods) When you 
play with Miss Tanu is it also with like the philosophizing like, I mean 
do you talk while you’re playing or is it just the playing?
Enaya: It’s playing and like a quarter or tenth that we are talking. But 
we are mostly playing. 
Researcher 5: And what are you talking about?
 
Enaya: Uhmm we talk about like a game or so and sometimes well 
we have like a break when we’re playing and then we talk a bit about 
what’s going to happen. Like yesterday we were playing a lot and then 
afterwards we stopped playing and then we went to practice for this 
(drinks from a cup).
 
Researcher 3: Tanu, are there also other children that you play with 
besides Enaya?
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Tanu: Uh yeah, yeah. There are other, there are uh one is around 
Enaya’s age and she has a younger sister as well so I played with them 
together and the sister was in kindergarten and school here. Then 
there is another child pair again it’s two brothers. So I started play-
ing with the brother before and he’s about five uh yeah in kindergar-
ten but the, while I, this is also a child I know for a long time and in the 
course of when I knew the child the baby brother came as well and 
then just started like joining and so this pair, I just look at it as one pair 
now, and uh there’s another boy who’s four uh, yeah that’s, and one 
more girl, I played with.
 
Researcher 5: Can I just ask one more question? When you were 
interviewing each other you told us that it’s very important to have 
other people’s perspective and there are different sights to stories. Is 
that something you’ve talked about or is that something you just sort 
of know or talked about with your parents or..
 
Enaya: Uhm that I actually learned in first grade because our 
school has like units and there are difficult words and then we learn 
their meanings but sometimes I can’t keep the meanings but some 
words only when I practice them they (makes downward hand 
motion) stay.. 
 
Tanu: I would like to add something to the word perspective because 
it was actually the first time that you used it yesterday and I was like, 
what is she, yeah like we were practicing that we can do this part like 
an interview and then Enaya just said, yeah now we’re going to this 
and we can get the other perspective, and I was like, what did you just 
say there? uh and then I asked her where she learned the word and 
she said it was in school and uh what you (towards Enaya) actually just 
pointed out was you know that, if you don’t practice it you lose the 
meaning and like, so for me in a way I’m lucky that she got the word in 
school so we can practice the meaning like it gets easier because uh I 
was telling Enaya this morning that it’s a very, very important word for 
social science. well any science like perspective is ,uhm, and so it’s 
great that you know how to use the word.
167
 
Researcher 4: Yeah you know in science it’s very much like this adult 
thinking that is, uh, is it really uh I, I think that is it really children thin-
king that they should have others perspective because it is what 
they’re learning or we teach children actually because she learned it 
from school, she learned it from elders, grown-ups that you should 
learn other’s perspective , so you know if you, uh, where is child’s own 
thinking they, because they learn it from school, they learn it maybe 
at home but you know sometimes if you don’t teach them than that 
mean, for example I have experience with my children the, my second 
year old she say that, I know better than you, because she for some of 
things then she, it’s, then I think it’s maybe now, it’s purely her thing 
it’s yeah because you know this is very much your, our education 
which really teach children, so I don’t know really where is this child’s 
own perspective , the perspective of child.
 
Tanu: (towards Enaya) You understand the question?
 
Enaya: (nods)
 
Researcher 4: Uuh
 
Tanu: You want me to answer because I.. /Researcher 4: No./
 
Tanu: (towards Enaya) Do you wanna say something about that?
 
Enaya: Mmh. Yeah I think it’s also like if you do this perspective it’s like 
if the grown-ups teach the smaller ones, like if they tell like, somet-
hing like, if I, someone just told me a weird perspective then I should, 
like sometimes the child finds, like if my mum says find, the teacher 
said to find the table so my mum said uh you do the nine times table 
and then I found a pattern that my mum and parents didn’t, know, 
even if they taught me it, (Listener laughs) Children find out things 
themselves.
 
Researcher 4: Yeah this is very good that you know. Children should, 
children’s own thinking. their own thoughts should ,they, i-it’s just 
equally important not that I, yeah,
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Researcher 5: I sort of, tend to disagree a bit because what is an own 
thinking because we’re all part of, you know you have your parents 
and a brother and I have my people around me as well you’re never, 
that’s something that just doesn’t come from just inside and I mean, 
to say that, well I mean how else are you going to sort of, be in the 
world if you’re not influenced by these people around you. And I don’t 
think that necessarily has anything to do with age or where it comes 
from, It’s just we’re all part of something and you can’t ..
 
Tanu: Yeah (looks at Enaya)
Researcher 5: Do you understand?
 
Tanu: (to Enaya) Is there anything, like do you think there is like your 
own thinking or is there something like one’s own thinking?
 
Enaya: Like it’s actually I’m thin-, I’m like thinking of both things 
because sometimes there is, with other people and sometimes there 
are only your person- , it’s only like one person and sometimes there 
are like really many people.
 
Researcher 4: I agree with these things you know, this children’s agency 
thing, where do you border that, because everywhere you go, you are 
in a system, where do you border that you know? So how much influ-
ence or how much maybe fortune you take from others or how much 
freedom they have to express their own thinking or maybe whatever 
they want to. So this, you know this border thing is, it’s uh important.
 
Researcher 5: I suggest that there is no such thing as your own thinking.
 
Tanu: I mean it, I’m having, this uh this, like I have this question a lot 
also with Enaya. Like I don’t know in, like of course in the end I will 
submit this as my doctoral research you know but it’s actually really 
difficult for me to, show clearly the points because I don’t know if it’s 
my thinking, like of course I’m making something of the theories I 
know, but what has emerged like it’s very difficult to say, was it like 
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Enaya or me or also the other children that I played with because there’s 
so much coming from the other side and it’s not just like I’m the rea- 
, you know so, I don’t know if it is my thinking either, you know? So I 
don’t, I mean I, one question is for the child participants but the other is 
also for me because I’m doubting this a lot. And it’s feeling really weird 
that I’m going to submit this as my thinking or my work whereas it’s like 
you know (uh), like I mean also you (looking at Enaya) you’ve like con-
tributed so much to it and…
 
Researcher 3: This opens up a whole range of issues to do with also 
like in methodology, in who owns what is produced from, from the 
search but I, we, we have, I’m not sure if we have opened up for that 
discussion right here and now but, but one thing that I really found 
interesting from what Enaya said is uhm, her mum and the teachers 
teach them something but she finds a pattern that they have no clue 
about. That she is part and parcel of, she has her own thoughts but at 
the same time she also identifies her own recognizing of things in the 
world that is how, unique, And I think that this is the core of what we 
call a child’s perspective, that there is a perspective. That a human 
being, a person, holds. That I think is a very central thing, that you 
should develop further. Really, serious!
 
Tanu: Yeah, we should develop that further (looking at Enaya)
 
Enaya: Yeah and , like if, uh, because grownups just don’t like usually 
do like, children if they want to have their own language like making up 
strange words than uhm maybe if they find a word and then if they put it 
on Google search than maybe there comes a meaning of it, So the child 
has found something out and without even noticing it. Then maybe that 
like, I learned about like Vincent Van Gogh he like, or Leonardo DaVinci 
he did like, he put a mark on this as my thing and you can’t use this 
thing as your own thing. So maybe that would be your special thing that 
you find it and you get better at your work.
 
Researcher 5: What you were saying about your doctor like, and-and 
you were talking about the network of meanings and how networks 
of meanings change and I don’t understand this as a problem like is it 
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me or is it her or the kids. It’s a co-production /Tanu: Yeah, Yeah./ of 
knowledge and that’s not, I mean I think that’s a good thing because 
like for my perspective and how I view, you know, truth in the world is 
that, no man is an island and we’re not, I don’t have my own perspec-
tive that’s just mine because I have been influenced with my culture, 
my history, my family, my friends, what I read online, everything! It’s 
nothing that’s just individually just by myself, All parts of me are a co-
production of, and this is sort of where I come from the actor-network 
theory as well is the co-production of meanings and so. I don’t think 
that would be a problem.
 
Tanu: No it’s not / Researcher 5: Because where did it come from?/ 
Tanu: But then in the end like there would, there’s a product / Resear-
cher 5: Yeah / Tanu: so when that book is printed it has like, uh, my name 
on it and then it looks like it’s, you know me but it’s actually not and, you 
know this, that’s how / Researcher 5: But it never is / it never is of course 
but then like we, I mean at the end it’s like I will, also you know like I will 
defend my thesis but actually like we’ve done the work together and the 
thing is because Enaya doesn’t have an institutional affiliation like, I do 
and she is too, (simulates quotation marks with fingers) she can’t sign 
up for a doctoral trial right now but I would feel like, I mean that she is ...
 
(Enaya has been raising her hand for some seconds)
 
(Tanu signalizes that she can talk now)
 
Enaya: Yeah and I mean, but what if you, if you feel like that way we 
should do this thing that you feel? You should, maybe you could write 
other people’s name also, and you wouldn’t, because if it’s your stu-
dies then you choose it but they can’t like choose if there you’re sup-
posed to have your name not others.
 
Tanu: Well sometimes they can. I have to listen to them too you know? 
Because they will give me the certificate so there are some things I 
can try to do different but some things I must, if I want that certificate 
(uh) I just have to …
 
Enaya: (nods) Ok.
171
 The discussion with the community of the Child and Youth Seminar 2017 
marked the end of the project, insofar as it opened up questions that came 
to the fore62, after having muddled through by ontologically validating the 
other temporal sides through pluralism. 
Having done that, it was the moment to return afresh to where I star-
ted, after having been somewhere else. Communities like the Child and 
Youth Seminar 2017, essentially adult communities of inquiry on mat-
ters of children and childhood, are where further dialogues on the pleni-
tude of new questions are being taken up. Such discussions may not yet 
be prepared to include child participation to the extent that is desired. 
But that the desirability of including children’s voices in adult epistemo-
logical quests is present is a promising sign for future directions of broa-
dening the scope of including children in knowledge production concer-
ning their lifeworlds. 
In the case of the work at hand, I will now proceed to return to where I 
started and attempt, in light of an overheating world, to answer the cen-
tral question:
What is the scope for the philosophical blossoming of adults when they 
enter children’s playfully constructed worlds?
But, before moving to concluding section, I present a brief summary of the 
phases of exploration. 
 
4.6. Summary
Initially, I was looking for something that would give child participants more 
room to exercise their interpretive philosophical agency and negotiate phi-
losophical questioning with adult counterparts. Major critiques of adult-
positionality in PC, especially the critique of white reason-ability, resonated 
with what Svendsen had to tell me about the contemporary problem of the 
white hereditary perspective in the Norwegian educational context and the 
62 For similar ongoing discussions regarding children’s participation in the childhood 
studies paradigm also conf. Barker and Weller 2005; Weller 2006, O’Kane 2000; 
Punch 2002; Clark 2017; Clark & Moss 2001; Christensen & James 2008; Burke 
2005; Greenfield 2004; Hart 1997; Lancaster and Broadbent 2003; Kellett 2004; 
2005; 2010; Gallacher and Gallagher 2008; Warming 2011; Nairn et al. 2007; 
Deszcz-Tryhubczak et al 2018, accepted draft version;Ennew Judith et al. 
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consequent need for a plural understanding of knowledge. The privilege to 
presume that one does not need to learn from other people is not simply 
a matter of colour but is, at a more fundamentally existential level, a privi-
lege that comes with age. The stiff adult position was what both Sungjae’s 
alternative class-based philosophy curriculum as well as PC community of 
inquiry practices shared in common. 
In the light of philosophy with children in an overheated global context, 
and as Kennedy and Kohan (Kennedy & Kohan 2016; Kohan 2014; Kohan 
2011) had pointed out, it was time to ask what philosophy and education 
can learn from children and childhood. 
Muddling through with children as interlocutors, I treated the research 
as experimentation (Gallacher & Gallagher 2008), to the extent that, alt-
hough I had a research interest, I hesitated to fix a question which was not 
influenced by my interlocutors. One would not call this a systematic enga-
gement with a problem, but rather delving into a mystery (Marcel 1949: 
117). And that, after the failure of the tea party experiment, became an 
immersion in the mystery of play. Until the failure of the tea party, I had not 
questioned sitting and talking as The form of philosophising with children. 
The purposeful methodologically immature direction (Gallacher & 
Gallagher 2008) created the possibility to allow being influenced by inter-
locutors, who in phase two took on the role of co-explorers. In the process 
of getting to know my own ignorance, I also discovered that the promising 
continental phenomenological tradition I placed faith in, had itself syste-
matically ignored the play of children (Wall 2013; 2011). Traces of tra-
ditional Western approaches in philosophy of education, i.e. Kant’s top-
down approach, Rousseau’s bottom up approach or Lock’s developmental 
approach, could be found in phenomenologists of play like Heidegger, 
Gadamer, Derrida and Kearney (ibid.)
Childism, which builds upon the phenomenological tradition, unders-
tands philosophy as play. The moment one accepts this, the authority of 
the adult dissolves since children are better than adults at playing. Con-
sequently, it is not the child, but the adult who is the default addressee 
of pedagogy. 
Subsequently, I chose to enter into immersive play with children as co-
explorers who would lead the way in what they were best at - playing. That 
would in turn lead to philosophising. But not as I believed I knew it.
Especially following the realisation of the importance of breathing in 
tuning with children that I had found with Baby Ole, and Irigary’s critique 
of the forgotten breath of phenomenology (Irigary 1999), I drew upon the 
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Eastern kin of continental phenomenology i.e. Buddhist mindfulness tech-
niques (Gokhale 2018). Specifically, I drew upon the Vipassana tradition in 
order to maintain the breath as a constant point of return. In addition, I used 
Jaina pluralism as an analytical fall back for the moments where I could not 
maintain the spatio-temporal bracketing of the graspable natural world that 
I was going to carry out while immersively playing. 
Playing with co-explorers opened up the horizons for me to unstiffen 
my conceptual muscles. The role of fantasy, not just in terms of counter-
factual thinking, but also in terms of what questions may be asked and by 
whom, came to the fore. 
I discovered that, in the context of children’s playfully constructed 
worlds, tools are all material objects which take on diverse meaning in 
order to construct fleeting, temporal worlds that one can enter and exit. In 
other words, playing is embodied thought experiment in motion.
Philosophical clearings with (hos/bei) children call for the unstiffening 
of conceptual muscles in a way that facilitates crossing the borders of 
one’s taken for granted world; subsequently, they urge one to experience 
other fleeting, temporal, co-existing worlds regardless of their contradic-
tory appearances. 
Lastly, having positioned myself as an ignorant guest, an element of 
relationality became obvious, since in letting my co-explorers think for me, 
they also thought from my side in order to accommodate me. 
The concluding retrospective discussion with researchers of the Child 
and Youth Seminar 2017 with Enaya Mubasher was a form of collec-
tive retrospection on the process. Enaya was someone who had agreed 
to muddle through with me even before I began muddling through syste-
matically. Entering a particular community of inquiry of adult researchers 
of childhood and youth with Enaya helped me to return to where I started, 
having been somewhere else. 
Going back to Svendsen’s observation (2014; personal communication) 
that the white hereditary perspective of the Norwegian educational context 
needs a plural concept of knowledge, which appreciates that two things can 
be the case at the same time. Furthermore, adult teachers have to risk their 
own position and authority and surrender to a process of becoming in a way 
that one let’s one’s worldview change in the classroom (ibid.). I respond 
by saying that such processes can well happen outside the spatio-tempo-
rality of schooling in most mundane spaces like kitchens, bathroom, and 
playgrounds too, because in taking something as mundane as the kitchen-
ness of a kitchen for granted, one has already moved away from plurality. 
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Philosophising with (hos/bei) children can thus be a way towards a lived-
experience of plurality. As the old Portuguese proverb summarises: 
Mais descobre huma hora de jogo, que hum anno de conversação.
(An hour of play discovers more than a year of conversation). 
(Bohn 281:1857; translation by author)
From a childist perspective, however, play would have to be grasped in the 
sense of brincar or å leke. 
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5. Outro
On an overheated planet (Eriksen 2016), where children from the highest-
scoring countries on the Human Development Index challenge their default 
positions as ‘pupils’ (Thunberg 2019; Su & Su 2019; Straume 2019) - 
it is time that everyday adult philosophers ask what they can learn from 
children and childhood. In theory, the question has already been raised 
in the overlapping fields of philosophy and education (Kennedy & Kohan 
2016; Storme & Vlieghe 2011). Nevertheless, in the practical realm of 
pedagogy of philosophy, owing to rigid adult positionalities (Reed-Sand-
oval & Sykes 2017) embedded in white reason-ability (Chetty 2018), this 
remains a challenge. Adopting a childist understanding of philosophy as 
play (Wall 2013) offers a possibility to overcome rigid adult positionali-
ties. The childist understanding understands philosophy/play as belon-
ging to the ontological structure of being human, not as a particular kind 
of activity or disposition. 
Philosophy/play, as belonging to the ontological structure of being 
human, refers to our interpretive agency i.e. how we co-construct net-
works of meanings wherein we dwell. Our interpretive agency has a signi-
ficant role in how, why and when we inter-act with objects around us. From 
the moment of waking to the minute we fall asleep, the way we exist in the 
world as a result of our choices and movements is to a large extent deter-
mined by our interpretations. Rigid adult positionalities occur as a result 
of taking for granted that our interpretive co-constructions are singularly 
real. By rigidity, I do not refer solely to intellectual rigidity. I instead emp-
hasise the accompanying embodied rigidity of the body and as a corol-
lary - what we habitually do with it. Similarly, grasping philosophy as play 
implies simultaneously grasping that philosophical processes cannot be 
reduced to logo-centric intellectual capacities. Playing with networks of 
meanings around us and the creative capacity to transform the world one 
dwells in constitutes philosophical processes. Hence, performing embo-
died thought experiments in motion is understood as a philosophical acti-
vity that can support adults to unstiffen their conceptual muscles. Perfor-
ming embodied thought experiments in motion e.g. using a ‘kitchen’ as a 
‘lavaland’, opens up the possibility of temporarily suspending one’s natu-
ral attitudes and living counter-factualities. Suspension unbars the possi-
bility for counterfactual experiences not just interpretations of what one 
encounters, but most importantly one’s self-understanding and what fol-
lows. Who one believes one is; how one actualises all that one believes 
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she is; what one claims to know with certainty; what and how one values; 
the mundane bodily ways through which one actualises their self-inter-
pretative beliefs - are just a few abstract extrapolations of what constitu-
tes our natural attitudes. Along with these extrapolations, there are also 
the accompanying logical justifications i.e. the ‘whys’ that one integra-
tes into her self-interpretations and their embodied actualisations. Furt-
hermore, there are emotional states that accompany the actualisations. 
Momentary suspension of the caregiver role in a ‘kitchen’ in order to fly 
cars in a ‘lavaland’ also implies a momentary suspension of all the mun-
dane embodied actualisations that accompany it. For most adults it is 
challenging to momentarily suspend their taken-for-granted network of 
meanings. However, it is precisely in children’s seemingly effortless capa-
city for momentary suspension in order to construct fleeting counterfac-
tual realities, that the transformative philosophical wealth for adults can 
be found. 
We, the everyday philosophers who have achieved the legal and social 
status of adulthood in the post-colonial overheated world, with our deeply 
embodied adultism (Speier, in Stolnick 1976; Flascher 1978), are confron-
ted with our own rigid natural adult attitudes (Waksler 1986; 1991; 1996). 
In turn the possibilities of our own philosophical blossoming, which could 
eventualise in a free relationship with our temporal others (Beauvais 2018), 
are inhibited. By freedom I mean freedom from the internalised adultist 
barriers which impede us from opening up to the subtle, yet powerful philo-
sophical complexities of children and childhood. 
The everyday adult philosopher seems to have become a bit too 
comfortably numbed with their epistemological privilege, regardless 
of racialised skin colour and gendered genitalia bestowed upon us. An 
epistemological privilege which gives us the freedom to teach the default 
addressees of pedagogy; the freedom to objectively observe and 
train our temporal others as scholarly and social objects. Moreover, an 
epistemological privilege that gives the freedom to ontologically invalidate 
the pluralistic fleeting worlds that not only exist, but have something 
valuable to contribute to the philosophical blossoming of the contempo-
rary everyday adult philosophers.
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
has systematically acknowledged the vital role of philosophical education 
for world peace and to prepare everyone to shoulder responsibilities in the 
face of the greatest challenges of the contemporary world, especially in 
the ethical realm (Goucha 2007). The educational agendas, policies and 
implementations that followed thereof - have categorically focused on trai-
ning adults to teach children how to philosophise, often simulating ‘sit-n-
talk’ adult democratic parliamentary models, for instance, the Lipmanian 
community of inquiry. 
Furthermore, the international organisation categorically upholds the 
right to philosophy for all (Goucha 2017). Despite the voiced ethical desi-
rability of a right to philosophy for all, children remain philosophically cons-
trained as default addressees of pedagogy in general, and pedagogy of phi-
losophy in particular. Contemporary research such as that of Gopnik (2009) 
is able to re-cognise the philosophical agency in even babies. Moreover, the 
continental phenomenological tradition, which is a promising alternative to 
deficit-fixated, developmental approach of psychology, is able to re-cog-
nise children’s consciousness as a positive phenomenon (Merleau-Ponty 
2010: 131; Bahler on Merleau-Ponty 2015; Welsh on Merleau-Ponty 
2013). Unfortunately, the philosophical agency of small children remains 
neglected in terms of its philosophical worth for big adults. As observable 
in the UNESCO report on the pedagogy of philosophy (Goucha 2007), the 
value of philosophising as a pedagogical response to accelerating times of 
Anthropocene Neoliberalism (Eriksen 2016) is expressed in terms of adults 
teaching how to philosophise and not themselves learning to philosophise 
with (Norwegian: hos/ German: bei) children. 
Having been through this hybridic, nomadic phenomenological investi-
gation into what doing philosophy with children could be like, I think that the 
crux of the problem is the identification of sitting and talking as The form of 
philosophising. Needless to say, as soon as linguistic competence is iden-
tified with The form of philosophising, adults have the upper hand. Howe-
ver, if, as childism proposes, we view philosophy as play and play as philo-
sophy (Wall 2011; 2013) - ignorance, incompleteness and immaturity of 
the embodied adult is unveiled, whereby the epistemological authority of 
the everyday adult philosopher simply dissolves. Subsequently, philosophi-
sing/playing itself becomes a process of muddling through (Gallacher and 
Gallagher 2018). By play, I mean something akin to the Norwegian verb 
å leke or the Portuguese verb brincar. 
Play/Philosophy as belonging to the ontological structure of what it 
means to be human (Wall 2011; 2013) is then not about solving problems 
that are objectively present before us to analyse and solve, rather a mystery 
to be lived (Marcel 1949) throughout one’s lifespan. By playing with the 
possibilities of what is presented to us in our immediately experienced life-
worlds, we, regardless of age, make sense of our realities. As processes of 
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broadening the horizons of one’s consciousness, when children play/philo-
sophise - they seem to perform embodied thought experiments in motion 
in a way that brings counter-factual spatio-temporalities into the horizons of 
the particular lived experience of that moment. 
Whilst playing/philosophising with (Norwegian: hos/ German: bei) chil-
dren as guests invited into those fleeting micro-worlds which arise and pass 
away in the rigid macro-worlds of adulthood - the adult may experience 
various forms of discomfort owing to their own embodied rigidity. To extend 
Eriksen’s anthropological metaphor of clashing scales (Eriksen 2016), the 
scales that clash here are philosophical, primarily because what the adult is 
being invited to do by their child counterpart may at first not make sense in 
the horizons of their immediately perceived, taken-for-granted lifeworld. To 
avoid this discomfort - phenomenological bracketing performed with bre-
athing as the point of departure and return, coupled with Jaina pluralism as 
an analytical fall back, can help. 
Conventional scholarly and social focus tends to ask - what is it that chil-
dren do? In this case though, the answer is: it is not important what they 
do. Rather, one is invited to broaden the horizons of one’s consciousness to 
accommodate the pluralistic ontological experiences by focusing awaren-
ess on what happens in one’s conscious lived-experience when one plays 
along on their terms. As Merleau-Ponty writes, “In the home into which a 
child is born, all objects change their significance; they begin to await some 
as yet indeterminate treatment at his hands; another and different person is 
there, a new personal history, short or long, has just been initiated, another 
account has been opened.” (Merleau-Ponty in Welsh 2013; 21). 
In case the adult curiosity for grasping what it is that children do remains 
unsatiated, the following words by Welsh illuminate an answer:
“Merleau-Ponty’s view is that children are natural phenomenologists in 
that they remain connected to experience and do not require a resolution in 
theory. Such a perspective is limiting when one is considering ideal and not 
natural objects, but is less likely to sacrifice experience on the altar of con-
sistency. Children explore the world rather than analyse the world. Unlike 
adults, children do not tend to take objects out of their context, or take them-
selves out of context. I can imagine myself somewhere else than where I sit 
at this moment. I’m driving to my house; I’m sitting with my friend on the 
porch. Moreover, I can with a bit more effort imagine that I had an entirely 
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different life. I can speculate on what it would be like, for instance, to grow 
up at the turn of the century on a farm. Yet, it is difficult to really “erase” 
myself, my context, my knowledge, my affections, and my desires and ima-
gine being this other person in an entirely different situation. But telling a 
tale to a child: “Imagine you were born on a farm before electricity!” can 
almost make the child imagine being in a farmhouse but remaining, other-
wise, the same. The child’s reality has a solidity that while not static, can 
appear to be rigid to adults who are indoctrinated in certain philosophical 
and scientific interpretations.” (Welsh on Merleau-Ponty 2013: 110). 
The scope of philosophical blossoming for adults when they play/phi-
losophise with (Norwegian: hos/ German: bei) children is vast. One can-
not provide a standard manual of what this entails, because every playful 
encounter is intersubjectively unique. However, after having been through 
this hybridic, nomadic phenomenological investigation - to a large extent 
by muddling through with Sungjae, Enaya, (Baby) Ole, Emma, Captain 
Duke, Finn, Thor, Amelie, Gullveig and Aida, what I can say with certainty 
is that: there is a vast scope for adults to blossom philosophically with 
children as their primary philosophical guides. In other words, the scope 
of philosophical blossoming for adults is demarcated by the ontological 
validation one is able to allow. 
From the way it looks, this overheated world of acceleration of acce-
leration where one has to constantly scale up, down and sideways bet-
ween the macro and micro scales of one’s lifeworld (Eriksen 2016: 146) is 
unpredictable. It could be that all of us, who are in the same boat divided 
by the same destiny (ibid: 156), might have to be well prepared for uni-
maginable scenarios. Who knows, perhaps as a result of overheating, fish 
might fly and birds might swim, iff they survive. Consequences of over-
heating are unpredictable. 
Playing/Philosophising with children will require us to slow down, scale 
down and cool down more often than we currently manage. The regu-
lar practise of temporarily suspending the natural attitude by performing 
embodied thought experiments in motion with child counterparts enable 
the kind of resilience required to broaden the horizons of adult consci-
ousness. In other words, blossom philosophically. Philosophical capaci-
ties needed to ‘shoulder responsibilities in the face of the greatest chal-
lenges of the contemporary world (Goucha 2007)’ need not be restricted 
to a logo-centric understanding of philosophising. Unpredictable futures 
will require philosophical resilience beyond rational skills, which is best 
trained in the presence of children. For adults in highest-scoring nations 
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on the Human Development Index, this is a more realistic possibility than 
those in the majority world. And it need not cost much. To conclude, in 
case I have not managed to show with words, I follow Enaya’s directive and 
attempt an illustration with a picture, to answer what philosophising with 
children could be for adults: 
Illustration 29:  Azulejo i Lisboa, co-crafted by author in Eglantine&Caroline’s Azulejo 
Workshop, Lisbon 2018
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Glossary of Terms
Adult ideological viewpoint
The common-sensical scholarly standpoint of seeing childhood as an adult-
in-society. Questions raised from this standpoint tend to follow patterns of 
what adults in a given society recognise as worthwhile problems for study. 
The adult ideological viewpoint especially in studies of childhood tends to 
ignore children as interactants and is akin to the developmental attitude 
found in Piaget’s deficit conception of childhood. (Speier 1976) 
Adultism
Implicit biases and behaviours of adults towards children which  resemble 
those exhibited by adults towards other adults of lesser power, that is 
referred to as pseudospeciation, racism, sexism or elitism (Flascher 1978).
Class-based philosophy
Curricularised ways of doing philosophy, based on age-specific, class(room) 
segregated thinking. Class-based philosophy need not necessarily take 
place within the spatio-temporality of schools. Rather it refers to a template 
attitude towards teaching children something philosophical through a curri-
culum designed solely by adults.
Childism
Childism emerges from the interdisciplinary movement in social sciences 
called childhood studies. It is the effort to reimagine and practice child-
inclusive social processes and structures. It aims at treating children as 
scholarly and democratic subjects, insofar as this is possible (conf. Wall 
2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2019).
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Childwork 
Work done by adults on the organisation and control of child activities (conf. 
Oldman 1994).
Child Work
Work done by children.
Education Sector
All parts of global and local, and public and private economies  comprising 
educational institutions e.g. kindergartens, schools, universities, hobby 
classes and learning centres, including human resources employed to 
keep the institutions running. Markets manufacturing scholastic lifestyle 
products including toys intended to educate learners also form part of 
the education sector. Furthermore, related industries such as the health 
sector working to ‘fix problematic learners’ to assimilate into the standard-
ised educational sector may also be counted as part of it.
Fielding
The process through which a thematic or geographical area becomes a field 
for a researcher.
Interpretive reproduction
Socialisation as commonly defined in the childhood studies paradigm. 
Refers to the interpretive approach towards socialisation which emphasises 
children’s active participation in cultural routines through a creative appro-
priation of information from the adult world in order to produce their own 
unique peer cultures. Children perform processes of interpretive repro-
duction to become part of adult culture and contribute to its reproduction 
through negotiations with adults (conf. Corsaro 1993; 1997).
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Islanding of Childhood
The mass-scale modern operations of age-based segregation that give rise to 
forms of separating children’s lifeworlds from those of adults (conf. Gillis 2008).
Minority World 
The highest Human Development Index nations which are demographi-
cally and geographically smaller compared to the Majority World i.e. low 
Human Development Index nations. The terms are considered more accu-
rately descriptive insofar as they describe what the nations are, as opposed 
to what they have or do not have.
Pedagogical Gaze 
An instrumentalising gaze whereby one’s attention is directed towards a 
perceived child counterpart as an ignorant subject in relation to an episte-
mologically superior, knowing self. In turn bestowing a sense of entitlement 
upon the self, to the ignorant other something. Also, an instrumental gaze 
where even scientific attention is directed towards the areas of children’s 
behaviour that guardians tend to focus on. The pedagogical gaze is akin to 
what has been described as the adultist position or adult-ideological posi-
tion (conf. Bluebond-Langner 1978; Flascher 1978; Speier 1976). 
Philosophical commitments
One’s loyalty to assumptions about the triangular scope of philosophy i.e. 
Being (ontology), Doing (ethics) and Knowing (epistemology), whether or not 
one is aware of it. Moreover, the common sense principles of logic one employs 
to work out and find a sense of meaning or make sense of quotidien life, also 
belong to the realm of one’s philosophical commitments. What exists and what 
does not? What is good or bad/right or wrong? Where do these notions come 
from e.g. God/Nature/Society? What is desirable in life? What is knowable? 
What is knowledge? What is truth? Who am I ? What am I doing? What is the 
meaning of (my) life? And so on, are scanty examples of fundamental philoso-
phical questions, one usually has either a reflected or unreflected position on.
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Philosophical clearings
Opportunities of self-reflexivity for adults that are illuminated in the pre-
sence of children, especially whilst playful engagement in the playfully co-
constructed worlds. These opportunities illuminate the taken-for-granted 
relationship between the self and the surrounding objects. Accordingly, 
they give way for broadening the horizons of one’s consciousness. 
World 
A network of meanings. 
Overheating
A macroanthropological description of the present state of globalised 
modernity i.e. the early 21st century Anthropocene Neoliberal world, 
beginning in 1991 with the end of the Cold War. The epoch is characteri-
sed by the acceleration of acceleration and exponential growth. As in phy-
sics - heat and speed are synonymous - the metaphor of overheating refers 
to that velocity and fullness of the current zeitgeist observable in the realms 
of environment, economy and culture. The central double bind of the epoch 
is obtaining between environmental and economic sustainability. A further 
characterisation of the epoch is a systemic clashing of macro and micro 
scales such that a heightened state of vulnerability, lack of trust and awa-
reness of risk is observed in micro-scale responses to macro-scale pheno-
mena (conf. Eriksen 2016).
Unstiffening conceptual muscles
Assuming dynamic psycho-physical stances while playing with children 
such that the borders of one’s taken for granted world (network of mea-
nings) are relaxed and crossed. In turn, opening up to experiencing other 
fleeting and temporal, co-existing worlds regardless of their contradictory 
appearances.
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